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Résumé: Le cyclone Katrina a donné lieu, notamment, à trois grandes enquêtes : Chambre 
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le pilotage de pareils événements. Il s'agit aussi, à chaque fois qu'il apparaîtra 
pertinent et possible, de tenter de prolonger la réflexion proposée pour nous 
préparer aux crises non conventionnelles qui sont désormais notre principal défi.  
 
Abstract: Hurricane Katrina has led to three main inquiries: House of Representatives, 
The White House, the Senate. This study examines the third of these reports. As 
previously done on other official inquiry reports, the goal is to determine and 
clarify the key factual findings and the most stimulating lessons for the handling 
and steerage of such off-the-scale events. Moreover, whenever it seems relevant, 
we try to extend the reflection offered by the report to help prepare for 
unconventional crises which are increasingly our most vital challenge. 
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“We were horrified when the response to the Katrina catastrophe revealed  
– all too often, and for far too long –  
confusion, delay, misdirection, inactivity, poor coordination,  
and lack of leadership at all levels of government.” 
 
“All of this unfolded  
nearly four years after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001;  
after a massive reorganization of federal plans and organizations for disaster response 
and billions of dollars of expenditures;  
and after a closely observed hurricane struck  
when and where forecasters said it would. 
 
We knew Katrina was coming.  
How much worse would the nightmare have been  
if the disaster had been unannounced –  
an earthquake in San Francisco,  
a burst levee near St. Louis or Sacramento,  
a biological weapon smuggled into Boston Harbor,  
or a chemicalweapon terror attack in Chicago? 
 
Hurricane Katrina found us – still – a nation unprepared   
for catastrophe.”  
[note to the readers] 
 
“Avoiding past mistakes will not suffice.  
Our leadership and systems must be prepared for catastrophes we know will be unlike 
Katrina, whether due to natural causes or terrorism.” 
[p. 21] 
 
 
 
 
 
Hurricane Katrina – A Nation Still Unprepared 
Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,  
United States Senate 
May 2006 
 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/FullReport.pdfSommaire 
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Avant-propos 
 
 
Crises : Nouvelles frontières 
 
11-Septembre, Anthrax, 11-Mars 2003 à Madrid, Canicule 2003, Katrina en 2005 – The 
Perfect Storm. Et maintenant, l’éventualité d’une pandémie grippale, la possibilité de 
bouleversements climatiques ou de tout autres « nouvelles donnes » globales.  
 
Les sociétés complexes sont désormais confrontées à des risques et des crises de classe 
nouvelle, sur de multiples fronts, imbriqués. Les niveaux de gravité sont pulvérisés, les théâ-
tres d’opérations plus larges que jamais, les cartes d’acteurs foisonnantes et illisibles, les 
outils de référence ne sont  plus guère pertinents quand on doit traiter de véritables mutations. 
Les institutions, les organisations, arrivent en limite de compétence – placées de plus en plus 
souvent hors domaine de pilotabilité comme on le dirait d’un avion sorti de son domaine de 
vol.  
 
Il convient de prendre toute la mesure des multiples franchissements de seuil dont nous 
sommes les témoins. 1 
• des sauts quantitatifs : l’événement en arrive souvent à peser aussi lourd, ou plus 
encore, que la somme de tous les accidents passés de même nature ;  
• la sur-complexité : c’est la multiplication concomitante de multiples chocs, qui 
traversent les catégories usuelles ;  
• une expertise dépassée : en situation, elle se trouve plongée non plus seulement dans 
l’incertitude, mais bel et bien dans l’ignorance ;  
• l’hyper-connectivité : elle provoque des effets dominos inédits ; 
• la vitesse : elle surclasse tous les dispositifs prévus. Le virus circule à la vitesse du jet, 
ajustant ses déplacements aux facilités offertes par les hubs tarifaires (Toronto, 2003). 
Les grands black-out énergétiques ont raison de la moitié d’un continent en quelque 
vingt secondes (USA-Canada, août 2003). Les industriels de l’informatique soulignent 
qu’un black-out électronique planétaire pourrait se propager en moins d’une minute. 
Or, on le voit à chaque grand choc, le temps de réponse des grandes institutions – sauf 
heureuse exception – varie de 4 jours à deux semaines pour une mobilisation initiale, 
dans le cas des organisations les moins mal préparées ; les autres réagissent encore 
plus lentement – voire ne réagissent tout simplement pas ; 
• des crises de texture : ce ne sont plus des installations spécifiques, ni même des 
infrastructures critiques qui sont en jeu, mais bien les textures profondes de nos 
sociétés, de type organique, avec leurs couplages et maillages serrés, leurs 
interdépendances cachées (cela fut notamment documenté de façon magistrale par Eric 
Klinenberg sur la canicule à Chicago en 19852) ;  
• des crises de conviction : les vraies vulnérabilités ne procèdent plus de simples 
considérations techniques, mais des cultures de nos sociétés face aux risques, de leurs 
                                         
1 Patrick Lagadec : “Crisis Management in the Twenty-First Century, “Unthinkable” Events in “Unthinkable” 
Contexts”, in Dynes, Quarantelli, Rodriguez, Handbook of Disaster Research, Springer, September 2006 ; H. 
Quarantelli, P. Lagadec, A. Boin: “Trans-System Ruptures: The New Disasters and Crises of the 21st Century 
and the Implications for Planning and Managing”, in R. Dynes, H. Quarantelli, H. Rodriguez, Handbook of 
Disaster Research, Springer, September 2006 ; Patrick Lagadec and Erwann Michel-Kerjan : « A New Era Calls 
for a New Model », International Herald Tribune, November 1, 2005.  
2 Eric Klinenberg, Heat Wave, A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago, Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 2002.  
 9 
convictions, et de la façon dont elles formulent leurs peurs ou leurs volontés de relever 
les défis de leur histoire ;  
• des crises de leadership, enfin : dès lors que les règles habituelles ne fonctionnent 
plus, le “management”  ne peut plus suffire. Il faut redonner sens, vision, direction, 
cohérence à des ensembles soudains emportés dans des turbulences non prévues dans 
nos scripts de référence. Sans céder aux illusions et aux dangers de l’homme 
providentiel, il convient cependant de remettre les dirigeants en responsabilité.  
 
Le caractère dominant de ces chocs “hors-cadres” est d’abord la confrontation à 
“l’inconcevable”. Non que les phénomènes en jeu soient par nature impossibles à comprendre 
ou à imaginer, mais parce que les acteurs restent prisonniers de visions, de cloisonnements, 
d’interdits, de modes d’action, qui n’ont pas été pensés pour un monde où dominent la 
surprise, la mutation et le chaotique.  
 
Les acteurs sont violemment projetés dans un autre espace. Leurs repères sont soudainement 
inappropriés. Et lorsque la stratégie est prise en défaut, les défaillances tactiques se 
multiplient. Davantage : le fossé entre les repères habituels et les réalités à traiter est tel que 
les opérateurs subissent d’emblée un phénomène aux conséquences majeures mais le plus 
souvent ignoré : une tétanisation qui bloque les intelligences, la recherche de solutions 
nouvelles, la capacité d’écoute, la volonté de coordination, et même la simple application des 
savoir-faire habituels. Après-coup, toute analyse “au fil de l’eau” ne fait qu’enregistrer des 
motifs de consternation sur le mode : « Comment autant de gens ont-ils pu faire montre d’une 
aussi faible capacité de réaction ? ».  
 
Ces difficultés critiques conduisent au déclenchement d’une dynamique funeste : le désarroi 
des décideurs, la défiance des citoyens, le découplage entre gouvernés et gouvernants. Ce fut 
ainsi le “cyclone” de Madrid en mars 2004 qui emporta le gouvernement Aznar. Ou le cri, 
après Katrina : “Nous avons été abandonnés », « This is not America ! ».  
 
Aucune formule magique – y compris même la référence rituelle au “partenariat public/ 
privé”– ne permet de contourner l’obstacle. Le diagnostic doit être pleinement accepté : pour 
affronter les grandes crises actuelles, faites de discontinuités déconcertantes et de dynamiques 
chaotiques (fondamentalement exclues de nos logiques managériales, y compris dans le 
domaine de la gestion des désastres) de nouvelles références intellectuelles, organisationnelles 
et culturelles doivent être construites. 3 De nouveaux outils sont à penser et à développer. 4 
 
Les questions sont foisonnantes :  
• Quels décalages de compréhension et de pilotage pénalisent la gestion des crises ?  
• Quelles pesanteurs historiques et culturelles, quelles routines, donnent leur force à ces 
décalages ?  
• Quels sont les meilleurs enseignements de l’expérience pour une anticipation et un 
traitement de ces défis “hors-cadre”?  
                                         
3 Patrick Lagadec: “The Borderline of Chaos”, Crisis Response, Vol 2, Issue 3, June 2006, p. 62-63. 
http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/062-063_crj2_3_lagadec.pdf 
Michel Nesterenko and Patrick Lagadec "Complexity and chaos",  Crisis   Response,  vol. 3,  issue 1, December 
2006, pp. 62-64. http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Crisis_nester.pdf 
4 Pierre Béroux, Xavier Guilhou, Patrick Lagadec: "Implementing Rapid Reflection Forces", Crisis Response, 
vol. 3, issue 2, pp. 36-37. http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Implementing_Rapid_Reflection_Forces.pdf 
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• Quelles initiatives bien précises peut-on lancer à court terme, pour apprendre et 
consolider organisations et systèmes face aux menaces de crises majeures ?  
• Quels nouveaux rapports public/privé développer en vue de ces environnements ?  
• Quelles répartitions et organisations de compétences entre les étages locaux, régionaux, 
nationaux, continentaux, intercontinentaux ?  
• Quelles formations des décideurs et futurs décideurs mettre sur pied pour traiter de 
réalités aussi surprenantes et instables ? 5 
• Quelles préparations de tous les autres acteurs parties prenantes, ONG, élus locaux, 
syndicats, experts, citoyens – puisque ces crises de textures ne peuvent être traversées 
sans implications  collectives puissantes ?  
 
 
Tirer le meilleur des grands rapports d’enquête – le cas Katrina, tome 3 
 
L’importance de l’événement Katrina oblige à une réflexion en profondeur sur l’épisode et ses 
enseignements. Les angles d’interrogation comme les méthodes d’analyse à solliciter sont 
multiples, reflétant la complexité du phénomène et des questions qu’il pose.   
 
Pour notre part, nous avons engagé la démarche, avec l’appui de la Direction du Contrôle des 
risques d’EDF – sous l’impulsion de Pierre Béroux.6 En équipe, nous sommes rendus7 à La 
Nouvelle Orléans et dans le Mississipi (février 2006). Pour rencontrer les grands opérateurs 
du domaine de l’électricité, des télécommunications, de l’eau, des services postaux, des 
transports aériens et portuaires ; des responsables de médias, la Croix-Rouge – et explorer 
avec eux les leçons essentielles qu’ils retiennent de Katrina.  Cette mission sur le terrain a été 
complétée par d’autres interviews et séminaires à Washington (mars, avril 2006), et a conduit 
à un premier rapport. 8 Une nouvelle mission9 à La Nouvelle Orléans a permis de nouvelles 
                                         
5 Patrick Lagadec : “Enseigner la question des crises : Enjeux, Obstacles, Initiatives”, Cahiers du Laboratoire 
d'Econométrie, janvier 2007, Ecole Polytechnique.http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/2007-01.pdf 
Patrick Lagadec : “Crises hors-cadres : Oser un enseignement”, in Ethique, Médecine, Société – Concepts et 
enjeux pratiques, sous la direction d’Emmanuel Hirsh, Vuibert, octobre 2007.  
6 Soucieuse de toujours rester en phase avec les défis de notre temps, EDF a pour politique de rechercher 
systématiquement les leçons des grands événements qui tranchent avec le quotidien. Ainsi :  
• La crise du verglas au Québec en 1998, qui a donné des leçons stratégiques immédiates pour le traitement des 
grandes tempêtes en Europe en décembre 1999 – http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Lagadec_PS_49.pdf).  
• La crise du SRAS à Toronto en 2003 – dans l’optique d’une pandémie grippale. Voir : Patrick Lagadec, 
William Dab : “Pilotage d'activités vitales en univers imprévisible – Les grands opérateurs de réseaux et le 
risque de pandémie : Mission Toronto – Enseignements du Sras, préparation à la pandémie grippale, 10-14 
octobre 2005”, Electricité de France, Direction du Contrôle des Risques, 10 Novembre 2005 
       http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/EDF_Pandemie_Grippe_Toronto.pdf 
• Le cyclone Katrina et les grands réseaux, voir note 7.   
7La mission comprenait : Xavier Guilhou (XAG Conseil), Daniel Madet (EDF), Jean-Pierre Roche (Aéroports 
de Paris), Erwan Lagadec (Harvard University). La mission fut en outre appuyée par l’Amiral Alain Oudot de 
Dainville, Chef d’état-major de la Marine, le Préfet Christian Frémont, Préfet de la Zone de Défense Sud ; et, 
aux Etats-Unis, par son Excellence Jean-David Levitte, Ambassadeur de France, et par Pierre Lebovics, Consul 
Général de France à La Nouvelle Orléans.  
8 Xavier Guilhou, Patrick Lagadec, Erwan Lagadec : "Les Grands Réseaux Vitaux et Katrina, enseignements sur 
les crises hors-cadre et leur pilotage". Dans le cadre d'une mission Electricité de France, à la demande de Pierre 
Béroux, Directeur du Contrôle des Risques.  
http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/EDF_Katrina_Rex_Faits_marquants.pdf 
Voir aussi Patrick Lagadec et Xavier Guilhou: "Katrina - Quand les crises ne suivent plus le script", Préventique-
Sécurité, n° 88, Juillet-août 2006, pp. 31-33. http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/PS88_Katrina_ok.pdf 
 11 
rencontres, ou des approfondissements, notamment avec le “patron” des Coast Guard10 
locaux, le Captain Paskewich11 (mars 2007).  
 
Une autre voie d’examen, et c’est celle qui a conduit à ce travail, consiste à analyser en 
profondeur les grands rapports d’enquête. C’est là pour nous une pratique habituelle12, qui 
répond à plusieurs objectifs : tirer tout le parti de ces volumineux documents, d’une très 
grande richesse factuelle ; explorer de nouvelles lignes d’analyse, au-delà de ce qu’ont pu 
faire les commissions d’enquête.  Et mettre ces réflexions au service du plus grand nombre : 
décideurs, experts, chercheurs, journalistes, étudiants.  
 
Le cyclone Katrina, a donné lieu à de très nombreuses analyses, et notamment à trois grands 
rapports d’enquête. Celui de la Chambre des Représentants13, celui de la Maison Blanche14, 
celui du Sénat15.  
 
Nous proposons ici un troisième travail sur le rapport du Sénat16, à la suite des tomes 1 
et 2, consacrés respectivement à l’examen des rapports de la Chambre des Représen-
tants, et de la Maison Blanche.  
 
Le tome 1 avait permis de cerner l’épisode en lui-même, à travers une présentation des 
données de base, sur le cyclone, ses impacts, et les actions des acteurs essentiels. Le tome 2 
avait privilégié l’examen de grands thèmes de réflexion transverse : impréparation, mutation 
culturelle, leadership, gestion et communication, rapports public-privé, infrastructures 
critiques, place des armées, place du citoyen.  
 
Pour ce troisième tome, nous avons choisi de proposer deux lectures :  
• La première (Partie 1) synthétique et stratégique, permettant d’aller directement aux 
conclusions (Chapitre 1) et propositions (Chapitre 2) de la Commission. Nous y 
                                                                                                                               
9 Avec l’appui et de la Direction du Contrôle des Risques d’EDF et de l’IRGC – International Risk Governance 
Council, Genève, http://www.irgc.org/irgc/. 
10 Nous prenons la liberté de mettre un pluriel sur ce collectif en anglais.  
11 Vidéo : “Katrina and the US Coast Guard", Captain Frank M. Paskewich, PE, Commanding Officer, Captain 
of the Port, talking to Xavier Guilhou, Caroline Guilhou, Patrick Lagadec, New Orleans, 9 March 2007 —
programme de retour d'expérience sur les crises hors-cadre à l'échelle internationale conduit par Pierre Béroux, 
Directeur du Contrôle des Risques d'Electricité de France, mission confiée à Patrick Lagadec et Xavier Guilhou 
(1h16mn). 
12 P. Lagadec : “La canicule de l'été 2003. Auscultation des rapports d'enquête", in "Retour sur les rapports 
d'enquête et d'expertise suite à la canicule de l'été 2003",cahiers du GIS Risques Collectifs et Situations de Crise, 
Claude Gilbert et Isabelle Bourdeaux Editeurs, CNRS et Maison des Sciences de l'Homme-Alpes, n°4, Mai 
2005, pp. 17-200. http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/retoursurenquetescanicule.pdf 
P. Lagadec : “Le rapport de la Commission d'enquête britannique sur l'Encéphalopathie Spongiforme Bovine 
(ESB) au Royaume-Uni entre 1986 et 1996", Cahiers du GIS Risques Collectifs et Situations de Crise, n°1, 
juillet 2001, 170 pages. http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/retour_ESB.pdf 
13 A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina, US House of Representatives, US Government Printing Office, 15 February 
2006, 362 p. + Annexes).  
14 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned, The White House, 23 February 2006 (217 p).  
15 Hurricane Katrina – A Nation Still Unprepared, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Washington, DC., May 2006 (749 p.).  
16 Pour des raisons évidentes, nous nous abstiendrons de reprendre en détail dans ce tome 2 des éléments 
descriptifs de Katrina, déjà largement produits dans le tome 1, et nous nous concentrerons sur les messages clés 
appelant repérage et réflexion.  
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ajoutons une réflexion personnelle (Chapitre 3) en examinant la question qui se pose à 
tout pays désormais, alors que d’autres Katrina, dans tous les domaines, pointent à 
l’horizon ou immédiatement à nos portes : « Et maintenant ? ». Comment penser, 
organiser, nos systèmes institutionnels, nos outils pour traiter ces défis non 
conventionnels ? C’est bien là en effet une préoccupation centrale, qui serait celle de 
toute commission d’enquête : Que proposer ? 
• La seconde (Partie 2), analytique, pour faire justice à l’énorme travail de la 
Commission, pour utiliser au mieux cette nouvelle mine d’informations, pour aider le 
lecteur intéressé à développer ses capacités de questionnement sur les grands cas de 
crise contemporaines. 
 
Nous sommes bien conscient de la complexité des questions abordées. Aussi bien, comme 
pour les deux premiers tomes mis en ligne, nous proposons ici une version provisoire, 
destinée à susciter la réflexion, en en aucune manière à la fixer.  
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Avertissements 
 
 
 
À l’adresse du lecteur français 
 
Lors des émissions de radio et télévision aux mois d’août-septembre 2005, nombre 
d’intervenants, experts ou commentateurs ont glosé sur le thème : « Les Américains ont trop 
de problèmes avec leur système fédéral et leur pauvre organisme de sécurité civile (FEMA). 
Nous, nous avons un système centralisé, les préfets et les plans Orsec ». Pareils 
commentaires sont tout à la fois stupides et indécents.  Nous travaillons ici sur un désastre 
qui a touché une superficie égale à la moitié du territoire français, avec perte totale de tous 
les services vitaux, et impossibilité de reconstruction à court terme.  
 
La seule attitude responsable est de commencer par écouter le cas et ses difficultés. En nous 
interrogeant en premier lieu sur ce qui sort de nos cadres de référence. Sauf à signer par 
avance nos propres capitulations en cas de phénomène également hors cadre qui pourrait 
toucher notre pays, ou l’Europe. Les capacités dont nous avons fait montre lors de l’épisode 
de la canicule 2003 – 20 000 morts en France, 70 000 en Europe – devraient nous inciter à 
quelque prudence. Nous engager à un nouveau regard scientifique sur ces enjeux, à une 
véritable mobilisation stratégique des dirigeants, dans tous les secteurs.  
 
 
 
À l’adresse du lecteur européen 
 
Un ouvrage est actuellement en cours de rédaction et qui paraîtra à l’automne 2007. Il prend 
l’ouragan Katrina et vient le superposer sur le nord de l’Europe : nord de la France, sud-est 
de l’Angleterre et notamment Londres, Pays-Bas. Dans l’attente de sa parution, on pourra 
lire le présent travail relatif à Katrina, aux Etats-Unis, et s’interroger sur ce que serait la 
réactivité de l’Union Européenne en cas de phénomène de cette nature, sur la préparation des 
dirigeants, des réseaux vitaux, des ONG, des médias, à un choc de ce niveau de difficulté. Là 
encore, il serait bien présomptueux de partir de l’idée que, de ce côté de l’Atlantique, nous 
avons tout ce qu’il faut pour anticiper, réagir et reconstruire.  
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Chapitre 1 
 
SYNTHÈSE  
KATRINA, UNE DÉBÂCLE QUASI-GÉNÉRALE 
 
 
1. Un tableau effarant 
 
La Commission trace quatre lignes fondamentales expliquant la faillite du système :  
• La non prise en compte des alertes lancées de longue date ;  
• L’incapacité à se mobiliser dans les jours précédant et suivant le sinistre ;  
• La défaillance des systèmes de réponse ;  
• Un déficit général de leadership.  
Le tout s’inscrit sur un fond de tableau traduisant une incapacité à construire une réponse 
nationale en cas d’événement de grande ampleur. Dès son premier test, la réorganisation 
générale engagée à la suite des événements du 11 septembre a connu  un échec cinglant. Tout 
au plus peut-on noter l’efficacité de l’U.S. Coast Guard, et les performances remarquables de 
certains acteurs du secteur privé. Eux, avaient anticipé, s’étaient entraînés, surent mobiliser 
des moyens, et eurent au front de vrais leaders, qui avaient carte blanche pour agir.  
These failures were not just conspicuous; they were pervasive. Among the many factors 
that contributed to these failures, the Committee found that there were four overarching 
ones: (1) long-term warnings went unheeded and government officials neglected their duties 
to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe; (2) government officials took insufficient actions 
or made poor decisions in the days immediately before and after landfall; (3) systems on 
which officials relied on to support their response efforts failed; and (4) government 
officials at all levels failed to provide effective leadership. These individual failures, 
moreover, occurred against a backdrop of failure, over time, to develop the capacity for a 
coordinated, national response to a truly catastrophic event, whether caused by nature or 
man-made. 
The results were tragic loss of life and human suffering on a massive scale, and an 
undermining of confidence in our governments’ ability to plan, prepare for, and respond to 
national catastrophes.[…] Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, this country went 
through one of the most sweeping reorganizations of federal government in history. While 
driven primarily by concerns of terrorism, the reorganization was designed to strengthen 
our nation’s ability to address the consequences of both natural and man-made disasters. In 
its first major test, this reorganized system failed. Katrina revealed that much remains to be 
done. 
Most of the hearings focused on what went wrong in Katrina. Two of the hearings, 
however, examined the successes: the effective and heroic search and rescue efforts by the 
U.S. Coast Guard; and the outstanding performance of certain members of the private 
sector in restoring essential services to the devastated communities and providing relief to 
the victims. These successes shared some important traits. The Coast Guard and certain 
private sector businesses both conducted extensive planning and training for disasters, and 
they put that preparation into use when disaster struck. Both moved material assets and 
personnel out of harm’s way as the storm approached, but kept them close enough to the 
front lines for quick response after it passed. Perhaps most important, both had 
empowered front-lin leaders who were able to make decisions when they needed to be 
made. (p. 2-3) 
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2. Une culture d’urgence piégée par la seule logique séquentielle, de poupées russes 
 
Chaque niveau de responsabilité est marqué par un principe de stratification séquentielle : 
le local intervient ; puis l’état, à la demande du niveau de base ; puis le fédéral, à la demande 
des états. Ce type de référence ne convient plus du tout pour les catastrophes de très grande 
ampleur. La Commission introduit la notion de désastre “ordinaire”, pointant clairement la 
nécessité d’ouvrir d’autres références pour les désastres qui sortent précisément de l’ordinaire.  
It has long been standard practice that emergency response begins at the lowest possible 
jurisdictional level – typically the local government, with state government becoming 
involved at the local government’s request when the resources of local government are (or 
are expected to be) overwhelmed. Similarly, while the federal government provides ongoing 
financial support to state and local governments for emergency preparedness, ordinarily it 
becomes involved in responding to a disaster at a state’s request when resources of state 
and local governments are (or are expected to be) overwhelmed. Louisiana’s Emergency 
Operations Plan explicitly lays out this hierarchy of response.  
During a catastrophe, which by definition almost immediately exceeds state and local 
resources and significantly disrupts governmental operations and emergency services, the 
role of the federal government is particularly vital, and it would reasonably be expected to 
play a more substantial role in response than in an “ordinary” disaster. (p. 3) 
 
 
3. Un événement prévu depuis 40 ans ; des alertes massives ; une surdité quasi générale 
 
La surprise extrême est souvent une dimension essentielle des grands événements 
catastrophiques actuels. Mais il n’est pas besoin de surprise pour faire montre d’une 
incapacité de réaction : Katrina l’illustre de façon magistrale. Les risques avaient été 
identifiés, et rappelés au cours des années. Des cyclones, tels Betsy en 1965, puis Camille en 
1969, avaient confirmé les pronostics. La simulation Pam en 2004 avait identifié des béances 
majeures. L’échelon central fut très précisément informé. Les alertes pour Katrina furent 
claires, précises, justes, répétées, massives, et même exceptionnellement personnalisées. Rien 
n’y fit.  
 Top officials at every level of government – despite strongly worded advisories from 
the National Hurricane Center (NHC) and personal warnings from NHC Director Max 
Mayfield – did not appear to truly grasp the magnitude of the storm’s potential for 
destruction before it made landfall. 
The potentially devastating threat of a catastrophic hurricane to the Gulf Coast has been 
known for 40 years: New Orleans experienced flooding in some areas of remarkably similar 
proportions from Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and Hurricane Camille devastated th Gulf 
Coast in 1969. More recently, numerous experts and governmental officials had been 
anticipating an increase in violent hurricanes, and New Orleans’ special and growing 
vulnerability to catastrophic flooding due to changing geological and other conditions was 
widely described in both technical and popular media.Hurricane Georges hit the Gulf Coast 
in 1998, spurring the state of Louisiana to as Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) for assistance with catastrophic hurricane planning. Little was accomplished for 
the next six years. Between 2000 and 2003, state authorities, an emergency-preparedness 
contractor, and FEMA’s own regional staff repeatedly advised FEMA headquarters in 
Washington that planning for evacuation and shelter for the “New Orleans scenario” was 
incomplete and inadequate, but FEMA failed to approach other federal agencies for help 
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with transportation and shelter or to ensure that the city and state had the matters in hand. 
During the Hurricane Pam exercise, officials determined that massive flooding from a 
catastrophic storm in New Orleans could threaten the lives of 60,000 people and trap 
hundreds of thousands more, while incapacitating local resources for weeks to months. The 
Pam exercise gave all levels of government a reminder that the “New Orleans scenario” 
required more forethought, preparation, and investment than a “typical” storm. 
Over the weekend, there was a drumbeat of warnings: FEMA held video-teleconferences 
on both days, where the danger of Katrina and the particular risks to New Orleans were 
discussed; NHC’s Max Mayfield called the governors of the affected states, something he 
had only done once before in his 33 year career; President Bush took the unusual step of 
declaring in advance an emergency for the states in the impact zone; numerous media 
reports noted that New Orleans was a “bowl” and could be left submerged by the storm; 
the Department of Homeland Security’s Simulation and Analysis group generated a report 
stating that the levees protecting New Orleans were at risk of breaching and overtopping; 
internal FEMA slides stated that the projected impacts of Katrina could be worse than 
those in the Hurricane Pam exercise. The warnings were as widespread as they were dire. 
(p. 4-5) 
 
 
4. Une préparation insuffisante, sur presque tous les tableaux 
 
La Commission dresse le tableau d’un système totalement dépassé, comme hypnotisé, qui 
va au fiasco majeur comme on se soumet à un destin tragique, en toute connaissance de cause, 
en toute résignation molle devant l’impuissance des hommes (et de la sienne propre) et des 
institutions (et de la sienne propre) à relever les défis difficiles :  
• Certes, on se démène dans les derniers moments, et l’on en fait d’ailleurs bien plus que 
jamais en matière de préparation. 
• Mais, comme l’a dit le Foch, “La guerre n’attend pas les vertus de la dernière heure”. 
Les responsables étaient d’avance vaincus, en raison des graves manquements qui 
affectaient toute la phase de préparation. Et de leur incapacité à comprendre qu’ils 
allaient devoir, plus encore, livrer « une autre guerre ».  
• En raison aussi de leur incapacité en matière de leadership, qui laissa le champ libre à 
tous les potentiels de défaillances qui marquaient le système.  
• L’échelon fédéral connaissait les mêmes difficultés – des failles imposantes, un 
leadership défaillant –, qui conduisirent à la même impuissance à mobiliser des 
resssources suffisantes, intersectorielles, ou en provenance du secteur privé.  
• Au plus haut niveau, le Secrétaire du DHS se contenta des réassurances reçues. Il 
n’activa pas le réseau des acteurs essentiels. Il ne sut pas non plus activer les textes 
spécifiquement prévus pour les castatrophes d’ampleur extraordinaire (Catastrophic 
Incident Annex du National Response Plan) – qui prévoient un passage du pull system 
au push system (intervention d’emblée, sans attente de sollicitations explicites et 
spécifiques de la part de l’état concerné).  
• Le Département de la Défense ne sut pas non plus monter une action intégrée à la 
hauteur des enjeux.  
• La Maison Blanche ne fit pas preuve de meilleure réactivité. Certes, le Président, à la 
demande de M. Brown, Directeur de la FEMA, prit l’initiative d’appeler la Gouverneure 
Blanco au téléphone pour la pousser à prendre un ordre d’évacuation obligatoire. Certes, 
il déclara une situation d’urgence alors que le cyclone n’avait pas encore frappé, ce qui 
était une première. Mais il ne quitta pas son ranch du Texas, et ne rentra à Washington 
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que deux jours après l’impact. Et c’est seulement alors qu’il réunit une équipe pour 
superviser la réponse fédérale.  
Katrina was not a “typical” hurricane as it approached landfall; it was much larger, more 
powerful, and was capable of producing catastrophic damage. 
In some respects, officials did prepare for Katrina with the understanding that it could 
be a catastrophe. Some coastal towns in Mississippi went to extraordinary lengths to get 
citizens to evacuate, including sending people door-to-door to convince and cajole people 
to move out of harm’s way. The State of Louisiana activated more than twice the number 
of National Guard troops called to duty in any prior hurricane, and achieved the largest 
evacuation of a threatened population ever to occur. The City of New Orleans issued its 
first ever mandatory evacuation order. The Coast Guard readied its personnel, 
prepositioned its equipment, and stood by to begin search and rescue operations as quickly 
as humanly possible. Departing from usual practice, the governors of the three affected 
states requested, and President Bush issued, emergency declarations before the storm made 
landfall. 
But however vigorous these preparations, ineffective leadership, poor advance planning 
and an unwillingness to devote sufficient resources to emergency management over the long 
term doomed them to fail when Katrina struck. Despite the understanding of the Gulf 
Coast’s particular vulnerability to hurricane devastation, officials braced for Katrina with 
full awareness of critical deficiencies in their plans and gaping holes in their resources While 
Katrina’s destructive force could not be denied, state and local officials did not marshal 
enough of the resources at their disposal. 
In addition, years of short-changing federal, state, and local emergency functions left 
them incapable of fully carrying out their missions to protect the public and care for 
victims. For example, the lack of survivable, interoperable communications, which 
Governor Haley Barbour said was the most critical problem in his state, occurred because 
of an accumulation of decisions by federal, state, and local officials that left this long 
standing problem unsolved. 
The Committee believes that leadership failures needlessly compounded these losses. 
Mayor Ray Nagin and Governor Kathleen Blanco – who knew the limitations of their 
resources to address a catastrophe – did not specify those needs adequately to the federal 
government before landfall. For example, while Governor Blanco stated in a letter to 
President Bush two days before landfall that she anticipated the resources of the state 
would be overwhelmed, she made no specific request for assistance in evacuating the 
known tens of thousands of people without means of transportation, and a senior state 
official identified no unmet needs in response to a federal offer of assistance the following 
day. The state’s transportation secretary also ignored his responsibilities under the state’s 
emergency operations plan, leaving no arm of the state government prepared to obtain and 
deliver additional transportation to those in New Orleans who lacked it, when Katrina 
struck. In view of the long-standing role of requests as a trigger for action by higher levels 
of government, the state bears responsibility for not signaling its needs to the federal 
government more clearly. 
Compounded by leadership failures of its own, the federal government bears 
responsibility for not preparing effectively for its role in the post storm response. FEMA 
was unprepared for a catastrophic event of the scale of Katrina. Well before Katrina, 
FEMA’s relationships with state and local officials, once a strength, had been eroded in 
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part because certain preparedness grant programs were transferred elsewhere in the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), not as important to state and local preparedness 
activities, FEMA’s effectiveness was diminished. In addition, at no time in its history, 
including in the years before it became part of DHS, had FEMA developed – nor had it 
been designed to develop – response capabilities sufficient for a catastrophe nor had it 
developed the capacity to mobilize sufficient resources from other federal agencies, and the 
private and nonprofit sectors. 
Moreover, FEMA’s former Director, Michael Brown, lacked the leadership skills that 
were needed. Before landfall, Brown did not direct the adequate pre-positioning of critical 
personnel and equipment, and willfully failed to communicate with DHS Secretary, 
Michael Chertoff, to whom he was supposed to report. Earlier in the hurricane season, 
FEMA had pre-positioned an unprecedented amount of relief supplies in the region. But 
the supplies were not enough. Similarly, while both FEMA and the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) made efforts to activate the federal emergency health 
capabilities of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and the U.S. Public Health 
Service (PHS), only a limited number of federal medical teams were actually in position 
prior to landfall to deploy into the affected area. Only one such team was in a position to 
provide immediate medical care in the aftermath of the storm.  
More broadly, DHS – as the Department charged with preparing for and responding to 
domestic incidents, whether terrorist attacks or natural disasters – failed to effectively lead 
the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. DHS leadership failed to bring a sense of 
urgency to the federal government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and Secretary 
Chertoff himself should have been more engaged in preparations over the weekend before 
landfall. Secretary Chertoff made only top-level inquiries into the state of preparations, and 
accepted uncritically the reassurances he received. He did not appear to reach out to the 
other Cabinet Secretaries to make sure that they were readying their departments to 
provide whatever assistance DHS – and the people of the Gulf Coast – might need. 
Similarly, had he invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) of the National 
Response Plan (NRP), Secretary Chertoff could have helped remove uncertainty about the 
federal government’s need and authority to take initiative before landfall and signaled that 
all federal government agencies were expected to think – and act – proactively in preparing 
for and responding to Katrina. The Secretary’s activation of the NRP CIA could have 
increased the urgency of the federal response and led the federal government to respond 
more proactively rather than waiting for formal requests from overwhelmed state and local 
officials. Understanding that delay may preclude meaningful assistance and that state and 
local resources could be quickly overwhelmed and incapacitated, the NRP CIA directs 
federal agencies to pre-position resources without awaiting requests from the state and 
local governments. Even then, the NRP CIA holds these resources at mobilization sites 
until requested by state and local officials, except in certain prescribed circumstances. 
The military also had a role to play, and ultimately, the National Guard and active duty 
military troops and assets deployed during Katrina constituted the largest domestic 
deployment of military forces since the Civil War. And while the Department of Defense 
(DOD) took additional steps to prepare for Katrina beyond those it had taken for prior 
civil support missions, its preparations were not sufficient for a storm of Katrina’s 
magnitude. Individual commanders took actions that later helped improve the response, but 
these actions were not coordinated by the Department. The Department’s preparations 
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were consistent with how DOD interpreted its role under the NRP, which was to provide 
support in response to requests for assistance from FEMA. However, additional 
preparations in advance of specific requests for support could have enabled a more rapid 
response. 
In addition, the White House shares responsibility for the inadequate pre-landfall 
preparations. To be sure, President Bush, at the request of Brown, did take the initiative to 
personally call Governor Blanco to urge a mandatory evacuation. As noted earlier, he also 
took the unusual step of declaring an emergency in the Gulf States prior to Katrina making 
landfall. On the other hand, the President did not leave his Texas ranch to return to 
Washington until two days after landfall, and only then convened his Cabinet as well as a 
White House task force to oversee federal response efforts.” (p. 5-8) 
 
 
5. Une réponse inacceptable, à tous les niveaux de responsabilité 
 
Les carences générales en matière de préparation conduisent à un tableau pathétique en 
matière de réponse :  
 
Recherche et Sauvetage  
Certes, l’héroïsme des sauveteurs permit de transporter un nombre considérable de 
personnes vers des zones hors d’eau, mais le système aval dérailla. Le plan prévoyait que les 
victimes recevraient nourriture, eau, soins médicaux, transport vers des centres d’héberge-
ment. La destruction des moyens de communication, l’effondrement du système de transport 
(la flotte de bus de la municipalité était sous l’eau ; rien n’avait été prévu pour que l’on 
dispose de conducteurs), la paralysie de la police (qui perdit des centaines de véhicules, de 
grandes quantités de munitions, d’uniformes…), l’absence de bateaux, conduisirent à une 
paralysie générale. Il est atterrant, souligne le rapport, de constater que les pompiers de La 
Nouvelle Orléans ne possédaient aucune embarcation, et la police seulement cinq  –dans une 
ville dont le risque majeur, d’une évidence criante, était pourtant l’inondation.  
The skill and dedication of Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (W&F) 
officials and others working in these adverse conditions stand out as a singular success 
story of the hurricane response. 
Applying a model developed in the Hurricane Pam exercise, rescue teams in Louisiana 
brought hurricane victims to high ground, where they were supposed to receive food, 
water, medical attention, and transport to shelters. Here, too, there were problems. Poor 
communications delayed state and federal officials learning about where rescuees had been 
dropped, in turn slowing shipments of food and water to those areas. The City of New 
Orleans was unprepared to help people evacuate, as many buses from the city’s own fleet 
were submerged, while at the same time officials had not arranged in advance for drivers for 
those buses that were available. 
The storm also laid waste to much of the city’s police, whose headquarters and several 
district offices, along with hundreds of vehicles, rounds of ammunition, and uniforms were 
all destroyed within the first two days of landfall. 
Planning for search and rescue was also insufficient. FEMA, for instance, failed to 
provide boats for its search and rescue teams even though flooding had been confirmed by 
Tuesday. Moreover, interagency coordination was inadequate at both the state and federal 
levels. While the Louisiana W&F and FEMA are responsible for interagency search and 
rescue coordination at the state and federal levels respectively, neither developed adequate 
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plans for this mission. Staggeringly, the City of New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) 
owned no boats, and the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD owned five. (p. 8). 
 
Diagnostic de situation  
L’incapacité à percevoir rapidement la dimension de la catastrophe a été au cœur de la 
défaite. Ce fut le trait majeur au niveau fédéral, qui avait un rôle critique dans la mesure où 
l’échelon local était submergé. Plus que de l’acquisition rapide des quelques informations 
déterminantes qui suffisaient largement pour déclencher une opération de grande envergure  –
en l’occurrence, dès l’instant où il y avait rupture des digues–, les échelons supérieurs se sont 
réfugiés dans une recherche d’informations exhaustives, minutieusement confirmées. Ils ont 
attendu le jeudi avant de prendre réellement en charge le désastre survenu le lundi à l’aube –
quand il devint impossible de se cacher plus longtemps derrière le besoin de vérification, 
d’user de tous les subterfuges adminisratifs possibles pour échapper à la réalité. Il aurait fallu 
s’avancer en terrain non balisé, et sortir des logiques si protectrices des fonctionnements en 
tuyaux, en silos, au sein d’usines à gaz bureaucratiques étanches à toute situation non 
nominale. Cette exigence était hors de portée.  
While authorities recognized the need to begin search-and-rescue missions even before 
the hurricane winds fully subsided, other aspects of the response were hindered by a failure 
to quickly recognize the dimensions of the disaster. These problems were particularly acute 
at the federal level. The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) – charged with 
providing reliable information to decision makers including the Secretary and the President 
– failed to create a system to identify and acquire all available, relevant information, and as 
a result situational awareness was deeply flawed. With local and state resources 
immediately overwhelmed, rapid federal mobilization of resources was critical. Yet reliable 
information on such vital developments as the levee failures, the extent of flooding, and the 
presence of thousands of people in need of life-sustaining assistance at the New Orleans 
Convention Center did not reach the White House, Secretary Chertoff, or other key 
officials for hours, and in some cases more than a day. Brown, then in Louisiana, 
contributed to the problem by refusing to communicate with Secretary Chertoff opting 
instead to pass information directly to White House staff. Moreover, even though senior 
DHS officials did receive on the day of landfall numerous reports that should have led to an 
understanding of the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans, many indicated they were 
not aware of the crisis until sometime Tuesday morning. DHS was slow to recognize the 
scope of the disaster or that FEMA had become overwhelmed. On the day after landfall, 
DHS officials were still struggling to determine the “ground truth” about the extent of the 
flooding despite the many reports it had received about the catastrophe; key officials did 
not grasp the need to act on the lessthan- complete information that is to be expected in a 
disaster. DHS leaders did not become fully engaged in recovery efforts until Thursday, 
when in Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson’s words, they “tried to kick it up a notch”; 
after that, they did provide significant leadership within DHS (and FEMA) as well as 
coordination across the federal government. But this effort should have begun sooner. 
DOD also was slow to acquire information regarding the extent of the storm’s 
devastation. DOD officials relied primarily on media reports for their information. Many 
senior DOD officials did not learn that the levees had breached until Tuesday; some did not 
learn until Wednesday. As DOD waited for DHS to provide information about the scope 
of the damage, it also waited for the lead federal agency, FEMA, to identify the support 
needed from DOD. The lack of situational awareness during this phase appears to have 
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been a major reason for DOD’s belated adoption of the forwardlooking posture necessary 
in a catastrophic incident. (p. 9) 
 
Évacuation post-impact  
Les grandes catastrophes sont très peu tolérantes à l’impréparation, l’indécision, les erreurs 
initiales de trajectoires. Les écarts, s’ils ne sont pas repérés et traités, sont très vite 
irratrappables ; les insuffisanses tendent à se coaguler à haute vitesse. La question des 
transports, nécessaires à l’évacuation post-impact, est une dramatique illustration de cette loi 
d’airain : erreurs préalables, fausses assurances, manque de réactivité, ont rendu dérisoires les 
efforts pathétiques que la Gouverneure finit par lancer.  
Overwhelmed by Katrina, the city and state turned to FEMA for help. On Monday, 
Governor Blanco asked Brown for buses, and Brown assured the state the same day that 
500 buses were en route to assist in the evacuation of New Orleans and would arrive within 
hours. In spite of Brown’s assurances and the state’s continued requests over the course of 
the next two days, FEMA did not direct the U.S. Department of Transportation to send 
buses until very early on Wednesday, two days after landfall, and the buses did not begin 
to arrive at all until Wednesday evening and not in significant numbers until Thursday. 
Concerned over FEMA’s delay in providing buses – and handicapped by the Louisiana 
Department of Transportation and Development’s utter failure to make any preparation to 
carry out its lead role for evacuation under the state’s emergency plan – Governor Blanco 
directed members of her office to begin locating buses on Tuesday and approved an effort 
to commandeer school buses for evacuation on Wednesday. But these efforts were too 
little, too late. Tens of thousands of people were forced to wait in unspeakably horrible 
conditions until as late as Saturday to be evacuated. (p. 9-10) 
 
Logistique et appui militaire  
Une zone sujette à un grand traumatisme nécessite l’injection rapide d’une quantité 
colossale de ressources. Une préparation insuffisante, une incapacité à mesurer et traiter les 
échelles requises, l’injection de moyens de communication et de suivi inadéquats, conduisent 
bien vite à la confusion, l’impuissance, le blocage. Qui n’a jamais envisagé les effets de seuil 
auxquels le système serait confronté en cas d’événement hors-cadres aura peu de chance de 
surnager le moment venu. Et, à cette question de l’échelle, s’ajoutent des problèmes bien plus 
fins, de texture, rapidement bloquants. Ainsi, il ne suffit pas d’avoir prévu des points de 
déchargement pour les biens commandés : encore faut-il que les destinataires soient en 
mesure de s’y rendre et de s’y approvisionner effectivement. Si les voies de communication 
sont bloquées par une inondation, des débris, des check-points de sécurité, même une 
logistique de qualité sur les grosses artères viendra échouer sur l’absence du système 
capillaire indispensable.  
FEMA lacked the tools to track the status of shipments, interfering with the 
management of supplying food, water, ice and other vital commodities to those in need 
across the Gulf Coast. So too did the incompatibility of the electronic systems used by 
federal and state authorities to manage requests for assistance, which made it necessary to 
transfer requests from the state system to the federal system manually. 
Supplies of commodities were especially problematic. Federal shipments to Mississippi 
did not reach adequate levels until 10 days after landfall. The reasons for this are unclear, 
but FEMA’s inadequate “surge capacity” – the ability to quickly ramp up the volume of 
shipments – is a likely cause. In both Mississippi and Louisiana, there were additional 
problems in getting the supplies the “last mile” to individuals in need. Both states planned 
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to make supplies available for pickup at designated distribution points, but neither 
anticipated the problems people would face in reaching those points, due to impassable 
roads or other issues. And in Louisiana, the National Guard was not equipped to assume 
this task. One of Louisiana’s greatest shortages was portable toilets, which were requested 
for the Superdome but never arrived there, as more than 20,000 people were forced to 
reside inside the Superdome without working plumbing for nearly a week. 
For their part, Louisiana and Mississippi relied heavily on support from other states to 
supplement their own emergency resources. Both states were parties to an interstate 
agreement known as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which 
provides a system for sharing National Guard troops and other resources in natural 
disasters. As in many other areas of Katrina response, however, the magnitude of the 
demands strained the EMAC process and revealed limitations in the system. Paperwork 
burdens proved overwhelming. Louisiana experienced difficulties processing the volume of 
incoming resources. On Wednesday, August 31, the federal National Guard Bureau, which 
ordinarily serves a coordinating function within DOD, relieved Louisiana and Mississippi 
of many of the bureaucratic responsibilities by making direct requests for available troops 
to state adjutants general. 
This process quickly resulted in the largest National Guard deployment in U.S. history, 
with 50,000 troops and supporting equipment arriving from 49 states and four territories 
within two weeks. These forces participated in every aspect of emergency response, from 
medical care to law enforcement and debris removal, and were considered invaluable by 
Louisiana and Mississippi officials. 
Although this process successfully deployed a large number of National Guard troops, 
it did not proceed efficiently, or according to any pre-existing plan or process. There is, in 
fact, no established process for the large-scale, nation-wide deployment of National Guard 
troops for civil support. In addition, the deployments of National Guard troopswere not 
coordinated with the federal Northern Command, which was overseeing the large-scale 
deployments and operations of the active-duty military. While the NRP has specific 
procedures for active-duty involvement in natural disasters, their deployment raised 
unforeseen issues and was initially a source of frustration to Governor Blanco. The 
governor directed her adjutant general to secure additional troops on the day after landfall, 
but federal and state officials did not coordinate her requests well, and ground troops didn’t 
arrive in significant numbers for several days. DOD chose to rely primarily on the 
deployment of National Guard troops (versus federal active duty troops) pursuant to its 
declared strategy and because it believed they were best suited to the required tasks, 
including performing law enforcement. In addition, the need to resolve command issues 
between National Guard and active duty forces – an issue taken up (but not resolved) in a 
face-to-face meeting between President Bush and the governor on Air Force One on the 
Friday after landfall, may have played a role in the timing of active duty troop 
deployments. The issue became moot as the two forces stayed under their separate 
commands, an arrangement that turned out to work well in this case thanks to the 
cooperation of the respective commanders. 
While the large numbers of active-duty troops did not arrive until the end of the first 
week following landfall, National Guard troops did, and DOD contributed in other 
important ways during that period. Early in the week, DOD ordered its military 
commanders to push available assets to the Gulf Coast. They also streamlined their 
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ordinarily bureaucratic processes for handling FEMA requests for assistance and  
emphasized movement based on vocal commands with the paperwork to follow, though 
some FEMA officials believe that DOD’s approval process continued to take too long. 
They provided significant support to search-and-rescue missions, evacuee airlifts, logistics 
management of buses arriving in the state for evacuation, and other matters. 
Toward the end of the week, with its own resources stretched thin, FEMA turned to 
DOD to take over logistics for all commodity movements. DOD acceded to the request, 
and provided some logistics assistance to FEMA. However, it did not undertake the 
complete logistical take-over initially requested by FEMA because that was not needed. 
By Tuesday afternoon, the New Orleans Superdome had become overcrowded, leading 
officials to turn additional refugees away. Mayor Nagin then decided to open the Morial 
Convention Center as a second refuge of last resort inside the city, but did not supply it 
with food or water. Moreover, he communicated his decision to open the Convention 
Center to state and federal officials poorly, if at all. That failure, in addition to the delay of 
shipments due to security concerns and DHS’s own independent lack of awareness of the 
situation, contributed to the paucity of food, water, security, or medical care at the 
Convention Center, as a population of approximately 19,000 gathered there. Those vital 
commodities and services did not arrive until Friday, when the Louisiana National Guard, 
assisted by National Guard units from five other states, brought in relief supplies provided 
by FEMA, established law and order, and then evacuated the Convention Center on 
Saturday within eight hours. (p. 10-12) 
 
Maintien de l’ordre  
Nous avons ici une illustration particulièrement nette du phénomène de complexification 
systémique brutale qui marque les situations de grande crise. Soudain, aucune strate, aucune 
niche, aucun domaine, ne peut plus se traiter indépendamment des autres. Une défaillance 
grave de maintien de l’ordre, liée notamment à une absence quasi-totale de préparation, dans 
une ville déjà marquée par de très sérieux problèmes de sécurité publique, conduit rapidement 
à des désordres, et plus encore à une perception de situation bien plus grave qu’elle ne l’est en 
réalité. Une pauvre préparation des responsables conduit ces derniers à enchérir encore sur les 
rumeurs et à consolider une vision générale, mais fausse, de quasi-guerre urbaine. Les 
conséquences sont immédiates sur nombre d’activités de secours et de supports. Le manque 
de leadership ne permet pas de récupérer des leviers d’action. La pauvreté de compétence 
générale conduit à donner toute leur puissance aux guerres de territoires préalables, bien plus 
naturelles qu’une coopération constructive.  
Law enforcement outside the Superdome and the Convention Center was a problem, and 
was fueled by several contributing factors, including erroneous statements by top city 
officials inflaming the public’s perception of the lawlessness in New Orleans. 
Without effective law enforcement, real or imagined safety threats interrupted virtually 
every aspect of the response. Fearing for their personal safety, medical and search and 
rescue teams withdrew from their missions. FEMA and commercial vendors of critical 
supplies often refused to make deliveries until military escorts could be arranged. In fact, 
there was some lawlessness, yet for every actual act there were rumors of dozens more, 
leading to widespread and inaccurate reporting that severely complicated a desperate 
situation. Unfortunately, local, state, and federal officials did little to stanch this rumor 
flow. Police presence on the streets was inadequate, in part because in a matter of hours 
Katrina turned the NOPD from protectors of the public to victims of the storm. 
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Nonetheless, most New Orleans police officers appear to have reported for duty, many 
setting aside fears about the safety of their families or the status of their homes. 
Even so, the ability of the officers who remained to perform their duties was 
significantly hampered by the lack of basic supplies. While supplies such as weapons and 
ammunition were lost to flooding, the NOPD leadership did not provide its officers with 
basic necessities such as food; nor did the Department have logistics in place to handle 
supplies. Members of the NOPD also identified the lack of a unified command for this 
incident as a major problem; eight members of the Command Staff were extremely critical 
of the lack of leadership from the City’s Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). The 
Department’s rank and file were unfamiliar with both the department’s and the city’s 
emergency-operations manuals and other hurricane emergency procedures. Deficiencies in 
the NOPD’s manual, lack of training on this manual, lack of familiarity with it, or a 
combination of the three resulted in inadequate protection of department resources. 
Federal law-enforcement assistance was too slow in coming, in large part because the 
two federal Departments charged under the NRP with providing such assistance – DHS 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) – had done almost no pre-storm planning. In fact, 
they failed to determine even well into the post-landfall period which of the two 
departments would assume the lead for federal law enforcement under the NRP. As a 
result, later in the week, as federal law-enforcement officers did arrive, some were 
distracted by a pointless “turf war” between DHS and DOJ over which agency was in the 
lead. In the end, federal assistance was crucial, but should have arrived much sooner. (p. 12) 
 
Santé  
On trouve là encore les facteurs de déstabilisation que sont : 1°) les franchissements de 
seuils quantitatifs (70 000 personnes à trier et prendre en charge sur le plan sanitaire, 25 
hôpitaux et de très nombreuses maisons de retraite à évacuer, ou en perdition) ; 2°) les 
croisements de difficultés de toutes natures. Ces enchevêtrements anéantissent les visions 
habituelles qui permettent d’optimiser la gestion dans chaque sous-territoire, en faisant 
abstraction de l’environnement. Ainsi, il est bien prévu que les populations ayant des besoins 
spéciaux en matière de santé soient hébergées au Superdome. Mais il n’était pas prévu que le 
Superdome soit rapidement endommagé, privé d’électricité et de nourriture, submergé par 
l’arrivée incontrôlée de 20 000 personnes, et non assisté pendant plusieurs jours… Il n’était 
pas prévu que des équipes d’assistance médicale quittent les lieux pour cause de sécurité 
publique. Ainsi encore, les hôpitaux crurent pouvoir rester ouverts, mais ce fut sans compter 
avec l’inondation et les pertes d’électricité qui en découlèrent ; certes, les plans prévoyaient 
une assistance via les hélicoptères, mais on se trouva très rapidement en compétition intense 
sur ce front – là encore, toute la réflexion « nominale » est pulvérisée : la flotte d’hélicoptères 
d’appui n’est plus disponible, tous les autres appuis anéantis ou engagés sur d’autres fronts, 
les communicaitons ne fonctionnent plus, etc. Nous sommes à l’opposé des cadres 
fondamentaux qui prévalent en matière de plan de secours, tous fondés sur l’hypothèse 
implicite selon laquelle tout problème spécifique est envisagé « toute chose égale par 
ailleurs ».  
New Orleans had a large population of “special needs patients,” individuals living at 
home who required ongoing medical assistance. Before Katrina struck, the City Health 
Department activated a plan to establish a care facility for this population within the 
Superdome and provided transportation to evacuate several hundred patients and their 
caregivers to Baton Rouge. While Superdome facilities proved useful in treating special 
needs patients who remained behind, they had to contend with shortages of supplies, 
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physical damage to the facility necessitating a postlandfall relocation of patients and 
equipment to an area adjacent to the Superdome, and a population of more than 20,000 
people using the Superdome as a refuge of last resort. Also, FEMA’s Disaster Medical 
Assistance Teams (DMATs) which provide the invaluable resources of pharmacies and 
hospital equipment, arrived at the Superdome on the night following landfall, but left 
temporarily on Thursday, before the evacuation of the Superdome’s special needs 
population was completed, because of security concerns.”  
In Louisiana, hospitals had to evacuate after landfall on short notice principally due to 
loss of electrical power. While hospitals had evacuated some of their patients before 
landfall, they had retained others thought to be too frail for transport, and believed by 
staying open they would be available to serve hurricane victims. Their strategy became 
untenable after landfall when power was lost, and their backup generators were rendered 
inoperable by flooding and fuel shortages. The Louisiana Department of Health and 
Hospitals (DHH) stepped in to arrange for their evacuation; while successful, it had to 
compete with search and rescue teams for helicopters and other needed resources. (p. 13) 
 
 
6. Des problèmes fondamentaux 
 
L’analyse de la Commission est cinglante : la courte-vue, le manque de financement, la 
méconnaissance générale – à tous les étages de l’administration, et pour tous les Etats-Unis – 
des principes et du fonctionnement du plan national de crise, constituent le fond de tableau sur 
lequel s’inscrit le fiasco de Katrina.  
 
Une situation globalement inacceptable 
La Commission pointe notamment : le manque de personnel (3 agents seulement pour le 
bureau de la protection civile de La Nouvelle Orléans), le manque de moyens (pas de bateau 
pour les pompiers), le manque de budget pour les exercices (ce qui fut la cause de reports 
multiples pour l’exercice Pam, et pour des sommes aussi minimes que 15 000 $), un nombre 
impressionnant de postes non  pourvus à la FEMA (350 à 500 pour une agence qui en compte 
2 500). Au niveau national, l’exercice TOPOFF 3 (Top Officials) d’avril 2005 avait montré, 
selon un rapport de novembre 2005 du DHS lui-même, un manque de compréhension des 
principes et protocoles fixés par le National Incident Management System, la colonne 
vertébrale du dispositif de crise du pays.  
 Actions taken – and failures to act – well before Katrina struck compounded the 
problems resulting from the ineffective leadership that characterized the immediate 
preparations for the hurricane and the post-landfall response. A common theme of these 
earlier actions is underfunding emergency preparedness. While the Committee did not 
examine the conflicting political or budget priorities that may have played a role, in many 
cases the shortsightedness associated with the underfunding is glaring. Among notable 
example are the following: 
• The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), 
the state counterpart to FEMA, suffered chronic staffing problems and employee 
turnover due to underfunding. LOHSEP’s Planning Chief also testified that lack of 
resources prevented the agency from meeting its schedule for periodic review and 
updates of state emergency plans. 
• The Office of Emergency Preparedness for New Orleans, long known to be among 
the nation’s cities most vulnerable to a catastrophic hurricane, had a staff of only 
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three. Its police and fire departments, responsible for search and rescue activities, had 
five and no boats, respectively. In 2004, the city turned down a request by the 
NOFD to fund the purchase of six additional boats. 
• The Hurricane Pam exercise faced repeated delays due to funding constraints. It took 
nearly five years for the federal government to approve the state’s initial funding 
request, and the limited funding finally granted necessitated last-minute cutbacks in 
the scope of the exercise. Follow-up workshops were delayed by funding shortfalls – 
some as small as the $15,000 needed for participants’ travel expenses – shortfalls 
that either the state or federal government should hav remedied. 
• Numerous witnesses testified that FEMA’s budget was far short of what was needed 
to accomplish its mission, and that this contributed to FEMA’s failure to be 
prepared for a catastrophe. FEMA witnesses also universally pointed out that the 
agency has suffered for the last few years from a vacancy rate of 15 to 20 percent 
(i.e., between 375 to 500 vacant positions in a 2,500-person agency), including 
several at key supervisory levels. FEMA sought additional funding but did not 
receive it. The Committee found that FEMA’s budget shortages hindered its 
preparedness.  
The Committee also found inadequate training in the details of the recently promulgated 
NRP was a contributing factor in shortcomings in the government’s performance. Louisiana 
Emergency Management Officials and National Guardsmen were receiving basic NRP and 
Incident Command System (ICS) training two days after the storm hit. Certain FEMA 
officials, also, were inadequately trained on the NRP and ICS. Only one large-scale federal 
exercise of the NRP took place before Katrina, the DHS’s Top Officials 3 (TOPOFF 3) 
exercise in April 2005, approximately three months after the NRP was issued. TOPOFF 3, 
sponsored by DHS, involved responders from all levels of government. A November 2005 
report by the DHS Inspector General, echoing the findings of an earlier report by DHS 
itself in May 2005, found that the exercise, which involved federal, state and local 
responders, “highlighted – at all levels of government – a fundamental lack of understanding 
for the principles and protocols set forth in the NRP and [National Incident Management 
System].” The lack of familiarity with emergencymanagement principles and plans 
hampered the Katrina response. (p. 14-15) 
 
 Des béances dans la planification de secours, notamment à La Nouvelle Orléans 
Le problème de l’évacuation de la ville était identifié depuis 1994 par les autorités locales, 
était connu des autorités fédérales. Mais rien ne fut fait, même le minimum qui aurait été un 
repérage élémentaire des bus disponibles.  Le problème ne fut pas intégré comme dimension 
de l’exercice Pam. Au début de l’été 2005, les responsables de La Nouvelle Orléans informè-
rent leurs homologues de la FEMA et d’autres agences fédérales que la ville n’était pas en 
mesure de réaliser l’évacuation pré-impact.  
Le fait que les intervenants, en cas de sinistre, auraient à opérer dans une zone privée 
d’électricité comme de communications ne fut pas pris en compte. L’agence chargée de ces 
questions au sein du DHS n’avait aucun plan de réponse.  
The Committee also identified significant planning failures that predated Katrina. One of 
the most remarkable stories from this investigation is the history of planning for the 
100,000 people in New Orleans believed to lack the means to evacuate themselves. Dating 
back to at least 1994, local and state officials have known about the need to address this 
problem. For its part, the federal government, which knew about this problem for some 
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time, neither monitored their planning nor offered assistance. This evacuation problem was 
not included in the Hurricane Pam exercise and, during follow up meetings in the summer of 
2005, New Orleans officials informed counterparts from FEMA, other federal agencies, and 
the state preparedness agency that the city was not able to provide for the necessary pre-
storm evacuation, but nothing was done to resolve the issue. 
•  The City of New Orleans, with primary responsibility for evacuation of its citizens, had 
language in its plan stating the city’s intent to assist those who needed transportation 
for pre-storm evacuation, but had no actual plan provisions to implement that intent. In 
late 2004 and 2005, city officials negotiated contracts with Amtrak, riverboat owners 
and others to pre-arrange transportation alternatives, but received inadequate support 
from the City’s Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and 
contracts were not in place when Katrina struck. As Katrina approached, 
notwithstanding the city’s evacuation plans on paper, the best solution New Orleans 
had for people without transportation was a private-citizen volunteer carpool initiative 
called Operation Brothers’ Keepers and transit buses taking people – not out of the 
city, but to theSuperdome. While the Superdome provided shelter from the devastating 
winds and water, conditions there deteriorated quickly. Katrina’s “near miss” ripped the 
covering off the roof, caused leaking, and knocked out the power, rendering the 
plumbing, air conditioning, and public announcement system totally useless. 
•  The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, whose Secretary had 
personally accepted departmental responsibility under the state’s emergency operations 
plan to arrange for transportation for evacuation in emergencies, had done nothing to 
prepare for that responsibility prior to Katrina. While the Secretary attempted to defend 
his inaction in a personal appearance before the Committee, the Committee found his 
explanations rang hollow, and his account of uncommunicated doubts and objections to 
state policy disturbing. Had his Department identified available buses or other means of 
transport for evacuation within the state in the months before the hurricane, at a 
minimum the state would have been prepared to evacuate people stranded in New 
Orleans after landfall more quickly than it did. 
•  FEMA and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), charged under the National 
Response Plan with supporting state and local government transportation needs 
(including evacuation) in emergencies, did little toplan for the possibility that they 
would be called on to assist with postlandfall evacuation needs, despite being on notice 
for over a month before Katrina hit that the state and local governments needed more 
buses and drivers – and being on notice for years that tens of thousands of people would 
have no means to evacuate. 
•  Though much attention had been paid to addressing communications shortfalls, efforts 
to address interoperability – as well as simply operability – were inadequate. There was 
little advance preparation regarding how responders would operate in an area with no 
power and where virtually all forms of pre-existing communications were destroyed. 
And while satellite phones were available to some, they either did not function properly 
or officials were not trained on how to use these relatively complex devices. Moreover, 
the National Communications System, the agency within DHS that is primarily 
responsible under the NRP for providing communications support to first responders 
during disasters, had no plans to do so. (p. 15-16) 
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Un système de digues en déshérence ; et, pendant le désastre, les guerres de frontières 
bureaucratiques continuent  
Les défaillances dans la planification d’urgence auraient eu moins d’importance si le 
système des digues avait été suivi de façon moins légère. Il était en fait totalement vérolé, 
qu’il s’agisse de conception, de construction, de maintenance. Il n’était pas du tout en rapport 
avec le risque couru. Le fait principal était surtout les conflits majeurs existant entre les 
acteurs en théorie en charge du système. Conflits qui explosèrent au moment du drame : 
lorsque les digues cédèrent, les réactions initiales consistèrent en des combats bureaucratiques 
pour savoir qui était en charge de la réparation ; puis pour décider de la façon de conduire ces 
réparations. Pendant ce temps, les eaux du lac Pontchartain continuaient à remplir la cuvette 
de La Nouvelle Orléans.   
These planning failures would have been of far less consequence had the system of 
levees built to protect New Orleans from flooding stayed intact, as they had in most prior 
hurricanes. But they did not, and the resulting inundation was catastrophic. The levee 
failures themselves turned out to have roots long pre-dating Katrina as well. While several 
engineering analyses continue, the Committee found deeply disturbing evidence of flaws in 
the design and construction of the levees. For instance, two major drainage canals – the 
17th Street and London Avenue Canals – failed at their foundations, prior to their flood 
walls being met with the water heights for which they were designed to protect central 
New Orleans. Moreover, the greater metropolitan New Orleans area was literally riddled 
with levee breaches caused by massive overtopping and scouring of levees that were not 
“armored,” or properly designed, to guard against the inevitable cascading waters that were 
sure to accompany a storm of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina. The Committee also 
discovered that the inspection and maintenance regime in place to ensure that the levees, 
flood walls and other structures existing to protect the residents of the greater New Orleans 
area was in no way commensurate with the risk posed to these persons and their property. 
Equally troubling was the revelation of serious disagreement – still unresolved months 
after Katrina – among officials of several government entities over who had responsibility, 
and when, for key levee issues including emergency response and levee repair. Such 
conflicts prevented any meaningful emergency plans from being put in place and, at the 
time of Katrina, none of the relevant government agencies had a plan for responding to a 
levee breach. While the deadly waters continued to pour into the heart of the city after the 
hurricane had passed, the very government agencies that were supposed to work together 
to protect the city from such a catastrophe not only initially disagreed about whose 
responsibility it was to repair the levee breaches, but disagreed as to how the repairs 
should be conducted. Sadly, due to the lack of foresight and overall coordination prior to 
the storm, such conflicts existed as the waters of Lake Pontchartrain continued to fill 
central New Orleans. (p. 16-17) 
 
 
7. Des problèmes de gaspillage, de fraude dans l’utilisation des fonds de reconstruction 
 
La Commission souligne que la pauvreté générale de préparation conduisit aussi, après la 
catastrophe, à de sérieux problèmes dans la gestion des fonds de secours. Au 8 mars 2006, le 
gourvenement fédéral avait engagé des dépenses à hauteur de 88 milliards de $ pour la 
reconstruction. Même si cette dimension n’est pas partie intégrante du mandat de la 
Commission, il apparaît que bien des failles sont à relever aussi dans ce domaine. Ainsi, la 
FEMA a pu acheter 25 000 maisons préfabriquées dont l’installation ne respectait pas les 
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propres normes de la FEMA, qui interdisent les constructions en zone inondable. 
 Besides overwhelming many government emergency-response capabilities, Katrina 
severely affected the government’s ability to properly track and verify its costs when it 
contracted for disaster relief goods and services. While the Committee did not specifically 
include this issue in its investigation, the Committee was aware of wasteful, and sometimes 
fraudulent and abusive spending practices, and held two hearings on the 
subject. 
It takes money to prepare, respond, and recover from a disaster, and typically the bigger 
the disaster, the more money it takes. As of March 8, 2006, the federal government had 
committed $88 billion to the response, recovery and rebuilding efforts. Unfortunately, no 
all of this money has been wisely spent. Precious taxpayer dollars have been lost due to 
waste, fraud, and abuse. 
Among the problems that have come to the Committee’s attention are FEMA’s lack of 
financial controls, failures to ensure eligibility of individuals receiving disaster-related 
assistance, and poor contracting practices, including use of no bid contracts. A notable 
example of the resulting wastefulness was FEMA’s purchase of 25,000 manufactured 
homes that are virtually useless because FEMA’s own regulations prohibit them being 
installed in a flood plain. In a similar vein, FEMA’s lack of controls in dealing with hotels 
providing temporary housing for evacuees resulted in instances where hotels charged for 
empty rooms; individuals held multiple rooms; hotel rooms were used as storage units for 
personal goods; individuals stayed at resorts; and hotels charged rates as high as $400 per 
night. (p. 17) 
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Chapitre 2 
 
LES RECOMMANDATIONS DE LA COMMISSION 
 
 
 
La Commission aligne 7 recommandations fondamentales, pour que le pays soit en mesure 
de relever les défis du 21ème siècle.  
 
1. Supprimer la FEMA. La nouvelle entité préconisée (la NPRA, National Preparedness 
and Response Authority) serait toujours placée au sein du DHS, mais son directeur serait 
adjoint direct du Secrétaire du DHS, avec accès direct au Président des Etats-Unis, à l’instar 
du Chef d’état-major des armées. Les hauts responsables de la NPRA seraient choisis pour 
leur compétence managériale et de leadership.  
 
2. Donner à la nouvelle entité un mandat qui soit dégagé des typologies habituelles de 
risques, et désormais articulé sur les grands enjeux transverses : une mission intégrée 
depuis la préparation jusqu’à la reconstruction, en passant par l’intervention ; une attention 
spéciale aux problèmes de communication et d’évacuation, qui sont communs à nombre de 
désastres ; une attention à des problèmes spécifiques comme la décontamination de masse en 
cas d’attaque radiologique, ou les sauvetages de masse en cas d’inondation ; une attention aux 
questions d’infrastructures critiques, notamment les installations clés pour l’énergie et les 
télécommunications.  
 
3. Développer des capacités régionales, afin : d’assurer les meilleures interfaces entre 
l’échelon fédéral et les échelons locaux ; de stimuler les préparations au plus près du terrain, 
entre les états, avec les ONG, avec le secteur privé ; de constiter des équipes d’intervention 
rapide (“Strike Teams”) pour réceptionner au mieux l’aide fédérale en cas d’aide extérieure à 
la région, ces Strike Teams devant travailler et s’entraîner très en amont avec les instances 
locales.  
 
4. Établir un véritable centre de crise interministériel pour garantir analyse de situation 
et coordination générale. Pour l’heure, il existe plusieurs entités de ce type : il convient de les 
regrouper en un National Operation Center (NOC). Le NOC regrouperait des représentants de 
toutes les agences fédérales concernées, s’assurerait de la bonne communication entre le 
gouvernement fédéral et les états concernés. Il incluerait une équipe d’analystes étoffée, en 
mesure de traiter l’information et de dresser le tableau de référence commun. En cas d’alerte, 
le NOC aurait notamment pour tâche de s’assurer que la situation est effectivement suivie et 
prise en charge.  
 
5. S’assurer d’une implication nouvelle et puissante, à tous les échelons administra-
tifs, dans le système de gestion de crise. Cela exige que des budgets à la mesure des enjeux 
soient affectés aussi bien à l’entité fédérale centrale (NPRA) qu’aux entités locales en charge 
des situations de crise. Il importe de même que les responsables soient formés, et entraînés. 
Un advisory council au sein de la NPRA, composé de représentants locaux et d’intervenants 
de première ligne, assurerait le lien nécessaire avec l’échelon local et ses préoccupations. Il 
conviendrait aussi d’intégrer plus fortement le secteur associatif et le secteur privé. Des 
responsables devraient être spécifiquement nommés pour prendre en charge cette dimension 
de coopération hors système administratif. Lorsque cela est approprié, des resprésentants du 
secteur privé devraient être associés à la planification, à l’entraînement et aux exercices.  
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6. Confirmer et renforcer les ancrages essentiels du pays en matière de réponse de 
crise. L’ensemble du système mis en place devrait être gouverné par le principe d’intégration 
des compétences, en lieu et place des traditionnels fonctionnements en tuyaux d’orgues, 
stratifications et découpages multiples. Il convient de consolider ce système composé 
essentiellement du National Response Plan (NRP), du National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), des Emergency Support Functions (ESF). Chacun doit être appelé à consolider ce 
système, à s’entraîner en conséquence. Et l’on doit, à la marge, supprimer la fonction de 
Principal Federal Officer qui a introduit des confusions et des conflits lors de Katrina, pour en 
rester à la seule fonction de Federal Coordinator Officer (FCO).  
 
7. Renforcer la capacité du pays à répondre aux événements d’échelle cataclysmique. 
Le texte de référence existe : le Catastrophic Incident Annex. Il faut s’assurer qu’il est bien 
compris, tant à l’échelon fédéral qu’à l’échelon régional. Le DHS doit s’assurer qu’il dispose 
de la capacité voulue pour des interventions d’urgence massives. Et ceci quelle que soit la 
nature des événements en cause.  
 
A NEW NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
 
The Committee’s Report sets out seven foundational recommendations together with a 
series of supporting “building blocks,” or tactical recommendations, all designed to make 
the nation’s emergency preparedness and response system strong, agile, effective, and 
robust. 
 
Hurricane Katrina exposed flaws in the structure of FEMA and DHS that are too 
substantial to mend. Our first foundational recommendation is to abolish FEMA and 
replace it with a stronger, more capable structure, to be known as the National 
Preparedness and Response Authority (NPRA). To take full advantage of the substantial 
range of resources DHS has at its disposal, NPRA will remain within DHS. Its Director 
would be assured of having sufficient access and clout by having the rank of Deputy 
Secretary, and having a direct line of communication to the President during catastrophes. 
The Director would also serve as the Advisor to the President for national emergency 
management, in a manner akin to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To ensure 
capable and qualified leadership, senior NPRA officials would be selected from the ranks of 
professionals with experience in crisis management, in addition to substantial management 
and leadership experience, whether in the public, private, or nonprofit sector.  
 
Our second foundational recommendation is to endow the new organization with 
the full range of responsibilities that are core to preparing for and responding to 
disasters. These include the four central functions of comprehensive emergency 
management – mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery – which need to be 
integrated. In addition, NPRA would adopt an “all-hazards plus” strategy for 
preparedness. In preparing our nation to respond to terrorist attacks and natural disasters, 
NPRA must focus on building those common capabilities – for example survivable, 
interoperable communications and evacuation plans – that are necessary regardless of the 
incident. At the same time, it must not neglect to build those unique capabilities – like mass 
decontamination in the case of a radiological attack or water search and rescue in the case of 
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flooding - that will be needed for particular types of incidents. NPRA’s mandate should 
also include overseeing protection of critical infrastructure, such asenergy facilities and 
telecommunications systems, both to protect such infrastructure from harm and to ensure 
that such infrastructure is restored as quickly as possible after anatural disaster or terrorist 
attack. 
 
Our third foundational recommendation is to enhance regional operations to 
provide better coordination between federal agencies and the states and establish 
regional strike teams. Regional offices should be adequately staffed, with representation 
from federal agencies outside DHS that are likely to be called on to respond to a significant 
disaster in the region. They should provide coordination and assist in planning, training, 
and exercising of emergency preparedness and response activities; work with states to 
ensure that grant funds are spent most effectively; coordinate and develop inter-state 
agreements; enhance coordination with NGOs and the private sector and provide personnel 
and assets, in the form of Strike Teams, to be the federal government’s first line of 
response to a disaster. The Strike Teams would consist of, at a minimum, a designated 
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO); personnel trained in incident management, public 
affairs, relief and recovery, and communications support; a Defense Coordinating Officer 
(DCO); and liaisons to other federal agencies. These regional Strike Teams should 
coordinate their training and exercises with the state and local officials and the private 
sector entities they will support when disasters occur. 
 
Our fourth foundational recommendation is to build a true, government-wide 
operations center to provide enhanced situational awareness and manage 
interagency coordination in a disaster. Currently, there is a multiplicity of interagency 
coordinating structures, with overlapping missions, that attempt to facilitate an integrated 
federal response. Three of these structures – the Homeland Security Operations Center 
(HSOC), the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and the Interagency 
Incident Management Group (IIMG) – should be consolidated into a single, integrated 
entity – a new National Operations Center (NOC). The NOC would include 
representatives of all relevant federal agencies, and should provide for one clearly defined 
emergency management line of communication from the states to the federal government 
and from the federal government to the states. It would also include a strong analytic team 
capable of sorting through and assessing information and determining which pieces would 
become part of the common operating picture. To improve its performance in future 
disasters, the NOC should establish clear protocols and procedures to ensure that reports 
are received and reviewed, at appropriate levels, in a timely manner. When there is notice of 
a potential major disaster, the NOC should implement plans, including one for securing 
information from DOD, for obtaining postdisaster situational awareness, including 
identifying sources of information and data particular to the region in which the disaster 
may occur and, where appropriate, bringing in individuals with particular knowledge or 
expertise about that region. 
 
Our fifth foundational recommendation is to renew and sustain commitments at 
all levels of government to the nation’s emergency management system. FEMA 
emergency response teams have been reduced substantially in size, are inadequately 
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equipped, and training for these teams has been all but eliminated. If the federal government 
is to improve its performance and be prepared to respond effectively to the next disaster, 
we must give NPRA – and the other federal agencies with central responsibilities under the 
NRP – the necessary resources to accomplish this. We must fund NPRA commensurate 
with the significance of its mission and ensure that those funds are well-spent. To be full 
partners in the national preparedness effort, states and localities will need additional 
resources as well. The Administration and DHS must also ensure that federal leaders of all 
agencies with an emergency support role understand their key responsibilities under the 
NRP and the resources they need to effectively carry out the comprehensive planning 
required, while also training and exercising on NIMS, NRP and other operational plans. To 
fully integrate state and local officials into the system, there should be established an 
advisory council to NPRA made up of state and local officials and first responders. The 
advisory council should play an integral role in ensuring that the full range of activities of 
the new organization – including developing response plans, conducting training and 
exercises, formulating preparedness goals, effectively managing grants and other resources – 
are done in full consultation and coordination with, and take into account the needs and 
priorities of, states and localities. DHS and the NPRA should more fully integrate the 
private and nonprofit sectors into their planning and preparedness initiatives. Among other 
things, they should designate specific individuals at the national and regional levels to work 
directly with private sector organizations. Where appropriate, private sector 
representatives should also be included in planning, training and exercises 
 
Our sixth foundational recommendation is to strengthen the underpinning of the 
nation’s response to disasters and catastrophes. Despite their shortcomings and 
imperfections, the NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS), including the 
Emergency Support Function (ESF) structure currently represent the best approach 
available to respond to multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional emergencies. Federal, state, and 
local officials and other responders must commit to supporting the NRP and NIMS    and 
working together to improve the performance of the national emergency management 
system. We must undertake further refinements of the NRP and NIMS, develop 
operational plans, and engage in training and exercises to ensure that everyone involved in 
disaster response understands them and is prepared to carry them out. In particular, the 
NRP should be strengthened to make the unity of effort concept very clear, so that 
everyone understands the concept and their roles in establishing unity, and there should be 
clarification of the importance of integrating agencies with ESF responsibilities into  the 
ICS, rather than their operating in “stovepipes.” The roles and responsibilities of the PFO 
and FCO are overlapping and were a source of confusion during Hurricane Katrina. The 
Stafford Act should be amended to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, and 
the NRP should be revised to eliminate the PFO position for Stafford Act-declared 
emergencies and disasters. It should also be amended to ensure that the Act addresses 
response to all disasters and catastrophes, whether natural or man-made.  
 
Our seventh foundational recommendation is to improve the nation’s capacity to 
respond to catastrophic events. DHS should ensure that the Catastrophic Incident Annex 
(CIA) is fully understood by the federal departments and agencies with responsibilities 
associated with it. The Catastrophic Incident Supplement should be completed and 
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published, and the supporting operational plans for departments and agencies with 
responsibilities under the CIA should be completed. These plans should be reviewed and 
coordinated with the states, and on a regional basis, to ensure they are understood, trained 
and exercised prior to an emergency. DHS must also develop the national capabilities B 
especially surge capacity – it needs to respond to catastrophic disasters, ensuring it has 
sufficient full time staff, response teams, contracting personnel, and adequately trained and 
sufficiently staffed reserve corps to ramp up capabilities, as needed. These capabilities 
must be scalable so that NPRA can draw on the appropriate resources from supporting 
ESF agencies to respond to a disaster irrespective of cause, size, or complexity. (p. 17-21) 
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Chapitre 3 
 
 
RÉFLEXIONS :  
FACE AUX RISQUES DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE, QUELLES STRATÉGIES DE RÉPONSE ?  
 
 
 
Les réflexions de la Commission sont d’autant plus intéressantes que, fondamentalement, 
elles ne sont pas spécifiques au cas de Katrina. Certes, bien des défaillances sont de nature 
strictement locales, régionales, ou nationales. Mais, face aux enjeux du 21ème siècle, tous les 
pays à économie complexe sont globalement confrontés aux mêmes défis. Sauts quantitatifs 
dans les désastres, sauts qualitatifs – complexité, réseau, vitesse, ignorance, inconcevable –, 
contextes globaux instables, dynamiques de liquéfaction accélérée des socles cuturels, 
stratégiques, tactiques, sur lesquels sont ancrés nos perceptions, nos visons, nos réponses, nos 
outils.  
Bien des pays, en cas d’événements aussi lourds que Katrina, et quels que soient les événe-
ments initiateurs (catastrophe naturelle, menaces de santé publique, effondrement techno-
logique, attaque terroriste, etc.), en viendraient à se poser les mêmes questions que la Com-
mission du Sénat américain sur le cas de Katrina : quel diagnostic, quelles recommandations ?  
L’habitude est de se focaliser immédiatement sur des réorganisations (avec une centralisa 
tion renforcée), de nouveaux plans, des outils plus puissants, etc. Hélas, ces jeux de mécano 
restent illusoires quant aux résultats si, comme c’est le cas, nos difficultés tiennent à 
l’inadéquation qui existe entre, d’une part, les défis à relever et, d’autre part, les visions, les 
références de fond, les cultures managériales des acteurs concernés.  
La première exigence est de clarifier l’enjeu : il ne s’agit pas seulement de faire un peu 
plus que par le passé ; il faut prendre acte d’une rupture de complexité, et donc de la nécessité 
d’un tout autre cadrage de l’action stratégique.  
La seconde exigence est de conduire une mise à  niveau de nos systèmes décisionnels et 
opérationnels. Deux stratégies sont sans doute à suivre, en parallèle : une dynamique de 
progrès tandentiel, pour faire monter en compétence les dispositifs existants, sans les ébranler 
outre mesure (lorsque les peurs sont trop élevées, les changements trop accélérés risquent fort 
de paralyser plus que de faire avancer) ; une dynamique de rupture créatrice, pour se doter au 
plus vite de points d’ancrage qui permettront de mieux tenir en cas de tempête trop dure pour 
nos systèmes actuels – qui, sauf sursaut, auront besoin d’une décennie ou deux pour se 
reconfigurer.  
 
1. Reconnaître les défis du 21ème siècle, et se mettre en position de les traiter 
 
Le rapport du Sénat sur Katrina apporte des illustrations remarquables de ces enjeux, qui 
sont l’essentiel du problème.  
 
Le piège de la guerre de retard : l’anti-manuel pour le pilotage des crises actuelles 
Les crises actuelles plongent rapidement les acteurs sur des théâtres d’opérations de grande 
échelle, d’une complexité stupéfiante. Surtout, elles laissent les intéressés sans mode 
d’emploi. Le cœur de l’action n’est plus la mise en œuvre rapide de réponses préprogram-
mées, mais la capacité personnelle et collective au questionnement, à l’ouverture des réseaux, 
au leadership, à l’initiative hors des sentiers battus.  
Quiconque est tout entier dans un mode d’évitement et de refus vis-à-vis de cette nouvelle 
donne sera instantanément mis en état de grande fragilité à la moindre ombre de phénomène 
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hors-cadre, en état de choc à la première information qui  ne rentre plus dans les balisages 
conventionnels.   
Des milieux non préparés appliquent alors avec la plus grande obstination les 
commandements suivants, d’autant plus dirimants que la situation est hors-cadre, donc 
pétrifiante. Ces Commandements sont tirés directement de l’expérience Katrina, mais cette 
expérience n’est en rien spécifique.  
 
 
Anti-manuel de pilotage des crises du 21ème siècle 
 
Avant toute action, s’assurer de la façon la plus exhaustive, la plus réglementaire, la plus 
indiscutable, que les conditions suivantes sont bien réunies :  
• Disposer d’une vision claire de la situation dans son ensemble. 
• Disposer de toutes les assurances garantissant que l’action est absolument nécessaire. 
Toute nouvelle grave doit faire l’objet de vérifications avant qu’elle n’engage à prendre 
une initiative – par défaut, la situation doit être considérée comme normale et sous 
contrôle, ne justifiant aucune action ou initiative inhabituelles. 
• Imposer que les sollicitations éventuelles suivent rigoureusement les canaux 
administratifs prévus et les modes de transmission prévus (même s’il n’y a plus de 
moyens de communication, plus d’électricité, il n’est pas question de tenir pour valide 
une demande arrivant par l’Internet, par exemple, s’il est stipulé qu’elle doit arriver 
par courrier – comme ce fut le cas de demandes d’aide en provenance de Louisiane) ; et 
s’il n’y a pas de sollicitation explicite, la situation doit être tenue pour nominale aussi 
longtemps que l’on ne dispose pas des preuves écrites et transmises par plusieurs 
canaux officiels indiquant le contraire de façon évidente et à l’aune des critères 
habituels. 
• Suivre un processus hiérarchique d’autant plus rigoureux, pointilleux et détaillé que les 
enjeux sont importants, et en évitant toute précipitation.  
• Pour éviter tout risque de difficulté de frontière, et afin de bien borner ses propres 
responsabilités, clarifier de façon minutieuse les lignes de démarcation et les 
attributions des multiples acteurs concernés. 
• Ne rien engager sans plan détaillé et approuvé. 
• Disposer de 80 à 90% de l’information avant de s’engager en quoi que ce soit. Surtout 
dans les cas graves, et plus encore dans les cas inhabituels.  
 
Ce bouclier personnel, managérial et institutionnel, permet de ne prendre aucun risque 
inconsidéré pour la tranquille dérive au fil de l’eau de son organisation. Même si c’est au prix 
de fiascos à la hauteur des événements, on disposera quoi qu’il arrive de tout l’arsenal 
réglementaire et de bon sens de base pour se protéger en cas d’enquête. En quelque sorte, une 
capitulation dans les règles est toujours préférable à une victoire non conventionnelle.  
Ainsi, certains « deviennent fous » en observant que la Navy a envoyé sur zone un porte-
hélicoptères alors que tout n’est pas encore ficelé pour autoriser une telle initiative – même 
s’il s’avère que ce porte-hélicoptère est crucial pour le sauvetage en masse, et que les victimes 
ne survivraient pas à une attente réglementaire. Comme le remarque la commission d’enquête 
du Sénat avec acidité, il se trouve qu’un navire a des vitesses de déplacement qui ne sont pas 
celles de l’avion ; le groupe naval était déjà dans le Golfe, juste après un exercice, et il 
apparut intelligent de lui faire suivre au plus près le cyclone pour une intervention la plus 
rapide possible – même si cela fit « s’étrangler » certains au DHS.  
Prior to landfall, Lt. Gen. Honoré [Commanding General, First US Army] had asked 
Maj. Gen. Rowe, NORTHCOM Director of Operations, to identify certain assets for 
 38 
the response, including helicopters, boats, and communications equipment, but 12 
hours after landfall Maj. Gen. Rowe replied that he was "somewhat hamstrung by 
JDOMS [Joint Directorate of Military support] desire to wait for [Requests for 
assistance]" and could not provide these critical assets to Lt. Gen. Honoré. To the 
Committee, Maj. Gen. Rowe explained: "I think the primary resistance is the 
organizational resistance and absence of a detailed, approved plan." 
"It's hard to get them to do anything where there is a chance of failure," Scott 
Wells [Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer] said, adding that DOD wants "to know 80 
to 90 percent of the information before they will commit an asset to work with you.”  
While FEMA and DHS officials have complained that DOD did not do enough, and 
was slow to process requests, our investigation has found that, in fact, FEMA 
originated very few requests in this early period. In one instance, DOD received 
complaints from DHS about actions it did take. […] the Navy had ordered the 
helicopter carrier USS Bataan to sail towards New Orleans behind the storm, and to 
prepare to provide assistance. However, on Monday afternoon, a senior DOD 
representative to DHS reported to Assistant Secretary McHale's staff that "folks over 
here [are hopping] mad about the news of the Navy ship that announced their 
deployment without evident legal authority." The USS Bataan, the military's most 
significant pre-landfall deployment, with helicopters prepared to assist with search and 
rescue, was challenged by DHS. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense had to reassure DHS that USS Bataan was simply prepositioning, 
and in fact would not engage in the response without the proper request and 
authorization. […] USS Bataan's helicopters launched on Tuesday, the first active-duty 
aircraft to assist with search and rescue. (Chapter 26-20) 
 
Habiter un autre univers :  points d’ancrage pour un pilotage 
A l’opposé de ces lourdeurs, trouvées dans toutes les bureaucraties, on a observé sur 
Katrina des démonstrations d’intelligence et de réactivité stratégiques remarquables, qui 
traduisaient une culture de fond appropriée aux enjeux contemporains. Ce furent notamment 
les “instructions orales” du Président des Chefs d’État-major des Armées, consolidées par 
l’attitude et les contributions du Deputy Secretary of Defense. On change alors d’univers, 
avec cette fois des références tout autres.  
 
 
Points d’ancrage pour les crises en émergence 
 
• Une ligne de fond : sortir de l’état de « léthargie par défaut » – on prend les rênes avant 
que la crise ait déclenché des états de sidération partout dans le système ; on ne laisse 
pas les différentes instances, à commencer par les plus éminentes, devenir les meilleures 
têtes de pont de la crise.  
• Une ligne de pilotage : il ne s’agit plus de remplir des cases, mais d’afficher une ligne 
stratégique. Ainsi, dans le chef d’état major des armées donne ses intentions, à chacun 
ensuite d’utiliser au mieux son jugement pour traduire ces intentions stratégiques sur le 
terrain. Il ne livre pas le script, il ouvre une page blanche en exigeant que chacun fasse 
usage de ses capacités pour y transcrire le meilleur de qu’il est en mesure d’inventer et 
de faire.  
• Une ligne d’audit implicite : vous ne serez pas jugé sur votre dextérité à utiliser toutes 
les ficelles des textes pour vous mettre aux abris, mais sur la pertinence de votre réponse 
à l’exigence de prise en charge. En d’autres termes, une mission d’enquête ne vérifierait 
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plus que chacun a bien appliqué ce qu’il était censé faire d’après les textes édictés, mais 
examinerait la capacité d’intelligence et d’action des uns et des autres lorsque les modes 
d’emploi habituels ont été pulvérisés.  
• Un rythme en rapport avec les circonstances : l’acheminement des formulaires et la 
valse lente des tampons ne doivent pas être les déterminants du rythme de l’action.  
• Des initiatives créatrices : c’est par exemple cette décision du Général Honoré de lancer 
sur le champ un exercice pour légitimer un déplacement des troupes d’active sur le 
territoire américain. Non de code : Exercice Katrina.  
 
In a meeting at 3:40 p.m., Gen. Myers [Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] then 
instructed his service chiefs to work together with NORTHCOM in determining 
necessary assets, telling them to pre-position resources in anticipation of a request for 
assistance from FEMA, if they thought it prudent. To expedite the deployment process, 
he instructed the services to proceed on the authority of this vocal command - Secretary 
England's direct instruction to Adm. Keating, and his own guidance to the service 
chiefs - and that the necessary paperwork would follow later." Think large," he told 
them. 
A vocal command of this magnitude is extremely rare in DOD. For the purpose of 
ensuring legality, availability of resources, and documentation of the chain of 
command, all deployments are normally processed rigorously through specific written 
orders and electronic tracking systems. Deputy Secretary England's command 
represented an extraordinary delegation of military judgment, on the assurance that 
Adm. Keating would keep the Department informed. It was a “blank check”, Deputy 
Secretary England said. Assistant Secretary McHale elaborated: "What was 
communicated… was what we in the military call 'commander's intent.' The message 
from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, consistent with the counsel provided by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was to act with a sense of urgency and to minimize 
paperwork and bureaucracy to the greatest extent possible. As Adm. Keating 
understood the direction, "We're moving anything we think FEMA will need. No 
obstacles from DOD or Joint While DOD's inherent authorities to respond had not 
changed, and it was understood that all the necessary paperwork would follow, the 
decision reflected an extraordinary delegation to the military commanders. Assistant 
Secretary McHale said, "The climate in the decision-making process in this department 
could not have been more proactive than it was. (Chapter 26–24-25) 
Lt. Gen. Honoré, based at Fort Gillem, Georgia, as Commanding General of First 
Army, planned to deploy to the Gulf Coast as soon as the storm had cleared. 
Although he had not been ordered to do so, he wanted to establish himself in the 
area to be positioned advantageously as the response progressed: "My thought was 
'get there,' because the first rule of war is you've got to get there," he said. His 
authority as an Army commander permitted him to move from one military 
installation to another provided that such a movement could be considered training. 
Thus, he created an "Exercise Katrina," and in coordination with NORTHCOM and 
his superior officer at Army Forces Command, planned his move to Camp Shelby, 
an Army facility in South Mississippi. 
Lt. Gen. Honoré explained that it was not in his nature to wait for a Request for 
Assistance of deployment orders prior to moving: "That is a response, sometimes, by 
folks to say, 'Let's wait until they ask for something.' But in this case, we've got a 
case where we need to save life and limb. We can't wait for a [Request for 
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Assistance] or shouldn't be waiting for one. If there's capability, we need to start 
moving." 
Lt. Gen. Honoré informed NORTHCOM and Adm. Keating of his plan to deploy 
to Camp Shelby on Monday but because Katrina continued to track northward from 
the Gulf Coast, he could not move until Tuesday morning. He arrived at 11 a.m. C T 
and surveyed the base and the surrounding region of Gulfport and Biloxi, which 
looked to him like they "had been hit by a nuclear weapon." (Chapter 26–29) 
 
 
2. Améliorer les systèmes existants 
 
C’est globalement l’approche retenue par la Commission du Sénat. Il s’agit d’identifier des 
lignes de progrès, à partir des points forts qui se trouvent déjà dans les systèmes en place. En 
l’espèce, aux Etats-Unis, on dispose déjà d’une planification nationale, de textes qui prévoient 
l’éventualité de désastres cataclysmiques et les nouvelles exigences qu’ils imposent (le “push 
system”, et non plus le “pull system” historique). Le rapport sénatorial propose un certain 
nombre d’initiatives, et notamment :  
 
Une réorganisation à l’échelon central 
Il s’agit de renforcer l’entité en charge des grandes situations de crise, en en faisant un pôle 
unique de pilotage, et en donnant à son dirigeant un accès direct au Président des Etats-Unis.  
Réflexion : on se gardera toutefois de simplifier outre mesure cette ligne de la centralisa-
tion : peut-on envisager un centre de commandement unique quand il s’agit de faire fonction-
ner en cohérence un secteur régalien et un secteur privé de plus en plus essentiel, et souvent 
très en avance sur le secteur public ? Il faut probablement mettre davantage l’accent sur la 
capacité à mettre en activité et en cohérence des pôles et réseaux d’intelligence et d’action. 
  
Une dynamisation à l’échelon local 
Il s’agit de garantir les meilleurs liens entre le central et le local, et dynamiser tout le 
maillage régional, public, mais aussi privé, et associatif. Le modèle : « si c’est grave, on 
reprend au niveau national » ne marche plus dans les grandes crises de texture. Il nous faut 
des modes d’action bien plus « biologiques » que ne l’est le mécano habituel, fait de parties 
disjointes, à étages successifs.  
 
Une ouverture au secteur privé, aux ONG 
Le principe n’est plus de se demander comment on peut élargir les listes de personnes à 
convoquer, mais de se préparer à ouvrir très largement les réseaux de décision et d’action –
 autrement que de façon marginale.  
 
Une attention forte et spécifique aux événements de niveau cataclysmique 
Ces scénarios impliquent notamment des puissances logistiques sans commune mesure 
avec les pratiques habituelles.  
 
 
3. Introduire des dynamiques en rupture 
 
Deux obstacles majeurs : blocage intellectuel, blocage psychologique 
Bien des démarches de progrès peuvent donc être engagées. Mais, au cœur de nos 
difficultés, il faut reconnaître deux obstacles majeurs, qui pèsent aujourd’hui de tout leur 
poids :   
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•   Un blocage intellectuel. Dès l’instant où sont énoncés les termes de la problématique 
à traiter, on observe le plus souvent l’incompréhension, voire le désarroi. Spécialistes 
et responsables ont été formés pour œuvrer au sein de mondes stables tout au plus 
sujets à risques accidentels, et pas du tout à un monde chaotique pour lequel  nous 
n’avons pas les repères d’intelligence requis. On peut concevoir de rajouter telle ou 
telle strate opérationnelle, mais non de devoir inventer des repères, des logiques, des 
modèles, des mesures, pour ces univers qui ne rentrent pas du tout dans nos 
découpages. Par exemple, on peut accepter de faire un plan d’exposition au risque, à 
condition toutefois que le périmètre à circonscrire reste bien délimité, limité au 
regard de l’ensemble, et affecté par un risque tout de même mesuré, encadré. Si 
pareils cadrages ne sont pas assurés, on plaidera vite que ces questions ne sont pas 
sérieuses puisqu’elle ne sont pas susceptible de mesure « scientifique », et ne 
peuvent faire l’objet d’une responsabilité, puisqu’il ne saurait y avoir de 
responsabilité en univers aussi mal défini.  
•  Un blocage psychologique. Bien davantage : ces univers non bornés, non stratifiés, 
non cartographiés, confrontent brutalement à l’action sans mode d’emploi, à 
l’ignorance, au risque sauvage, à la responsabilité non limitée par avance. Ce second 
facteur est de loin le plus pénalisant. C’est lui qui explique au premier chef les 
fiascos actuels. La simple évocation de pareils espaces de réalité et de responsabilité 
est souvent ressentie comme une violente agression, quasiment vitale. Aussi 
longtemps que le choc est à ce point violent, les intéressés sont promis à perdre 
largement leurs moyens en cas de crise effective. Et, de façon instantanée, les 
personnes comme les organisations, les systèmes comme les pays, peuvent perdre 
leurs capacités de réaction, même les plus basiques.  
 
Des pistes à éviter 
Pour relever ces défis, éviter le constat de décrochage systématique de nos organisations 
dès lors qu’elles sont confrontées à des situations hors-cadres, on ne peut se contenter de 
puiser dans le stock de réponses habituelles. Rajouter une couche organisationnelle à l’édifice, 
ou des salles de crises, ou des plans… ne permettra pas de changer de niveau de compétence. 
Au nombre des fausses bonnes solutions, on donc peut citer notamment :  
•   La création d’un “Conseil national” réunissant des dizaines de représentants 
d’administrations concernées ;  
•   Le développement de simples logiques de moyens ;  
•   La mise en place de centres de crise multipliés ;  
•   La création d’un étage exécutif supplémentaire pour ce type de crise, doté d’un centre 
de crise national censé tout contrôler ;   
•   Le simple discours, par exemple le plaidoyer (verbal) pour le partenariat public-privé, 
etc.  
 
Des démarches à impulser 
Le principe directeur n’est pas de trouver la bonne boîte à outils, à livrer toute faite. En 
milieu chaotique, le plus important est de prendre des initiatives spécifiques qui permettront 
d’enclencher des dynamiques de progrès, en transformant les ancrages profonds. Ce n’est pas 
là une vue sans consistance, mais bien une stratégie imposée par l’enjeu à traiter.  
Un certain nombre de traits doivent marquer la démarche :  
•   Une approche de questionnement ouvert,  non de réponses pré-programmées ;  
•   Un souci d’ouverture aux grands acteurs type grands opérateurs d’infrastructures 
critiques, ONG et associations ;  
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•   Des formes d’organisation transverses, réactives, inventives, qui n’ajoutent pas de 
filtres supplémentaires mais tirent bien les systèmes et les décideurs vers le haut, vers 
les réponses créatrices, adaptées aux univers chaotiques ;  
•   Des vues larges, des actions fines : dans les univers instables, le plus important est de 
poser des jalons à partir desquels pourront se développer d’autres dynamiques 
positives, et non de chercher à tout planifier et résoudre.  
 
Des initiatives à engager 
Au nombre des initiatives à considérer (ce ne sont pas des « solutions » mais des jalons 
possibles), on peut citer :  
•   La mise à l’agenda de la question des crises hors-cadres, avant d’avoir à le faire en y 
étant acculé, sous les coups de boutoir d’une suite de fiascos. Cette mise à l’agenda 
concerne toute grande organisation. Il faudrait notamment le faire à l’échelon 
international, par exemple au niveau du G8 : mettre le sujet des crises hyper-
complexe à l’agenda des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement.  
•   L’énoncé d’une exigence de progrès au niveau du pilotage stratégique. Il s’agit de 
jeter les bases d’une capacité d’aide au pilotage des grandes crises hors-cadres au 
sein des grandes organisations, Etats, et institutions internationales – et notamment 
l’échelon décisionnel européen (bien au-delà des avancées déjà réalisées en matière 
de colonnes secours, de cellule de crise plus tactique que stratégique).  
•   Le développement d’outils adaptés, et notamment de Forces de Réflexion Rapide 
comme outil d’aide à l’analyse stratégique et à la décision en temps réel, pour les 
grandes crises hors-cadres (type pandémie grippale ou autres). Cette capacité est 
désormais en place à EDF, où elle continue à se développer et se renforcer en 
compétence – sous la conduite de Pierre Béroux, Directeur du Contrôle des Risques. 
•   La mise en place de plate-formes d’échanges, entre les acteurs, et au niveau 
international, sur le modèle de celle déjà lancée au Centre des Relations 
Transatlantique de la SAIS (School of Advanced International Studies) à 
Washington.   
•   Une politique systématique de retour d’expérience sur les crises hors cadres, à 
l’échelle internationale, avec des équipes riches de leur diversité d’expertise, comme 
ce qui a été fait sur Katrina, ou le SRAS à Toronto, etc.  
•   Un effort de formation initiale ouvrant les esprits à la reconnaissance, la 
compréhension, et le pilotage des univers non normés.  
 
Il nous revient, ni plus ni moins, que de refonder notre intelligence des risques et des 
crises, de leur compréhension comme de leur pilotage.17 Les dernières décennies ont vu le 
développement et la consécration des modèles et outils de mesure, de réponse, qu’il s’agisse 
d’estimation des risques, d’évaluation des risques, d’organisation de crise, de communication. 
Il nous faut désormais aller affronter de nouveaux océans, inconnus, pour lesquels nous 
n’avons pas de cartes. Plus encore : pour lesquels nos cartes sont souvent des pièges 
fondamentaux.  
Comme au temps des grandes découvertes, il nous faut comprendre que le plus âpre ne sera 
pas dans l’affrontement des difficultés inconnues, mais dans une autre battaille –qui aura pour 
objet nos propres grilles mentales. Nos grilles de perception et d’action ne nous préparent pas 
à traiter de réalités que nous avons appris à nier (rationnellement) ou à rejeter (viscéralement). 
Comme l’ont montré les grandes découvertes maritimes, lorsqu’il fallu se décider à franchir 
tel cap jusque là tenu pour une fin du monde, le principal obstacle n’était pas la difficulté 
                                         
17 Patrick Lagadec : “Over the edge of the world”, Crisis Response, Vol 3, issue 4, September 2007, p. 48-49. 
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physique, mais la « barrière mentale, le prototype même des obstacles primitifs à 
l’exploration ».18  
Aussi longtemps que les dirigeants appelés à piloter les situations de crise en gestation 
n’auront pas été intellectuellement et psychologiquement préparés à traiter de ces défis de 
l’hypercomplexe et de l’inconcevable – y compris en formation initiale ou tout au moins au 
niveau des Mastères – il y a peu à attendre des plaidoiries répétées pour voir advenir un peu 
plus de responsabilité et de compétence opérationnelle dans le domaine. 19 
 
 
                                         
18 Daniel Boorstin : Les Découvreurs, Robert Laffont, Bouquins, 1983, p. 147. Daniel J. Boorstin : The 
Discoverers, Vintage Books, New York, 1983, p. 166.  
19 Patrick Lagadec : “Enseigner la question des crises : Enjeux, Obstacles, Initiatives”, Cahiers du Laboratoire 
d'Econométrie, janvier 2007, Ecole Polytechnique.http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/2007-01.pdf 
Patrick Lagadec : “Crises hors-cadres : Oser un enseignement”, in Ethique, Médecine, Société – Concepts et 
enjeux pratiques, sous la direction d’Emmanuel Hirsh, Vuibert, octobre 2007.  
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SECONDE PARTIE 
 
 
 
 
LECTURE ANALYTIQUE DU RAPPORT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Avertissement 
Je propose dans cette seconde partie une lecture de type « Morceaux choisis » pour ne pas 
reprendre à nouveau des constats faits précédemment (tome 1 et 2) – même si le « plan » 
s’avère de ce fait plus éclaté que structuré. On doit noter que le texte de la Commission est lui 
aussi globalement assez peu structuré, plus marqué par l’accumulation de remarques que par 
des analyses en recul, ce qui accroît certainement la sensation d’éclatement.  
J’ai choisi également de retenir prioritairement les messages non spécifiques de la situation 
américaine, mais de portée générale. 
Un grand nombre de sous-titres sont proposés, pour permettre d’aller chercher plus aisément 
des points d’intérêt très spécifiques.  
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Chapitre 4 
 
LE RISQUE HORS-CADRES :  
QUAND NOS CARTES DE RÉRÉRENCES NE FONCTIONNENT PLUS 
 
 
 
Le piège du connu 
« Je suis passé sans dommage à travers un cyclone de catégorie 5, je passerai à travers 
Katrina, annoncé de catégorie 4, ou 3 » fut souvent une réaction des résidents concernés. Et 
c’est ainsi, écrit la Commission, que Camille (niveau 5) a plus tué en 2005, qu’il ne l’avait fait 
en 1969. La rationnalité n’est certes pas réellement mise en cause, mais plutôt la rationalité 
simplifiée (fort dégradée) qui sert souvent dans les univers de crises. La question des « sous-
cultures de catastrophe » (l’habitude de populations locales à passer à travers tel ou tel type de 
désastre), souvent vantées comme des acquis collectifs de fond qui permettent aux groupes 
humains de mieux affronter des événements graves, sont à reconsidérer dès lors que l’on sort 
des événements nominaux du passé. Que vaut une bonne culture des cyclones si les problèmes 
majeurs sont liés non directement au cyclone, mais aux effets dominos qu’il entraîne ? Si les 
conditions sociétales ont été bouleversées en raison de mutations climatiques, technologiques, 
sociologiques ?  
 Gulf Coast residents call it “hurricane roulette.” Some who had endured 1969’s 
Category 5 Hurricane Camille, the region’s benchmark for catastrophic storms, thought that 
no other storm could come close. But Katrina ended lifetimes of successful storm-dodging. 
Jeff Elder, an insurance rep, had ridden out 20 years of hurricanes with his family in a two-
story, wood-frame home three miles north of the Biloxi, Mississippi, beachfront and 14 
feet above sea level. “The eye of Hurricane Georges passed directly over our home,” he 
wrote in an e-mail, “and, while the bay [just south of the Elders’ home] rose to a level of 
about ten feet above normal, the water never reached our property. In fact, during 
Hurricane Camille… the water in Back Bay only rose to a level approximately 12 feet 
above normal.” By early afternoon on Monday, August 29, the day Katrina madelandfall, 
the Elders had six feet of water in their living room. 
As Biloxi city spokesman Vincent Creel said of Camille survivors lulled into a false 
sense of security, Hurricane Camille killed more people in 2005 than it did in 1969. 
(Chapter 1-5) 
 
Du plan-papier à la réalité sociétale 
Nos traditions, en matière de grandes questions de sécurité civile, valorisent le plan, exposé 
avec fierté, comme on prépare un défilé militaire pour la fête nationale. Il faut souvent bien de 
la hardiesse pour suggérer que les réalités sociales ne se laissent pas traiter comme à la 
parade. Le fait que des milliers de personnes n’aient pas évacué La Nouvelle Orléans relève 
de ces dimensions le plus souvent oubliées de nos plans-papier.     
 In many cases, however, hubris or miscalculation had nothing to do with why some 
stayed behind. Katrina struck in the very last days of August, when those living check-
tocheck were running out of their bi-weekly or monthly allotments. Tens of thousands 
didn’t have cars. Even many who did may not have been able to shoulder the costs of 
evacuation; the average cost for three days for a family of four, including lodging, food, and 
transportation, could easily exceed a thousand dollars, according to an analysis of Hurricane 
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Ivan prepared for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). For the poor of 
neighborhoods like the Lower Ninth Ward, one of the city’s lowest-lying areas, this was an 
impossible sum, though they had an alternative in the Superdome, the city’s “refuge of last 
resort.” 
Nearly 100,000 New Orleanians either couldn’t or didn’t comply with Mayor Nagin’s 
evacuation order. The city had no plan for evacuating them, and the Louisiana Department 
of Transportation and Development, the state agency responsible for transportation during 
a disaster, had done nothing by the time of landfall. New Orleans’ enterprising health 
department director, Dr. Kevin Stephens, had begun negotiating agreements with several 
transportation agencies, but they remained incomplete at the time of landfall. Federal 
officials, who had participated in the Pam exercise and knew that state and local authorities 
would need evacuation help, had no plans in place, either. (Chapter 1-5) 
 
Du réglé au chaotique 
Notre culture des risques et des crises est fondée sur une vision simple : il existe un état du 
monde stable, prévisible, réglé ; un écart se produit ; cette occurrence est prévue, connue, 
mesurée ; les protocoles à suivre pour réduire l’écart sont établis, et il suffit de les suivre. 
Brutalement, un événement type Katrina pulvérise cette logique fondamentale d’écart 
spécifique dans un système stable. On se trouve en présence de béances, les stabilités 
générales ne sont plus assurées, les outils à disposition ne sont plus adaptés car il ne s’agit 
plus de réduire des écarts. Il s’agit de tracer des chemins dans des univers chaotiques, 
profondément étrangers à nos cultures.  
FEMA, the federal government’s primary disaster-response agency, had no effective 
supply-tracking system, so replenishing provisions turned out to be complicated. Planning 
and coordination were so poor that truck drivers didn’t know where to go, and emergency-
management officials didn’t know what was en route, or when it might show up. Phone 
lines were down, so it was hard to clarify. “We'd find [the trucks] parked along [Highway] 
49,” Mike Beeman, FEMA’s liaison to coastal Harrison County in Mississippi, said. 
“[We’d] go over and find out who he was, what he had in the back end, because… many 
times [we] knew items were sent to us, but we didn't know where they were… We'd 
finally find maybe five or six truckloads of water or ice that were sitting off the roadway in 
some apron at a supermarket. … Some of them sat sometimes two or three days. I found 
25 trucks one day… They were just sitting there, waiting for somebody to tell them where 
to go… I have no idea where they came from. (Chapter 1-10) 
 
Des sociétés incapables d’apprendre ?  
L’apprentissage personnel et collectif ne pose guère de difficulté dès lors qu’il s’agit de 
traiter de phénomènes répétitifs. Hélas, il faut bien mesurer les difficultés colossales que l’on 
rencontre lorsque l’on tente de faire progresser nos sociétés sur des événements qui sortent 
des régularités statistiques. Ce problème devient sérieux si d’aventure ces événements non 
conventionnels sont globalement bien plus lourds que les phénomènes récurrents, peuvent 
entraîner des effondrements systémiques. La Commission le souligne avec acidité :   
This report is a study of a catastrophe, an “ultra-catastrophe,” in the words of DHS 
Secretary Michael Chertoff. The National Response Plan defines a catastrophe as “any 
natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of 
mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, 
environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.” By definition, they 
are rare, but the age of terrorism and climate change has ensured that the next occurrence is 
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mainly a question of how and where, not when. 
For that reason, the Committee intends this report to serve as a catalyst for constructive 
reform before the next catastrophe, whatever shape it might take. Ironically, many of this 
report’s findings have an alarming resemblance to the General Accounting Office’s analysis 
of the government’s inadequate response to 1992’s Hurricane Andrew. The Committee 
hopes that this report will never become part of a compendium of warnings similarly, and 
tragically, ignored. (Chapter 1-15) 
 
Le tableau de la débâcle 
Cette résistance à l’apprentissage est telle que la Commission tient à se faire cinglante dès 
l’introduction. Le système n’a pas seulement connu quelques points faibles. Il a été enfoncé.  
The Committee has found: 
• A failure on the part of all levels of government to plan and prepare for the 
consequences of Katrina. 
• A failure to heed the warnings of a looming catastrophe during the weekend preceding 
the storm, and a failure on the day of landfall to recognize that the worst predictions 
had come true. 
• A failure on the part of government leaders to think “big” before Katrina struck and 
to challenge existing planning assumptions in the face of what was known to be a 
“nightmare scenario.” 
• A failure on the part of all levels of government to plan and provide for the timely 
and effective evacuation of the elderly, the sick, and the disabled from New Orleans, 
and the evacuation of tens of thousands of able-bodied residents who did not have 
personal transportation. 
• A failure to act on the lessons of past catastrophes, both man-made and natural, that 
demonstrated the need for a large, well-equipped, and coordinated law enforcement 
response to maintain or restore civil order after catastrophic events. 
• A failure to plan for and provide in a timely manner mass medical care andtemporary 
shelter for tens of thousands of Katrina victims that all levels of government knew 
were likely to be impacted by a catastrophic hurricane. (Chapter 1-16) 
 
Application aux cyclones : quand les cadrages de base ne fonctionnent plus 
Catégoriser, rassurer, réduire à la normalité, sont les tendances les plus ancrées qui 
marquent les réponses au risque. Dès lors que les risques sortent des niches qui leur sont 
réservées, on voit soudain s’ouvrir un terrain barbare, qui ne respecte plus nos cartes, nos 
échelles, nos mots d’ordre. Ainsi :  
• En matière de cyclone, nos repères habituels en termes de gravité sont fondés sur la 
vitesse des vents : ce n’est pas là le critère essentiel, les phénomènes de montée des 
eaux sont autrement plus importants ; et les protections naturelles offertes par les zones 
de marais sont une sécurité critique, constamment et gravement mise à mal au fil des 
ans par destruction des zones de marais et autres zones tampons ;  
• Ce n’est pas parce que l’on n’annonce pas une saison dense en matière de cyclones que 
l’on est à l’abri de cyclones hors normes ;  
• Nous avons de bonnes compétences en matière d’évacuation, mais seulement si un délai 
suffisant nous est donné (plusieurs jours, et trois ce n’est pas suffisant), si les masses de 
populations concernées ne sont pas trop importantes. Mais voici que les zones à risque 
sont marquées par des pressions démographiques exponentielles ; sont peuplées de 
populations de plus en plus âgées, de moins en moins transportables.  
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• Voici que la fréquence des phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes augmente, ce qui 
peut nécessiter des évacuations de précaution massives et répétées.  
• Certes, les progrès de la météorologie permettent de voir plus loin, mais précisément 
cela risque aussi de multiplier les exigences d’évacuations de précaution. Mais on ne 
peut évacuer Houston trois fois durant un même été, et trois fois pour rien ; même après 
un fiasco à La Nouvelle Orléans.  
• Si des populations ont été relogées dans des caravanes ou abris de fortune après un 
cyclone, comme Katrina, tout phénomène un peu fort – bien moins puissant qu’un 
cyclone – risque d’exiger un traitement de type cyclone.  
On pourrait multiplier les observations. Elles se résument à une mise en garde tautologique 
: dès lors que l’on entre dans le complexe hors nomenclature habituelle, rien ne fonctionne 
plus simplement. Et ce n’est plus sur tel ou tel point tactique que l’on rencontre des 
difficultés. Le fondement même de nos analyses, de nos dispostifs, se révèle fragilisé, voire 
pulvérisé.  
Though hurricanes are measured by their wind speeds, many scientists have come to 
believe that storm surge is far more deadly than wind, especially considering that the highly 
populated areas of the Atlantic seaboard and the Gulf Coast lie only 10 feet above mean 
sea level. […] “The greatest potential for loss of life related to a hurricane is from the storm 
surge,” according to an official with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA). (Chapter 3-2) 
During Hurricane Andrew in 1992, alarmed by scenes in South Florida, approximately 
1.2 million evacuated from the New Orleans metropolitan area. While the evacuation almost 
certainly saved lives, federal hurricane experts were alarmed that officials in New Orleans 
expected 60 to 80 hours warning to complete an evacuation. During testimony before a 
Congressional committee in 1993, Dr. Robert Sheets, then the director of the NHC, warned 
that “We don’t have the skill meteorologically speaking to provide a sufficient warning for 
those long lead times. There is no way I am going to have 70 hours of lead time for New 
Orleans to respond to a hurricane….” 
By 2005, advances in technology, such as refinement of satellite capabilities and 
improvement of pressure-measuring sensors in reconnaissance planes, had drastically 
increased the NHC’s lead times. By 2 p.m. ET Friday, August 26, 65 hours before Katrina 
made landfall, NHC Director Mayfield was making calls to emergency officials in the Gulf 
Coast alerting them that a rapidly strengthening storm was heading directly for New 
Orleans. (Chapter 3-2) 
In earlier periods of our history, the physical impact of major hurricanes in the Gulf was 
softened by swamps, marshes, and barrier islands, while the societal impact was limited by 
its relatively small concentrations of buildings and people. (Chapter 3-3) 
In more recent times, however, the population in the coastal counties from Texas to the 
Florida Keys has soared. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that 9.46 million people live 
along the Gulf Coast – 3.5 times the number in 1950 – and their numbers are growing by 
nearly 7 percent a year. From 1970-1994 the Gulf Coast averaged less than one hurricane 
landfall per season, and the East Coast averaged one hurricane landfall every five years. 
This is in sharp contrast to the average of three U.S. hurricane landfalls during very active 
seasons. Unfortunately, decisions about land use, construction standards, etc. were based 
on an erroneous assumption, growing out of that period, that hurricanes would no longer 
affect the United States as frequently or as strongly as they had in earlier decades. 
Besides economic and population growth – including the swelling numbers of retirees 
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drawn to warm-winter locales – engineering projects intended to prevent or reduce flood 
damage increased the appeal of the Gulf Coast. Here, as in the Southwest and the West 
Coast, “we are pushing toward the very areas where nature puts us most at risk from 
tropical storms, mudslides, and forest fires,” Princeton University researcher Edward 
Tenner wrote in 1996. One of Tenner’s examples: “a big storm could leave 20 feet of water 
in downtown New Orleans and flood evacuation routes.” (Chapter 3-3) 
Marking the beginning of a new multi-decade period of hurricanes activity involves 
extensive analysis of historical trends, conditions in the Atlantic and the atmosphere. Even 
so, there are no guarantees. Catastrophic hurricanes occurred in years of normal or even 
below-normal hurricane activity. In 1972, Hurricane Agnes never got beyond Category 1 
strength, but still caused 122 deaths in the United States with severe flooding in Virginia 
and the Carolinas. Hurricane Andrew, the most damaging hurricane in U. S. history before 
Katrina, formed during a season (and cycle, lasting until 1994) of belownormal activity. 
(Chapter 3-3 ; 3-4) 
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Chapitre 5 
 
L’ALERTE SUR PHÉNOMÈNES HORS-CADRES :  
DES SYSTÈMES COMME DÉBRANCHÉS 
 
 
Nous avons coutume de gommer les problèmes de remontées d’information. Le cas de 
Katrina montre que, même sur une situation parfaitement anticipée, la cartographie 
institutionnellement validée d’une situation va demander des délais considérables. Il faut tenir 
compte bien sûr des problèmes de liaisons. Mais les viscosités organisationnelles sont 
autrement plus importantes. Et il faut probablement mettre en tête de la liste des facteurs une 
tétanisation générale, une impossibilité à tout niveau de se saisir d’une information 
« terroriste », c’est à dire qui ne cadre pas avec les systèmes d’hypothèses en vigueur, qui va 
poser des problèmes à l’organisation, qui va nécessiter des prises de risques. La tendance va 
être d’exiger des vérifications en tout genre, avant de tenir une information pour valide – et le 
plus souvent est tenu pour « valide » ce qui confirme le bienfondé des hypothèses 
coutumières.  
Dans le cas de Katrina :  
•   Le directeur du service de suivi des cyclones prend l’initiative exceptionnelle 
d’appeler personnellement les hauts responsables régionaux pour s’assurer qu’ils 
sont bien au fait de l’extrême gravité des événements. 
•   La brèche initiale de digue survient le lundi matin dès 6h30, et la brèche 
catastrophique se produit entre 9h et 10h. 
•   Deux officiers de sapeurs-pompiers de La Nouvelle Orléans filment les brèches à 
11h11 du matin et ils n’ont aucun doute sur la gravité de l’événement.  
•   Entre 17h15 et 19h, un responsable public affairs de la FEMA, Marty Bahamonde, 
peut observer la situation depuis l’hélicoptère des Coast Guard, et il n’a aucun doute 
sur la gravité des brèches, comme de l’inondation générale.  
•   La mobilisation à Washington n’interviendra réellement que très longtemps après : 
rapports bloqués ou réécrits de façon « optimiste », demandes de vérification, etc. Le 
tableau est tout simplement ahurissant. 
Deux interprétations sont possibles, probablement à prendre toutes les deux en 
considération :   
•   Par construction, les institutions sont des systèmes à haut degré de viscosité, et il ne 
faut guère s’attendre – sauf leadership particulièrement déterminé, comme celui dont 
sut faire preuve le directeur du centre de suivi des cyclones – à une réactivité en 
moins de 24 heures, tout au moins pour un début d’inscription à l’agenda ; plusieurs 
jours seront encore nécessaires pour un début action organisée ; plusieurs semaines 
pour une dynamique d’ensemble cohérente. L’identité administrative est d’adminis-
trer, de déployer une culture de dossiers, de vérifier la conformité des pièces, de 
rejeter les formulaires incomplets – en aucun cas de piloter des situations non 
conformes.   
•   Si d’aventure la situation est effectivement gravissime, à la viscosité s’ajoute un 
syndrome de tétanisation. L’annonce de l’événement se transforme en grenade 
incapacitante. Et même un message-flash ultra précis, signé d’une autorité crédible, 
ne parviendra pas à percer les murs érigés en temps réel, dès la perception d’une 
menace vitale (pour le fonctionnement routinier de l’organisation). En l’espèce, on 
tiendra le rapport de Marty Bahamonde pour douteux. Et l’on réagit sur le mode : “il 
a dû mal voir, La Nouvelle Orléans (contrairement d’ailleurs à ce que soulignaient 
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tous les rapports d’étude préalables pour ce type d’événement) ne peut pas être sous 
les eaux”.  
Le premier blocage peut être traité en développant des capacités de leadership tranchant 
avec le « wait and see » protecteur. Le second invite à traiter instantanément les institutions 
comme des organisations sujettes à pathologies graves dès l’instant où elles sont confrontées à 
l’aberrant. Un leadership à la hussarde peut aider chacun à reprendre ses esprits. Mais il est 
possible qu’il faille bien davantage, relevant plus de la psychiatrie que du management 
conventionnel. 20 
 “Max Mayfield, Director of the NHC, phoned Walter Maestri, an old friend and the 
Emergency Preparedness Director in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. Maestri recalled 
Mayfield’s words: “This is it. This is what we’ve been talking about all of these years. 
You are going to take it. … It’s a 30, 90 storm.” Maestri explained, “That’s the longitude 
and latitude of the City of New Orleans.” (Chapter 4- 1)  
On Saturday evening, Max Mayfield made another round of telephone calls to assure 
himself that local and state officials understood what was coming. At approximately 7:25 
p.m., he spoke with Governor Blanco, who suggested he call New Orleans Mayor Ray 
Nagin. Twenty minutes later, he spoke with Governor Haley Barbour in Mississippi. By 8 
p.m., he had spoken with Mayor Nagin. (Chapter 4- 2) 
Because the storm surge arrived ahead of the hurricane, some residential areas in the 
greater New Orleans area began to flood just after 4 a.m. (Chapter 4- 5) 
Based on two very detailed eyewitness accounts in the area, it is estimated that the 
initial breach on the east side of the 17th Street Canal occurred at approximately 6:30 a.m., 
and that the catastrophic failure of the levee took place somewhere between 9 and 10 a.m. 
Similarly, sometime between 7 and 9:30 a.m., a section on the east side of the London 
Avenue Canal (close to the Mirabeau Bridge) failed; sometime between 7:30 and 10:30 a.m., 
a section on the west side of the London Avenue Canal breached, “sen[ding] an 8 foot high 
wall of water cascading into the surrounding neighborhoods.” All three of these breaches 
caused catastrophic flooding in the Orleans East Bank polder, which includes (among 
others) the Central Business District, Lakeview, Mid City, and Lakewood areas of the city.   
Captains Paul Hellmers and Joe Fincher, two New Orleans Fire Department firemen 
located at a department refuge in the Lakefront area of the city, videotaped the 17th Street 
Canal breach. In the video, which captures the breach at 11:11 a.m., Capt. Hellmers said: 
[Y]ou can…see the water pouring through the [inaudible] wall. There’s a… concrete wall 
on top of the dirt levee. And you can see that the… wall is gone – you can see the water 
pouring through, it looks like about a 200-foot section of wall that’s gone! The water is 
continuing to rise – very slowly.  
While Capt. Hellmers observed that the water in the entire area was rising “very 
slowly,” it is clear from the video that the water from the 17th Street Canal breach is 
pouring through the gaping hole with enormous pressure and speed.65 A second video of 
the New Orleans area, shot from a Coast Guard helicopter during the early afternoon of 
August 29, helps explain the different impressions.66 From the vantage point of the 
helicopter’s bay window, it is evident that the inflow from Lake Pontchartrain was 
                                         
20 Ces considérations peuvent choquer. Hélas, j’ai pu voir à de multiples reprises, certes en exercices (mais je 
dirais plutôt : « même en exercice »), que la simple injection d’hypothèses non anticipées pouvait « vider » une 
salle de crise de façon quasi instantanée. Et le mécanisme fonctionne à merveille : personne ne s’en souvient, 
tant est pressant le besoin d’effacement. Certes, il est possible de filmer la scène, et cela a été fait, mais il 
apparaît vite que l’on irait au devant de problèmes sérieux si l’on s’avisait de projeter le film.  
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spreading out rapidly into a vast area of land, so the water level rose slowly despite the 
power of the flow. 
Later in the day, between approximately 5:15 and 7 p.m., Marty Bahamonde, a public 
affairs official with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) who had spent 
the night at the New Orleans City Hall Emergency Operations Center, joined a Coast 
Guard helicopter crew to conduct a visual inspection. The first of his two rides began with 
a quick pass over the 17th Street Canal. A second flight of approximately 45 minutes 
covered most of the metropolitan area of New Orleans. Bahamonde described the scene: 
[A]s far as the eye could see in either direction was completely covered with water. 
There was no dry land. I saw no dry land the moment I left, other than around the 
Superdome… It was varying in depth. There were houses that were completely under 
water. All you saw was rooftops … It was obvious that there was massive flooding 
throughout the city... (Chapter 4- 6) 
And we went out and flew over the [I-10] twin span and it was completely 
destroyed...We flew over the canal area, may have even been the Mississippi, where a huge 
tanker had been run aground....Chalmette, the Ninth Ward, all completely flooded... the 
Intracoastal Industrial Canal. You didn’t really know it was a canal because it was just one 
sheet of water.... And as we got back toward the city, it became obvious now that – it’s 
close to 7 o’clock – that there are literally hundreds of people on rooftops, standing in 
balconies in apartments, and that there was a desperate need for a rescue mission because it 
was now getting dark. (Chapter 4- 7) 
Around the same time that Bahamonde was observing the devastation from a Coast 
Guard helicopter, Colonel Richard P. Wagenaar, Commander of the Army Corps of 
Engineers district office in New Orleans, was conducting a similar reconnaissance in a four-
wheel-drive vehicle. Col. Wagenaar told the Committee that between 5 and 5:30 p.m. he 
reached an elevated overpass on Interstate 10 near downtown New Orleans: [T]hen we saw 
the water, and the water was – all you could see were the trees sticking out of the water… 
that’s probably 10 or 15 feet of water...a sight to behold, because, literally, I mean, you 
just drive on an interstate and there is a lake. I mean, it literally was a lake.” (Chapter 4- 7) 
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Chapitre 6 
 
L’EXERCICE PAM :  
UNE DÉMARCHE PARTICULIÈREMENT HARDIE 
 
 
Certes, la Commission souligne les retards subis dans la conduite de ce projet, 
notamment en raison de limitations budgétaires ; ou encore les difficultés dans la prise en 
compte des enseignements de l’exercice. Mais on relèvera la puissance de l’action 
entreprise, la hardiesse des hypothèses retenues. Il ne s’agissait plus d’un exercice-
démonstration calibré de telle sorte que les hypothèses habituelles ne soient en rien 
affectées. 21 
“Based on scientific research and dozens of emergency-management studies, the 
Hurricane Pam scenario predicted: 
• Widespread flooding throughout the city 
•  67,000 dead 
•  200,000 to 300,000 in need of evacuation after landfall 
•  Hundreds of thousands displaced 
•  Sheltering and evacuation needs exceeding state and local governments’ capabilities 
•  Hospitals would be overcrowded with special-needs patients. Backup generators 
would run out of fuel or fail before patients could be moved elsewhere. 
•  Incapacitated first responders and parish resources 
•  Compromised situational awareness” (Chapter 8-1) 
 
On notera aussi le nombre imposant de participants :  
“The initial Hurricane Pam workshops took place from July 16 until July 23. 
Attendance included over 300 participants from 15 federal agencies, 20 state agencies, 13 
parishes, 5 volunteer agencies” (Chapter 8-6) 
 
Cependant, rien n’est dit sur une quelconque participation des dirigeants. Il est probable 
qu’ils n’y participaient pas, ce qui constitue une grave défaillance. Davantage : ces absences, 
qui sont la norme la plus courante22, souligne que ces questions de vulnérabilités vitales ne 
font pas encore partie des responsabilités des dirigeants. Aussi longtemps que cette loi 
fonctionne, il est inutile de s’étonner des fiascos subis lorsque le risque, comme c’est le cas 
aujourd’hui, sort des ornières du quotidien. Certes, il est désormais d’usage, en cas de grand 
malheur collectif, de compenser la désertion par une communication submergeante, mais une 
émulsion d’émotion ne ressucite pas les morts.  
 
 
                                         
21 Lors d’une préparation de ce type, pour un séisme suivi d’un tsunami, il sembla indispensable de tenir pour 
acquis que : l’aéroport ne serait pas affecté, les autoroutes seraient tout au plus concernées par quelques éboule-
ments, la préfecture serait intacte et disposerait de tous ses agents, les moyens de communication ne seraient en 
rien affectés, les hôpitaux préservés, l’électricité serait fournie sans difficulté, etc.  
22 Ce qui se traduit par des remarques du type : « On peut faire un exercice, mais ne comptez pas sur le dirigeant 
pour y être, il ne travaille que sur notes » ; « Pour la conférence sur la question des crises la semaine prochaine, 
nous n’aurons pas les cadres dirigeants, le Président a mis une réunion importante au même moment » ; « On 
devrait faire quelque chose sur le sujet, mais le comité de direction n’est pas encore mûr », etc.  
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Chapitre 7 
 
LES DIGUES :  
ENTRE IRRESPONSABILITÉ ET IMPUISSANCE DEVANT LE RISQUE MAJEUR 
 
 
Il faut reconnaître l’immense mérite de la Commission d’avoir tenté d’y voir clair dans les 
attributions des uns et des autres, dans les perceptions des uns et des autres, quant aux 
périmètres de responsabilité qui étaient peut-être les leurs en matière de digues, de sécurité 
des digues, d’intervention d’urgence. Aussi longtemps qu’il s’agit tout au plus de régler 
quelque difficulté marginale, les usages bureaucratiques habituels permettaient sans doute de 
tenir le quotidien, mais le château de cartes ne pouvait manquer de s’effondrer en cas de 
phénomène majeur. Ce fut le problème posé par Katrina. L’éventualité de brèche avait été 
exclue des dispositifs. Dès lors que la réalité ne rentrait plus dans les plans, l’impuissance 
imposait sa loi.  
Mais il faudrait sans doute retourner le raisonnement : vu les grandes difficultés qu’aurait 
soulevé tout examen un peu lucide, il était plus confortable de bâtir et de consolider un 
magma organisationnel illisible. Inutile, en pareilles circonstances, de tenter d’organiser 
quelque exercice, plan ou autre dispositif de sécurité.  
 Louisiana law requires levee districts to have emergency plans. The Orleans Levee 
District had such a plan, but the plan did not contemplate repairing major breaches like 
those experienced along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals.118 Instead, the levee 
district assumed that, consistent with the informal distinction it used in classifying O&M 
problems – that minor problems were its responsibility and major problems were the 
Corps’ responsibility –fixing any breach in the system would be the Corps’ responsibility 
because it would be “major.” The Corps, meanwhile, was under the impression that the 
Lake Pontchartrain Project had been turned over to the levee district and so it was the levee 
district’s responsibility to be the first responders for any emergency, regardless of  the 
size. The conflicting expectations resulted in a breakdown in the preparation for and 
response to Katrina among all involved – the Corps, the LA DOTD, and the Orleans Levee 
District. 
At the Committee’s December 15, 2005 hearing, “Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge 
of the New Orleans Levees?” the parties involved had no agreement on emergency 
responsibilities.(Chapter 10-14) 
 
Quant à savoir qui était en charge si d’aventure il y avait brèche des digues, c’est comme 
demander à des organisations ce qu’elles ont prévu en cas d’invasion de Martiens. Face au 
désastre, qui aurait nécessité une réactivité collective sans faille ni hésitation, on est empêtré 
instantanément dans des conflits illisibles. Bien entendu, on ne saurait demander aux Sociétés 
de se préparer à tout et n’importe quoi, du type invasion de Martiens. Mais, en l’espèce, il 
s’agissait du scénario le plus central, le plus pressant, pour La Nouvelle Orléans.  
La Commission livre le script de la déposition du Colonel Wagenaar, qui s’exprime au 
nom du Corps of Engineers du district.  
“Who was doing it, who was in charge, you know, and what parish was what and who 
could build what road and what trucks could be used and what equipment could be used, 
you know. … I mean, the issue was, is the… [West Jefferson] Levee District had like five 
trucks, dump trucks and an excavator. And here we bring in a contractor that’s ready to go 
that’s got 20 trucks… I mean, we’re bringing federal contractors – we’re bringing the 
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federal government to bear on the problem. And they [the West Jefferson Levee District] 
were like, “Well, you can’t do that, that’s our road.” They were working on building this 
road back there. ‘Well, you can’t’ – you know, “We’re building the road, you can’t do 
that.” …I mean, all – pretty much a turf war almost…. And it just got to the point where, 
you know, we were mobilizing contractors…and they wouldn’t let us operate on the bridge 
[the Hammond Highway Bridge]. Mike Stack [with LADOTD] and – you know, Giuseppe 
[with the West Jefferson Levee District blocked some of our equipment from moving with 
his vehicles.” 
This disagreement illustrated the overall confusion among federal, state, and local entities 
over who was responsible for the Lake Pontchartrain Project. As mentioned above, Col. 
Wagenaar thought the levee districts were responsible for the repairs, but the Orleans Levee 
District did not have the personnel or the material available to address the situation. The 
leadership vacuum was filled by LA DOTD [Louisiana Department of Transportation and 
Development] personnel who assumed command of the initial repair efforts. That effort, 
too, proved inadequate, at least according to Col. Wagenaar, who thought it was best that 
the Corps take over – “[W]e had a bunch of dysfunctional stuff going on out there, and we 
figured if we didn’t do it and take over and marshal federal resources at this problem, that 
we’d be here for quite a while trying to fix this hole.” 
The levee districts and the LA DOTD personnel on the scene did not agree with Col. 
Wagenaar’s decision, so ultimately, on Thursday, September 1, LA DOTD Secretary 
Johnny Bradberry, and the Corps’ Director of Civil Works, Major General Don Riley, 
resolved the dispute, concluding that the repair effort would be a Corps-directed 
operation. 
 
En conclusion, la Commission en est réduite à préconiser des lignes inimaginables de bon 
sens. On se prend à se demander si elle s’adresse à des institutions responsables ou à des 
malades mentaux – qui ont mis trois jours à harmoniser leurs violons alors que l’on était en 
plein désastre humanitaire. Elle en est effectivement réduite à traiter les institutions 
responsables comme des invalides graves en leur rappelant certaines exigences on ne peut 
plus élémentaires. Comme si, à la suite d’un crash aérien, une commission d’enquête faisait 
savoir, avec tact pour ne pas heurter, qu’il serait préférable que les pilotes soient dans le 
cockpit au moins lors du décollage et de l’atterrissage.  
Mais il faut bien comprendre le fond du problème, pathétique. L’idée que l’on pourrait être 
concerné par des scénarios dépassant le simple écart à la marge est hors champ de vision, et 
au-delà du supportable. Telle est, en vérité, le ressort de l’incompétence et de l’irresponsabili-
té générales. C’est le facteur qui permet de donner sens à tout ce débat surréaliste.  
 Resolving the dispute over who was in charge of the repair effort and the full-scale 
efforts to fill the breaches took three days. No such dispute should have occurred, and 
resolution should not have taken so long. Responsibilities among the levee districts, the LA 
DOTD, and the Corps should have been understood and documented. An interagency 
emergency response plan should have been in effect. The Corps should have pre-
positioned personnel and material from either the New Orleans District, or the other 
districts within the Mississippi Valley Division and identified in the Division’s Hurricane 
Contingency Plan, to assess and repair immediate problems. In the end, neither the Corps, 
the LA DOTD, nor the levee districts had any plan in place, nor had they determined or 
planned in advance who would be responsible for, and have the assets nearby, to address 
(Chapter 10-16) 
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Chapitre 8 
 
PRÉPARATION EN RETARD D’UNE GUERRE :  
QUAND LE DÉVOUEMENT NE SUFFIT PLUS 
 
 
Il y a bien eu des réactions, du dévouement et de la compétence. Mais quand il s’agit de 
livrer une « autre guerre », la bonne application de chacun à mettre en place les moyens 
usuels, et même à les renforcer, ne permet pas d’échapper au fiasco. Comme l’avait écrit un 
officier français sur un papier retrouvé sur son corps lors de la débâcle de juin 1940 : « Je me 
tue, Monsieur le Président, pour vous faire savoir que mes hommes étaient de braves, mais 
que l’on n’envoit pas des gens avec des fusils contre des chars d’assaut ».  
La Commission ne manque pas de souligner ce problème : l’état de Louisiane n’était pas 
préparé face au scénario qui allait se dérouler – et qui était pourtant parfaitement répertorié, et 
même nommé de façon directe The New Orleans Scenario, sans qu’il soit même besoin de 
préciser davantage. Aussi sûrement que la Tour Eiffel est attachée à Paris. La Commission 
insiste : dès l’annonce de l’arrivée de Katrina, l’état de Louisiane avait toutes les raisons de 
savoir que son plan allait échouer. Ce qui ne manqua pas de se produire.  
The seeds of Louisiana’s failure to prepare were sown long before Hurricane Katrina 
approached the state. As detailed in other report sections, Louisiana had been on notice of 
its vulnerability to catastrophic hurricanes for decades, but over the long term had never 
fully upgraded its emergency response systems to the level necessary to protect its 
citizens from those events. Based on its own models and experience, it could have foreseen 
the inadequacy of many of its plans and resources, particularly its plans to evacuate people 
without personal transportation and the staffing of its state emergency preparedness office. 
In short, when it received warnings of Katrina’s approach, the state had reason to know 
that its emergency response systems were likely to fail, however diligently they were 
implemented. And fail they did. (Chapter 11-1) 
 
La Commission rend pourtant justice à nombre d’actions engagées par l’état et sa 
Gouverneure : dispositifs de crise, mobilisation de forces de sécurité, lettres au Président Bush 
pour obtenir aide et appuis, etc. Mais un message, souligne la Commission, n’est pas 
suffisamment mis au centre de ces démarches : le fait que l’on va être totalement dépassé.  
C’est là un trait classique en situation de crise non conventionnelle n’ayant pas fait l’objet 
d’attention suffisante. La sourde sensation que quelque chose ne va pas, l’angoisse tétanisante 
que l’on risque d’être submergé et que l’on ne pourra pas être à la hauteur de ses devoirs, de 
son image, déclenche rapidement une posture de protection : « Nous faisons face ».  
Au plus haut niveau, comme on le voit régulièrement, cette fière affirmation est 
généralement prise comme une bonne nouvelle, « rassurante », et volontiers réutilisée en 
communication médiatique pour « rassurer » le public : les services « font face ». Il faut 
savoir décrypter ce message. En cas de situation non conventionnelle, il y a de fortes chances 
que ce soit davantage un signal de détresse qu’une réassurance effective.  
 While Governor Blanco’s letter sounded a note of urgency, she and other state officials 
missed other critical opportunities over the weekend to convey the extent to which the 
state’s response capabilities were likely to be overwhelmed. Most important, in a video 
teleconference of federal, state, and local officials on Saturday, Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting 
Deputy Director of LOHSEP, answered a question from former FEMA Director Michael 
Brown of whether the state had “any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to you 
that you need” in the negative: 
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Mike Brown: Any questions? Colonel, do you have any unmet needs, anything that 
we’re not getting to you that you need or—  
COLONEL SMITH: Mike, no. (Inaudible) resources that are en route, and it looks like 
those resources that are en route are going to – to be a good first shot. Naturally, once 
we get into this thing, you know, neck deep here, unfortunately, or deeper, I’m sure that 
things are going to come up that maybe some of even our best planners hadn’t even 
thought about. So I think flexibility is going to be the key. 
Brown later testified that he was seeking information from the state on what it needed at 
that moment only, and Col. Smith later tried to downplay the significance of his response. 
But his remarks reflect an underestimation of the extent to which the state was unprepared. 
Given the frenzied efforts over the weekend to get hold of the incomplete drafts of plans 
under development in the Hurricane Pam exercise, it should not have taken Louisiana’s 
“best planners” to identify shortfalls in ongoing preparations. (Chapter 11-3) 
 
En ce qui concerne la ville de La Nouvelle Orléans, la question du Superdome est retenue 
par la Commission. C’est l’exemple pur d’une sortie des univers habituels. Le plan prévoyait 
que cette installation pourrait être utilisée comme centre d’hébergement de dernière extrémité 
pour 200-400 personnes nécessitant des aides particulières (mais en aucun cas des malades 
exigeant une assistance lourde), ce qui signifiait, en comptant leurs accompagnateurs, 400 à 
800 personnes. Dans les cas des deux derniers cylones, environ 30 personnes ayant besoin 
d’assistance s’étaient présentées au Superdome. Pour Katrina, le responsable en charge prit de 
la marge, et prépara le Superdome à recevoir environ 1200 personnes, dont 600 personnes à 
assister – soit 20 fois plus que dans les cas précédents. Dès son ouverture, le dimanche matin, 
le Superdome vit arriver 1000 patients, dont certains exigeaient des traitements lourds, cas 
totalement exclu du périmètre de mission défini. Il fallut tout reconsidérer, demander de l’aide 
– qui n’arriva pas à temps (avant l’impact) en raison d’un refus d’assistance de la police du 
Texas, puis des conditions météorologiques qui s’aggravèrent.  
Autre nouvelle donne : jusqu’alors ce type d’hébergement était pensé pour quelques heures 
avant retour à domicile. Cette fois, il faudrait compter en jours.  
Pour le dimanche soir environ 10 000 personnes étaient arrivées au Superdome. Il fallait 
tout repenser en termes de nourriture. Et l’on allait oublier les toilettes portables, dont 
l’absence allait se révéler désastreuse.  
Le système n’était pas pensé pour cette fonction. Il ne pouvait qu’aller au fiasco.  On ne 
saurait plaider la surprise absolue. Le Maire avait demandé des crédits pour renforcer les 
capacités du Superdome afin qu’il puisse mieux remplir sa fonction de centre d’hébergement 
de dernière extrémité. Les crédits lui avaient été refusés.  
Cependant, ce que l’on omet généralement de dire, c’est que, dans les conditions qui 
prévalaient en matière d’impréparation, les 10 000 puis les 20 000 personnes allaient certes 
vivre l’horreur, mais échapperaient au moins à la mort.  
The Region 1 plan called for preparations to receive 200 to 400 special-needs individuals 
and each was expected to bring a caregiver, meaning a total of 400 to 800 individuals. 
Hurricanes Isidore and Ivan had each resulted in about 30 special-needs people, plus 
caregivers. As a result of the plan, past experience, and the capacity of the Superdome, Dr. 
Kevin Stephens, Director of the City’s Health Department, set up the shelter to 
accommodate approximately 1,200, comprised of 600 special-needs people and their 
caregivers. (Chapter 11-4) 
At 8 a.m. on Sunday, the Superdome opened, as planned, for special-needs patients.59 
Approximately 1,000 special needs patients arrived throughout the day,60 plus an 
undetermined number of caregivers. Colonel Pat Prechter, Deputy Commander of the 
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National Guard’s Louisiana Medical Command, noticed that some patients arriving in the 
shelter, following processing through registration and triage, required dialysis or constant 
oxygen which would normally disqualify them as candidates for special-needs shelter 
admission. Following this observation, and at the city’s request, National Guard medical 
officials began assisting with triage. Of the approximately 1,000 individuals who arrived at 
the special-needs shelter, 450 to 500 of the most critical were evacuated63 to a special-needs 
shelter in Baton Rouge. 
Despite the pre-staging of substantial assets, officials realized on Sunday that additional 
supplies were necessary. The city provided more medical oxygen and large quantities of 
other supplies ranging from saline solution to adult diapers. When Simonson called again on 
Sunday, Dr. Stephens accepted the help, which included a FEMA Disaster Medical 
Assistance Team (DMAT) and material from the U.S. HHS’s Strategic National Stockpile 
of emergency medical supplies. While FEMA was able to get military-style rations, water, 
and ice to the Superdome, the DMAT had to stop in Baton Rouge because the Texas State 
Police denied two requests for police escorts and then once in Louisiana the team met 
worsening weather conditions. The team didn’t make it to the Superdome before landfall. 
(Chapter 11-5) 
In prior hurricanes, the Superdome had served as a refuge for those needing to ride out 
the storm for a few hours before returning home. During Katrina, thousands would stay for 
days. 
In 2004, recognizing the need for greater sheltering capacity, Mayor Nagin requested 
$850,000 from the New Orleans Congressional delegation for “a study … to determine the 
feasibility of upgrading the Louisiana Superdome, or any other facility, to serve as a refuge 
of last resort.” The city made similar requests to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 2005. These funding 
requests were denied, although the record does not indicate why. The city did not appeal to 
the state because of the perception that the state lacked the capability to help, and the city 
was planning on upgrading the Dome under FEMA – not state – regulations.The upgrade 
would have taken at least two more years (and cost $7 millionto $17 million).   
By late Sunday evening, about 10,000 people had shown up at the Superdome. The 
Louisiana National Guard had pre-positioned 900,000 Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) rations 
and water for its staff’s needs (though most were ultimately given to the storm victims). 
Officials realized that even that cache would need augmenting, and rushed out requests for 
350,000 additional MREs from the city and additional food and water from the state. 
FEMA and the Louisiana National Guard were able to move in more rations and water 
before landfall. 
No one had made arrangements for portable toilets, however. Dr. Stephens tried to 
contract directly with individual vendors on Saturday, August 27, but could not reach 
them. Several Superdome witnesses interviewed considered this omission a central failure in 
pre-storm planning. 
The large number of people at the Superdome also required a significant security 
presence. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) under Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain 
were in charge, first with 40 officers and later with double that amount. In support of 
NOPD, the Louisiana National Guard pre-positioned considerable troops to assist with 
security, as well as other missions, such as engineering functions, communications, and 
food distribution. Pre-landfall security mainly entailed screening walk-ins and bus arrivals 
searching for weapons. When the downpour started around 6 p.m. Sunday, security 
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screening moved inside the building. This made it harder for city police to ensure that no 
one entered with a weapon. The National Guard also pre-positioned about 10 high-water 
vehicles at the Superdome. These trucks proved invaluable after many of the streets around 
the Superdome flooded. When the Superdome opened to the general population, National 
Guard officers there asked the LOHSEP and the Texas and Florida National Guards for 
additional support. NOPD Deputy Chief Swain also requested additional police officers to 
assist at the Superdome. 
At Katrina’s landfall on Monday morning, August 29, the Superdome’s special-needs 
shelter and refuge of last resort housed over 10,000 people who would ride out the stormin 
its cavernous interior. (Chapter 11—6-7) 
 
Il faudrait aussi accepter de discuter d’un point jamais traité par les Commissions 
d’enquête. Et si, demain, les décisions et investissements exigés pour la protection des 
populations ne cadraient plus du tout avec les conceptions et les moyens qui sont les nôtres ? 
Comme le disait un préfet français : « Si je voulais vraiment faire une mise à l’abri efficace 
face au risque inondation, je devrais faire évacuer les 2/3 du département ». Nos outils sont 
prévus pour protéger des « zones à risques », tenues pour spécifiques, marginales, résiduelles. 
Et si demain la question est de protéger toutes les côtes sud et est des Etats-Unis ?  
Nous savons traiter les risques domestiqués. Pas les risques barbares. Comme le disait bien 
la Munich Ré dans un document publié pour son centenaire : « La prévoyance, les mesures 
préventives contre les dommages ne sont que trop souvent rattrapées et dépassées par des 
périls encore plus considérables […]. L'institution des assurances résulte de la raison humai-
ne. Dans une large mesure, elle permet la réparation matérielle des conséquences des défail-
lances humaines. Mais elle trouverait logiquement ses limites dès l'instant où l'humanité ne 
disposerait plus de la capacité de régler les problèmes de son existence raisonnablement ».23 
 
                                         
23 Münich Ré, Plaquette éditée à l'occasion du centenaire de la société, 1980, p. 36. "Foresight and preventive 
measures against damages are only too often overtaken and exceeded by evermore considerable hazards (…). 
Insurance was instituted as the result of human reasoning. To a large extent, it allows us to repair the material 
consequences of human failures. But it faces logical limitations as soon as mankind no longer has the capacity to 
deal with the problems of its existence in a reasonable way.”  
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Chapitre 9 
 
MOBILISATION STRATÉGIQUE : 
UNE CULTURE DE SUIVI DES PROBLÈMES, NON DE PRISE EN CHARGE 
 
 
 
1.  Le DHS : aux abonnés absents 
 
La Commission dépeint une mobilisation fédérale totalement décalée. Certes, en jouant 
systématiquement sur les mots, les dirigeants peuvent prétendre qu’ils ont rempli leur mission 
en s’assurant que, globalement, les rouages fonctionnaient. Et les rouages, à haut niveau, 
considèrent eux-aussi qu’ils ont rempli leur devoir dès lors qu’ils recevaient des assurances du 
terrain – ce qui justifiait l’attente.  
Les idées de pilotage, d’initiative, d’anticipation autre que de façade, semblent hors 
culture, hors de portée. Chacun se contente de flotter comme une méduse au gré des courants, 
tout en prenant soin de se couvrir par quelques appels et intervention minimales.  
Les dirigeants n’entrent dans aucun questionnement, aucune dynamique stratégique, 
aucune prise en charge effective. Ils  n’ont d’ailleurs pas grande connaissance des dispositifs 
qu’ils sont sensés engager (Chertoff) ; et, quand ils les connaissent, il arrive qu’ils y soient 
franchement hostiles (Brown). Il arrive même qu’ils (Chertoff) prennent des décisions 
étranges, comme celle de nommer (après un long délai, cependant) le directeur de la FEMA 
comme patron des opérations de Katrina, lui qui doit rester en mesure de jouer son rôle au 
niveau central, éventuellement même d’engager son organisation sur d’autres événements – et 
il y eut un (petit) séisme en Californie le 1er septembre.  
Fait particulier relevé par la Commission, le Secrétaire Chertoff, le samedi précédant le 
désastre, est chez lui, au travail sur d’autres dossiers. Certes, il a reçu une note sur une vidéo-
conférence du  jour ; on ne saurait plaider qu’il s’agisse là d’une mobilisation à la hauteur des 
enjeux, lorsque l’on est dans l’attente d’un désastre certain et imminent comptant comme l’un 
des plus graves pour le pays.  
Il faut inverser les raisonnements : tout fonctionne comme si la perception d’un événement 
hors-cadre insufflait une panique latente, conduisant à prendre une distance maximale, à 
tenter de recevoir des messages rassurants qui permettront de justifier la fuite. Et cet effet 
incapacitant frappe d’abord à haut niveau, l’ensemble du système se mettant au diapason, ou 
étant déjà sur ce registre d’attente passive.  
Beaucoup plaideront qu’il ne faut pas se fixer sur les leaders, que ce sont les systèmes qui 
importent. Cette vue habituelle ne tient pas compte du fait, comme le dit un responsable 
interrogé par la Commission que, dans les milieux dirigeants, les niveaux hiérarchiques 
comptent énormément. S’il faut mobiliser le ministère de la Défense, par exemple, le rang de 
l’appelant est crucial. En outre, si l’on veut bien entrer dans les dynamiques particulières des 
crises (mais c’est effectivement là le pas souvent impossible), il faut bien reconnaître que 
l’impulsion donnée par le chef d’orchestre n’est pas un mince paramètre dans une dynamique 
chaotique. Bien sûr, on peut se passer de leader, quelqu’un d’autres peut prendre les rênes, 
mais cela a un coût considérable en termes de délais, de puissance, de cohérence.  
Bien au contraire, il est vital aujourd’hui, plutôt que de dénigrer avec superbe la fonction 
de leader, de rappeler à tout leader que, s’il ne se prépare pas à exercer ses responsabilités 
pendant les tempêtes, il n’est en rien légitime pour continuer à occuper son poste.  
La charge de la Commission à l’endroit du patron du DHS est certes cinglante, mais elle 
est fondée. Quand l’homme-clé-de-voûte de la sécurité du pays le plus puissant du monde 
peut rester tranquillement chez lui à la veille d’un évenement qui va – sans grande incertitude 
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– noyer une ville entière, raser la superficie de la Grande-Bretagne, on est bien loin de 
l’optimum.  
 
Défaillance dans les  préparations globales et spécifiques 
“In the critical days before landfall, DHS leadership mostly watched from the sidelines, 
allowed FEMA to take the lead, and missed critical opportunities to help prepare the entire 
federal government for the response.” (Chapter 12-1, je souligne) 
 “DHS and its leaders failed to prepare the nation adequately for the unprecedented 
devastation of Hurricane Katrina. DHS failed to fully adapt and appropriately train to meet 
the requirements of the NRP in the nine months between its promulgation and Hurricane 
Katrina. Nor did the Department address FEMA’s deficiencies such as staffing shortage, 
weaknesses in commodities tracking, and insufficient plans for post-disaster communica-
tions. (Chapter 12-1) 
As Katrina was bearing down on the Gulf Coast, they [DHS leaders] failed to take 
reasonable steps during that period to create a full awareness and a sense of urgency across 
the federal government about the impending catastrophe. DHS’s actions and inactions 
during the days immediately prior to landfall had consequences in the days that followed. 
(Chapter 12-2) 
 
Leaderhip défaillant 
The job of leading the federal response to a catastrophe rests with the Secretary of DHS. 
In the days before Katrina made landfall, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff’s efforts in this 
regard fell short of what was reasonably expected of him. 
On the Saturday before landfall, Secretary Chertoff was at home working on unrelated 
matters, and his only apparent Katrina-related activity was to receive a briefing about that 
day’s FEMA video teleconference (VTC). 
On Sunday, Secretary Chertoff participated in the FEMA VTC. He heard assurances 
from former FEMA Director Michael Brown and others that preparations were well in 
hand. (Chapter 12-2) 
Secretary Chertoff testified that he did not second-guess statements he heard on the 
Sunday VTC – including those by state emergency managers and state National Guard 
officials who, as he termed it, “express[ed] very clearly their satisfaction with the state of 
affairs.” […] Secretary Chertoff thought the emergency-management officials on that call 
had hundreds of years of combined professional experience managing hurricanes. Secretary 
Chertoff also spoke with Governors Barbour of Mississippi, Blanco of Louisiana, and 
Riley of Alabama that day. 
The Secretary and other senior leaders did not take affirmative steps prior to landfall, 
beyond his statements on the Sunday VTC, to ensure that DHS components with 
operational responsibilities under the NRP were prepared to respond. Instead, the evidence 
suggests that Secretary Chertoff and DHS responded to Katrina as if DHS headquarters 
had no special responsibilities outside the normal course of operations. 
Despite assurances and lack of affirmative requests from the Governors of the Gulf 
states, the Secretary still should have taken additional steps to better prepare his 
Department for the coming storm. (Chapter 12-3) 
 
En dépit d’alertes précises, fortes, crédibles, répétées 
From all corners, the message throughout the weekend, especially at the Saturday and  
Sunday VTCs, was that a catastrophe was about to strike the Gulf Coast, and the greater 
New Orleans area in particular. 
The head of the National Hurricane Service, Max Mayfield, had been making calls to 
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leaders in parishes, cities, states and the federal government. The Hurricane Pam exercise 
in 2004 had predicted that flooding from a catastrophic storm – what had been known for 
years among meteorologists and government officials as the “New Orleans scenario” – 
might kill as many as 60,000. In the weekend conference call, Brown referred to the 
approaching storm as the “big one.” As Mayfield said, “I think the wisest thing to do here 
is plan on a Category 5 hurricane…no matter where it hits it’s going to have an impact 
over a very, very large area… (Chapter 12-3) I don’t think any model can tell you with any 
confidence right now whether the levees will be topped or not, but that’s obviously a very, 
very grave concern.” (Chapter 12-4) 
 
Un suivi mou, plutôt qu’une forte prise en charge, et un questionnement rigoureux 
During the weekend, as Katrina neared New Orleans, there was a need for initiative, for 
recognition of the unprecedented threat and the equally unprecedented response it required. 
Leadership – direction, encouragement, a sense of purpose and urgency – was needed. 
Secretary Chertoff did not provide it.  
For example, he did not ask specifically what preparations were under way, how much 
material was being pre-positioned, and whether it would be enough. And though the DHS 
Inspector General had issued a draft report in June 2005 stating that FEMA’s logistics-
management systems had performed poorly during the four Florida hurricanes in 2004, 
Secretary Chertoff did not inquire whether the system could handle the expected impact of 
Katrina. The Committee has found no evidence to suggest that anyone, including Secretary 
Chertoff, attempted to determine if the system could handle the expected impact of 
Katrina. […](Chapter 12-4) 
 
Un lien étonnamment ténu entre le Secrétaire du DHS et le Directeur de la FEMA 
Although he has stated repeatedly that he relied on Brown as his “battlefield 
commander,” aside from on the Sunday VTC, according to Brown, Secretary Chertoff did 
not talk to his “commander” directly over the weekend, either while Brown was in 
Washington or after he left for the Gulf Sunday afternoon. In view of Secretary Chertoff’s 
testimony that he stayed in contact with “senior DHS and FEMA officials and [his] 
experienced advisors,” this omission is particularly inexplicable. Because Secretary 
Chertoff was placing so much faith in Brown to lead the preparations and response, it was 
incumbent on the Secretary to do more than just have a brief conversation with him in front 
of dozens of state, local, and federal officials – including the President of the United States 
– on a VTC. Secretary Chertoff should have called Brown privately to discuss in more 
detail the status of preparations and the level of cooperation Brown was getting from DHS 
and other government departments. Conversely, Brown failed to inform the Secretary of 
the FEMA deficiencies that he has since claimed in testimony and media interviews to 
have known about at the time. These two key players’ failure to communicate is evidence 
of the profound dysfunction then existing between DHS and FEMA leadership. (Chapter 
12-4) 
 
Pas d’activation du texte essentiel pour les catastrophes hors cadres 
Secretary Chertoff did not activate the NRP-CIA [Catastrophic Incident Index], as he 
had the authority to do. […] (Chapter 12-6)  
Activating the NRP-CIA also could have accelerated the involvement of the Department 
of Defense. (Chapter 12-7) 
 
Pas de nomination d’un représentant personnel, puis confusion des rôles pour Brown 
Secretary Chertoff did not appoint a Principal Federal Officer (PFO) until the evening 
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of Tuesday, August 30, approximately 36 hours after landfall. The position is provided for 
in the NRP so that the Secretary will have an on-the-ground representative to oversee the 
federal response. It is designed to support the unified command structure and be the 
primary point of contact and situational awareness for the Secretary in a disaster area. The 
Secretary appointed a PFO months in advance for events such as the Super Bowl. Yet DHS 
waited until the day after landfall to appoint one for what many government officials – 
including Brown – feared was a potential catastrophe. Secretary Chertoff testified that he 
did not appoint a PFO on Saturday, when the President issued the emergency declaration 
for Louisiana, because the PFO “doesn’t exercise command authority; it is a coordinating 
authority.” He also stated that he believed Brown had all the authority he needed to 
coordinate the federal effort by virtue of his rank within DHS. […] 
The Committee disagrees that Brown’s rank in DHS was a substitute for PFO 
designation. With other duties to perform, and with no way of knowing whether Katrina 
would be the only disaster in store, Brown was in no position to commit to the 100 percent 
on-scene focus required in a PFO. The Committee believes Secretary Chertoff should have 
appointed a PFO in conjunction with the President’s declaration on Saturday August 27. 
Doing so could have laid the groundwork for a unified approach to preparation and 
signaled strongly that DHS and the federal government was stepping forward with all 
available assets. Appointment before landfall could have allowed the individual appointed 
to bring together state, local, and other federal officials in the region and to put in place 
coordinated plans for a response in advance of the storm rather than trying to establish 
control in the midst of the response. Deficiencies, such as the failure  to evacuate special-
needs individuals or the lack of planning for post-landfall evacuation of the general 
population, might have been identified earlier. None of this happened. 
That said, it’s unclear that appointing Brown PFO prior to landfall would have 
improved the response. Brown has made it very clear that he did not want to be appointed 
PFO. In fact, he thought the entire concept “silly,” as he felt it added an unnecessary layer 
of bureaucracy. The choice of Brown as PFO – whether before landfall or after – was poor, 
even if for no other reason than his animosity toward the PFO concept, the NRP, and DHS, 
not to mention his lack of emergency-management training and experience. Perhaps 
Secretary Chertoff, who was in his position for less than seven months, wasn’t aware of 
Brown’s attitudes or was poorly advised. Or perhaps he chose Brown in the hope that he 
would rise above policy differences in the face of catastrophe. (Chapter 12-8) 
One of the PFO’s main responsibilities is to keep DHS leadership informed of the 
situation on the ground, but Brown, who has expressed disdain for this structure as 
inefficient, refused to communicate with the Secretary, circumventing the chain of 
command to communicate directly with the White House. His actions were inexcusable – 
not only insubordinate, but disruptive to DHS’s awareness of the threats and problems that 
it was facing. 
Brown was a poor choice for another reason. Even when appointed PFO, Brown 
remained the Director of FEMA, an apparent violation of the NRP’s requirement that a 
PFO not be “‘dual hatted’ with any other roles or responsibilities that could detract from 
their overall incident management responsibilities.” According to DHS Deputy Secretary 
Michael Jackson, “for the incident of a hurricane, PFO and Director of FEMA, ‘macht 
Nichts’ [German for ‘amounts to nothing’] they both have the same capacities, capabilities, 
performance capabilities in managing the events.” There is, however, a practical reason 
why a PFO should have no other responsibilities: the PFO has to befocused entirely on the 
catastrophe at hand. But just as DHS and Secretary Chertoff had responsibilities that were 
broader than Katrina, so, too, did FEMA and its Director. On Thursday, September 1, a 
minor earthquake occurred in California. Had this earthquake been more severe – or had 
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there been wildfires, flooding, or another disaster elsewhere – it remained FEMA’s 
responsibility to respond, and the FEMA Director’s job to see that it did so. Either Brown 
shouldn’t have been appointed PFO or someone else should have become Acting Director 
of FEMA. Neither happened. (Chapter 12-9). 
 
La cellule de conduite interministérielle activée deux jours trop tard 
The Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) brings together senior-level 
officials from multiple agencies, in theory to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security in 
managing national incidents. The IIMG was formally activated at 11:30 a.m., Tuesday, 
August 30. Over the weekend, the Director of the IIMG, Robert Stephan, consulted twice 
with Matthew Broderick, who, as the Director of the Homeland Security Operations 
Center, the primary hub for domestic incident management, operational coordination and 
situational awareness, was charged with recommending activation to the Secretary. 
Stephan recalled asking Broderick whether there was “anything significant at this point in 
time that we need to be worried about and that would cause us to bring in the IMG [sic] 
this evening? And the answer was no…” It’s unclear whether early activation of the IIMG 
may have resulted in a more effective federal response. Though the IIMG was designed to 
be a mechanism by which to share information, identify available resources, and 
coordinate government efforts, some witnesses criticized the IIMG as ineffective in 
practice. One witness derisively called it the “bright idea brigade.” The FEMA designee to 
the IIMG said that it actually hindered response efforts after its activation in Hurricane 
Katrina by meddling in operational details. (Chapter 12-9). One emergency preparedness 
officer said that “It became a huge animal you have to feed information to.”  
Since the IIMG was not activated until recovery was under way, it’s unclear whether 
response efforts would have improved if it had been activated pre-landfall. However, the 
decision not to activate the IIMG prior to landfall suggests that DHS leadership did not 
fully recognize the potential scope of the damage Katrina presented or its obligation to lead 
the federal response in accordance with the NRP. While the performance of the IIMG 
appears to have been mixed after landfall, things might have gone more smoothly if it had 
been activated sooner and been allowed before the height of the crisis to work through 
issues associated with its first use since the implementation of the NRP. 
Alternatively, if activating the IIMG before landfall was not called for in an incident the 
magnitude of Katrina, this calls into the question the utility of the organization itself and 
suggests that consideration should be given to abolishing it and distributing its functions to 
operating elements. (Chapter 12-10) 
 
Conclusion : une piètre performance 
Secretary Chertoff testified that he believed his role as chief executive of the 
Department was to impart strategic guidance and deal with senior officials, not be a 
“hurricane operator.” But Secretary Chertoff came up short by his own yardstick. A chief 
executive should understand the responsibilities of the organization he runs. In the days 
before Katrina, Secretary Chertoff appeared not to have fully understood the broader role 
of DHS under the NRP. A strategic leader chooses capable subordinates and provides those 
subordinates with guidance, works effectively with other key government officials, and, in 
DHS’s case, cooperates effectively with states. Even judging the Secretary by his own 
criteria, his performance in the nation’s worst domestic disaster fell short of reasonable 
expectations. (Chapter 12-10) 
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2. La FEMA : dépassée, avant même l’arrivée de Katrina 
 
La FEMA était prévenue, et beaucoup étaient parfaitement conscients du décalage total 
entre la préparation et la mobilisation d’une part, et les enjeux d’autre part. Comme pour les 
grandes batailles perdues, les causes étaient profondément ancrées dans la texture du 
système : un personnel insuffisant, des équipes sous-équipées, des équipes d’intervention non 
préparées, un manque de protocoles opérationnels, des budgets insuffisants. La conviction 
était sans ambiguïté : “Si c’est le scénario Nouvelle Orléans, nous avons une guerre de 
retard”. [Chapter 12-12] 
Comme c’est alors souvent le cas lorsque l’on se trouve ainsi écartelé entre la mesure du 
défi et la conscience de son impréparation, un syndrome de tétanisation se met en place. 
Même si des actions sont posées, si des vidéo-conférences sont montées, si des alertes sont 
lancées, le système n’est pas véritablement mobilisé, les connections ne sont pas établies, le 
chef d’orchestre n’est pas au pupitre, tout se fait sur le mode trop tard-trop peu, et le tout est 
perlé de non-décisions ahurissantes, comme de laisser le responsable des services 
opérationnels de la FEMA partir pour un congrès en Alaska, le vendredi 27 août [Chapter 12-
12]… Un brouillard d’effervescence qui cache mal l’incapacité à embrayer sur l’événement.  
Le décalage est bien exprimé par la Commission : la FEMA suivait semble-t-il les pages de 
son manuel de base au lieu de se saisir du manuel propre au « big one ». [Chapter12-11] 
La difficulté est que la viscosité dont fait alors preuve le système est en relation directe 
avec la gravité du sinistre attendu. Il est très difficile de faire exploser à temps la bulle 
d’impuissance dont se protège l’ensemble, anesthésié par sa propre perception 
d’impréparation. En quelque sorte, si une décision est tout de même prise, c’est que l’on s’est 
bien assuré qu’elle n’aurait pas de vertu de réarmemement de l’ensemble. Comme si le 
système se mettait en position d’échec, capitulant par avance. On fait des réunions, on lance 
même des alertes d’une précision extraordinaire, mais rien ne s’ensuit. Qui n’a pas travaillé en 
cellule de crise, en position d’analyste critique, ne peut comprendre ces phénomènes de 
désintégration. Et qui ne peut tolérer psychologiquement la confrontation au chaotique ne 
pourra même percevoir pareille perte globale de capacité : pour être vraiment une couche 
“protectrice”, la fuite doit rester masquée. Et, dans un système non préparé, malheur à qui 
voudrait tout de même rendre explicites les comportements de fuite systématique dont fait 
montre le système. Celui-ci a un besoin vital d’aveuglement. Et l’on ne touche pas 
impunément à des protections vitales. M. Brown est probablement victime lui aussi de ce 
phénomène. En dépit de toutes les critiques qui seront émises à son égard, il se démène tout 
de même, mais rien n’y fait. Le système n’embraye pas…  
La Commission examine dans son chapitre 14 les problèmes liés, sur le fond, à la FEMA. 
Elle pointe tout un ensemble de faiblesses structurelles : des leaders non qualifiés ; une 
désarticulation, le DHS ayant enlevé la fonction “Préparation” à la FEMA, quand il est capital 
de garder une solide intégration des compétences de la prévention, l’anticipation, 
l’intervention à la préparation ; des budgets insuffisants ; un personnel gravement insuffisant ; 
une pauvre capacité à acheter les matériels d’intervention. Bref, une organisation incapable de 
traiter une catastrophe de grande échelle. Les Sénateurs soulignent que la solution n’est pas de 
sortir la FEMA du DHS : la Coast Guard est bien au sein du DHS, ce qui ne l’a pas empêchée 
d’être compétente. C’est un problème de management et de leadership.  
Au-delà du fait spécique à la FEMA, nous sommes confrontés à un problème de fond : 
comment consolider, aujourd’hui, des organisations en mesure de traiter les événements hors-
cadres ? Avons-nous les moyens de le faire ? Avons-nous la volonté, l’état d’esprit qu’il 
faudrait avoir, vu le très faible intérêt suscité par les questions de vulnérabilités systémiques 
vitales ? Il est à craindre qu’un audit sérieux, sur tous les continents, donnerait des résultats 
très inquiétants. Or, comme l’a montré le cas de Katrina, pouvoir compter sur la compétence 
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d’un corps particulier (en l’espèce la Coast Guard) n’est vraiment pas suffisant. Et la glorifi-
cation de quelques héros ne peut effacer un fiasco politico-humanitaire de grande échelle.  
 
Tableau général : “I don’t think w’re thinking big enough” 
Before landfall, Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Katrina in New 
Orleans, called Edward Buikema, FEMA’s Acting Director of Response. “I don’t think 
we’re thinking big enough,” he told Buikema. “[Katrina] is bigger than how we normally do 
things.”  
Wells was exactly right. Despite knowing for years the catastrophic impact that a large 
hurricane could have on New Orleans, despite the predictions of the exercise known as 
Hurricane Pam, and despite FEMA’s own internal slides showing projections that Katrina 
could be worse than Pam’s predictions of 60,000 fatalities – FEMA just wasn’t thinking 
big enough for Katrina. 
FEMA officials knew the threat a large hurricane posed to New Orleans. Buikema 
testified that FEMA considered a large hurricane hitting New Orleans to be one of the 
worst catastrophes that could occur in the United States.74 Eric Tolbert, FEMA’s Director 
of Response until February 2005, testified that while at FEMA, the hurricane threat to 
New Orleans was his top priority and that FEMA knew a hurricane Category 3 or stronger 
could breach or overtop the levees. Despite this knowledge, FEMA’s leadership failed to 
ensure that the federal government’s preparations for the response were adequate. Its 
leaders didn’t compel the federal government to think bigger than usual. They failed to ask 
the right questions to make sure FEMA’s response was big enough. They did not utilize all 
available resources. FEMA seemed to be following pages from its regular playbook instead 
of a playboo made for “the big one.” 
Some of FEMA’s pre-landfall failures had to do with FEMA’s systematic weaknesses 
[…]. They included insufficient staff; limited ability to track commodities; unexercised, 
untrained, under-equipped emergency-response teams; unprepared disaster-assistance 
workforce; lack of operating procedures; and lack of necessary funding. FEMA Director 
Michael Brown sought additional funding to address many of these problems, but DHS did 
not provide sufficient additional funding. The failure to address or solve these many 
problems cast the die even before Katrina moved towards the Gulf Coast. 
As early as Saturday morning, August 27, Michael Lowder, FEMA Deputy Director of  
Response e-mailed several FEMA employees: “If [this] is the ‘New Orleans’ scenario, we 
are already way behind. Let’s don’t hold back. Let’s make sure that all of our Emergency 
Support Functions are fully engaged and ramped up, everything turned on, etc. This may 
be IT!” Because of the inadequate preparations, even before landfall, the federal government 
was already behind in fighting Katrina’s terrible wrath. 
 
Alertes claires, viscosité générale 
Thus, at least as early as Thursday evening, FEMA was aware of a dangerous hurricane 
forming in the Gulf of Mexico and by noon Friday was aware that Katrina was shifting 
west toward New Orleans. This awareness did not provoke action. On Friday, August 27, 
when asked, Brown permitted Acting Response Division Director Buikema to go to Alaska 
for a previously scheduled emergency-management conference even though “The 
predictions are now Katrina will turn into a Cat4. [Chapter 12-12] 
FEMA’s Sunday morning National Situation Report warned, “Katrina could be 
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especially devastating if it strikes New Orleans because the city sits below sea level and is 
dependent on levees and pumps to keep the water out. A direct hit could wind up 
submerging the city in several feel of water. Making matters worse, at least 100,000 people 
in the city lack the transportation to get out of town. Also on Sunday, DHS released a 
report, stating, “Any storm rated Category 4 or greater…will likely lead to severe flooding 
and/or levee breaching. This could leave the New Orleans area being submerged for weeks 
or months… The magnitude of this storm is expected to cause massive flooding.” This 
report was circulated to the White House’s situation room, throughout DHS, and to all 
agencies in DHS’s HSOC. Brown testified that he spoke to White House officials at least 
30 times during the weekend prior to landfall, repeatedly warning them about Katrina. 
Brown said he spoke directly to the President on Saturday, August 27, and warned that 
Katrina could be catastrophic. Brown later called to ask that the President contact 
Governor Blanco and “do everything he could within his persuasive powers to convince 
[Louisiana officials] to do a mandatory evacuation.” Brown testified that he told both 
former Chief of Staff Andy Card and Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin prior to landfall that 
he was concerned about how bad Katrina could be, saying he thought Katrina could be the 
catastrophic “big one.” 
On the Sunday before landfall, President Bush and Hagin both participated in FEMA’s 
noon video teleconference (VTC), where Max Mayfield, Director of the National Hurricane 
Center, predicted Katrina would be a “very dangerous hurricane” and warned, “I don’t 
think any model can tell you with any confidence right now whether the levees will be 
topped or not, but that’s obviously a very, very grave concern.” Although the President 
appeared on the VTC, promised federal government assistance, and thanked Governor 
Blanco and Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour for heeding these warnings, and doing all 
they could possibly do to prepare for this storm, the President did not ask any substantive 
questions. On that call Colonel William Doran, operations division chief for LOHSEP, 
noted that the State of Louisiana was “way ahead of the game there” with catastrophic 
planning “thanks to the help of FEMA, when we did the Hurricane Pam exercises.” Col. 
Smith said Louisiana’s evacuations were going “much better than it did during Ivan.” 
After the Sunday noon VTC, Brown had another conversation with Hagin in which  said 
he again raised his concerns about the storm and complained that he had never been allowed 
to do the catastrophic planning that was necessary for FEMA to be prepared for a storm 
like Katrina that he had pushed to be able to do. “I [was] just adamant that they understand 
my concern about New Orleans,” Brown described the call. [Chapter 12-14] 
 
Tableau globalement défaillant 
FEMA’s many failures in preparing for Katrina include: (1) multiple failures involving 
deployment of personnel; (2) not taking sufficient measures to deploy communications 
assets; (3) insufficient planning to be prepared to respond to catastrophic events, (4) not 
pre-staging enough commodities; (5) failures associated with deployment of disaster 
medical assistance teams and search and rescue teams; (6) failures involving evacuation; (7) 
failure to establish a joint field office quickly enough; and (8) failure to take measures prior 
to landfall to ensure proper security for emergency response teams. [Chapter 12-15] 
 
Le cas des bateaux : double piège 
On notera à quel point compte la première image formée sur une catastrophe. Chacun 
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sait que le problème crucial pour La Nouvelle-Orlans, c’est l’inondation. Les premières 
nouvelles sont « rassurantes ». On ne cherche pas à en savoir davantage. Affaire classée, 
tout va bien. La propension des systèmes à hisser le drapeau vert à la première information 
ou non information rassurante est toujours très prégnante. Une équipe de Réflexion 
stratégique devra ici, systématiquement, surveiller de près les premières informations, et 
les surdités qu’elles provoquent – à la mesure des peurs préalables.  
Despite the expectation of flooding, FEMA did not pre-position boats for its USAR 
[Urban Search And Rescue] teams. One USAR team manager said later : 
I don’t recall that, that we were thinking about, gee, we’re going to need a lot of boats 
down here. Actually, when the hurricane went through there, the news wassaying, it’s 
not a big deal. It spared the city. That’s kind of the impression we were getting from 
watching the news on there, so we were not thinking about massive amounts of boats 
and things like that at that time, that I can recall. I’m sure we had some discussions 
about it. 
Finally, FEMA pre-staged the teams in Shreveport205 –approximately 340 miles from 
New Orleans. Lokey made this choice because he wanted to be sure they would be out of 
harm’s way while the storm’s path was uncertain. However, this distance meant that 
FEMA USAR teams did not reach New Orleans until Tuesday night, and did not begin 
rescue missions until Tuesday morning – 14 hours after the Coast Guard and state and 
local teams began rescuing people. FEMA’s teams were too few, too late, and boatless. 
[Chapter 12-22] 
 
Centre de coordination fédéral avancé : 12 jours de délais 
A Joint Field Office (JFO) is a coordination center that FEMA sets up, where federal, 
state, and local organizations with primary responsibility for disaster response can work  
together and coordinate the response. FEMA did not take adequate steps to set up the JFO 
before landfall. While the preparatory step toward a JFO – an Initial Operating Facility 
(IOF) – was opened pre-landfall, the JFO was not fully operational until 12 days after 
landfall. [Chapter 12-22] 
 
Valse-hésitation vis-à-vis de la Défense 
C’est une illustration exceptionnellement claire de la viscosité des esprits, des 
comportements. On sait tout en ne faisant pas, on interroge tout en esquivant, le quiproquo 
fonctionne à plein.  
Perhaps one of the most obvious consequences of FEMA not “thinking big enough” was 
its delay in asking the Department of Defense to apply its resources. Brown conceded that 
he should have spoken with DOD Secretary Donald Rumsfeld prior to landfall to request 
assets. So, too, should have Secretary Chertoff. Indeed, DOD was surprised by the early 
silence from FEMA. 
The need for DOD assets pre-landfall, such as helicopters, boats, and communications 
equipment, was considered but not acted upon by FEMA or DHS leadership. On the 
August 28 VTC, Secretary Chertoff inquired, “[A]re there any DOD assets that might be 
available? Have we reached out to them, and have we, I guess, made any kind of 
arrangement in case we need some additional help from them?” Brown replied that “We 
have DOD assets over [here] at the EOC. They are fully engaged . . .” Apparently, Brown 
was referring to DOD liaisons to the EOC, known as Defense Coordinating Officers 
(DCOs); in this case, two individuals, rather than tangible resources that could be 
positioned or readied. Secretary Chertoff accepted this reply, telling Brown, “good job.” 
Neither Brown nor Secretary Chertoff sought to ascertain or understand what specific 
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capabilities DOD might bring to the response, nor did they seek to call upon those 
capabilities before landfall. [Chapter 12-24] 
 
L’audit de fond : un problème de leadership, et non de design organisationnel 
The Committee’s investigation found systemic and leadership failures, displayed in both 
the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, at both the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and FEMA. These failures contributed to human suffering and the loss of 
life. The causes of many of these failures were known long prior to Katrina and had been 
brought repeatedly brought to the attention to both the DHS and FEMA leadership. Despite 
warnings, leadership repeatedly failed to make vital changes. [Chapter 14-1] 
Brown and most of his front office staff had little or no emergency-management 
experience prior to joining FEMA [Chapter 14-4]. Indeed, several FEMA leaders came 
from campaign rather than emergency management backgrounds. Additionnally, a review of 
the bibliographies by Committee staff of FEMA regional directors since 2001 show that 
many of them had little or no emergency-management experience as well. [Chapter 14-5] 
Several FEMA Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs), said that FEMA is capable of 
handling small and medium-size disasters, but is not organized for large response 
operations. As FCO Scott Wells said, “FEMA is not trained, FEMA is not equipped, FEMA 
is not organized to do very large response operations... If you want big capability, you got 
to make a big investment. And there is no investment in response operations for a 
catastrophic disaster.” [Chapter 14-8] 
Frank Cilluffo Associate Vice President for Homeland Security and Director of the 
Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University, agreed and testified 
that moving FEMA out of DHS would simply obscure the real issues :  
In my opinion, to re-create FEMA as an independent agency further obfuscates and 
bifurcates an already too complex systems-to-systems approach. … To have state and 
local government and first responders plug into one system to respond to bad weat 
another system to respond to bad people is unrealistic. There is no reason to have 
competing systems in an environment of limited resources. The problem is not really of 
organizational design. The requisite policy in law exists. The challenge is one of 
management and leadership. [Chapter 14-15] 
In short, the problems in DHS’s response to Katrina must be fixed, not transferred 
[Chapter 14 – 16] 
 
 
3. La Coast Guard : l’exception 
 
Un facteur central résume la capacité de la Coast Guard : son « agressivité » dans sa prise 
en charge des situations difficiles. Aussi bien dans la préparation, l’intervention que dans les 
liens avec tous ses partenaires. Tel le dompteur en face du fauve, qui impose sa détermination, 
et ne se met pas en posture de capitulation molle.  
 
Préparation rigoureuse 
Rigorous planning, training, and exercising are key elements in the Coast Guard’s 
approach to disaster response. 
In the spring of 2005, as every spring, prior to the start of the hurricane season, the 8th 
Coast Guard District – which stretches from the Appalachians, to the Rockies, south of 
the Great Lakes, and excluding most of Florida – and all its subordinate units, including 
Sector New Orleans, exercised their hurricane plans.229 Because personnel turnover in the 
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New Orleans District runs about one-third each year, the exercise provides a good 
opportunity to bring new personnel into the Coast Guard’s culture of operations on the 
Gulf Coast, including how to make hurricane plans for their own families. [Chapter 12-25] 
 
Action et Lucidité 
On August 27, the Coast Guard positioned its five search-and-rescue helicopters from 
Sector New Orleans in Houston, Texas, and Lake Charles, Louisiana, just out of the 
hurricane’s path, so they could fly in behind the storm.243 As they flew out of New 
Orleans that day, Captain Bruce Jones, the Commander of Coast Guard Air Station New 
Orleans, told his flight crews to “take a last look folks, because when you come back, it 
will be under twenty feet of water.” [Chapter 12-26] 
 
Intervention immédiate 
At 2:50 p.m. on Monday, August 29, Coast Guard helicopters made their first rescue in 
the New Orleans area. [Chapter 12-26] 
 
Prise en charge déterminée 
Several factors contributed to the Coast Guard’s success in preparing for Hurricane 
Katrina. First, rigorous planning, training, and exercising are key elements in the Coast 
Guard’s approach to disaster response. Second, the Coast Guard’s plans and exercises help 
personnel develop and maintain close ties to state and local officials, with whom they 
coordinated closely during the Katrina response effort. Third, the Coast Guard has a clearly 
articulated response mission understood by all personnel. Fourth, the Coast Guard notifies 
public- and private-sector partners of storm risks and of necessary safety precautions. 
Fifth, the Coast Guard aggressively moves personnel and assets out of the storm’s path, 
but positions them to maximize their utility in the response effort. Finally, the Coast 
Guard plans for and rapidly deploys additional assets from outside the affected area 
without significant bureaucratic hurdles, owing to an institutional commitment to providing 
assistance when possible. The Coast Guard’s efforts – including the rescue of over 33,000 
people – demonstrate the effectiveness of being proactive in planning for disaster response. 
Unfortunately, DHS, which had extremely poor situational awareness of the storm’s 
impact, failed to make use of the Coast Guard’s early presence in the area. [Chapter 12—
26-27] 
 
 
4.  Les mondes de la Défense : des questions à examiner 
Les détails manquent dans le rapport, mais certaines lignes laissent entrevoir l’intérêt d’un 
regard sur l’engagement des armées en situation hors cadres. Katrina a montré aussi bien des 
initiatives fortes que des comportements singulièrement en retrait.  
In the Navy, the Commander of the Second Fleet recognized that the USS Bataan, a 
helicopter-bearing ship in port in Texas, was well positioned to provide assistance and 
ordered the ship to get underway on August 28 and steam in behind the hurricane. […]. As 
a result, once Katrina made landfall, USS Bataan’s helicopters were among the first active-
duty aircraft to conduct search-and-rescue missions beginning on Tuesday. Nonetheless, 
DHS personnel questioned the admiral’s forethought and authority, and were reportedly 
angered that the Navy had acted in advance of a request. 
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The preparations by the commanders were not always coordinated with DOD, and on 
at least one occasion, met with resistance from a DOD headquarters component. Lt. Gen. 
Honoré’s [Commander of the US First Army based in Atlanta] request on the eve of 
landfall that certain assets be identified for immediate use was not answered by the Joint 
Staff, despite the fact that the NORTHCOM Director of Operations made the same 
request by personally contacting the Director of JDOMS [Joint Directorate of Military 
Support, within the Pentagon’s Joint Staff]. Several witnesses explained that, traditionally, 
the Pentagon will only take disaster-assistance action with a specific request from FEMA 
and once the actual requirement has been verified, though […] several commanders took the 
initiative to mobilize and alert assets in advance of FEMA requests. 
Although DOD was prepared to receive and process requests, it received very few 
requests from FEMA prior to landfall. In addition to staging bases, FEMA requested that 
DOD provide helicopters for rapid needs assessment prior to landfall; JDOMS only 
approved this request 12 hours after landfall, a sign, according to some witnesses, of its 
initial reluctance to provide assistance without the conditions described above. And 
although the Department’s preparations for Katrina were consistent with its procedures 
and prior practices in civil support missions, they were not sufficient for a storm of 
Katrina’s magnitude. Additional preparations in advance of specific requests for support 
could have enabled a more rapid response. [Chapter 12-31] 
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Chapitre 10 
 
LE PILOTAGE AU SOMMET : 
LA MAISON BLANCHE 
 
 
Les événements majeurs exigent, à tous les niveaux, et particulièrement à l’échelon le 
plus élevé, une prise en main appropriée. La Commission examine l’intervention de la 
Maison Blanche sur Katrina : un leadership introuvable, jusque trop longtemps après 
l’impact. Le cas de La Nouvelle Orléans n’était pas pas un dossier inconnu pour la Maison 
Blanche. Les alertes furent innombrables. La réaction resta largement déficiente.  
“De quoi s’agit-il ?” : la définition du problème ne fut pas suffisamment poussée, et la 
question du risque, puis de la réalité de la destruction des digues, ne fut pas explicitée.  
“Quels pièges ? ” : la Maison Blanche ne sut expliciter ni faire expliciter le fait que l’on 
était bien dans le scénario “Nouvelle Orléans” (l’un des 15 scénarios gravissimes pour le 
pays), ne sut pas expliciter ni faire expliciter la question de la rupture des digues, radicale-
ment différente de celle du dépassemement des digues.  
“Quels acteurs ?” : la Maison Blanche ne sut pas se représenter de façon claire que la 
FEMA n’était pas à la hauteur pour traiter un problème de cette envergure. 
“Quelle initiative ?” : la Maison Blanche resta dans une posture de réassurance, le 
Président resta dans son agenda, comme si la mesure de l’événement n’était pas prise.  
Et ce qui peut apparaître comme de l’esquive prévalut, jusqu’au moment où, face au 
désastre politico-médiatique, il fallut bien se réveiller – au milieu d’une spirale devenue 
infernale.  
Certes, ce sont des sujets d’une difficulté considérable. On ne peut pas constamment 
bouleverser les agendas – mais ici le doute n’était pas permis. Les esprits restent souvent 
sur l’idée que, pour ne pas inquiéter, le Président doit « faire comme si de rien n’était » –
 comme Kennedy sut le faire au début de la crise des missiles de Cuba, en maintenant un 
déplacement prévu à Chicago ; mais, fin août 2005, nous n’étions pas du tout dans ce 
registre : le monstre Katrina était déjà là, et sur CNN.  
 
1. Avant le désastre, l’hésitation 
 
Le scénario de désastre à la Nouvelle Orléans était connu de la Maison Blanche  
Katrina’s devastation should not have been a surprise to the White House. In early 
2004, White House Deputy National Security Adviser, General John A. Gordon, went to 
New Orleans to receive a briefing on catastrophic hurricane planning efforts for the region. 
The detailed briefing covered the catastrophic consequences of a Category 3 hurricane 
hitting New Orleans. Gen. Gordon reported this back to the White House, which may have 
influenced the funding that resulted in the Hurricane Pam exercise. In addition, another 
White House aide, Janet Benini, attended the Hurricane Pam exercise. Benini also chaired 
the group that developed the National Planning Scenarios, a set of 15 plausible, high 
consequence events used by the federal government to come up with preparedness goals 
and lists of emergency response capabilities that federal, state, and local responders should 
have. One event included among the scenarios is modeled on a hurricane hitting New 
Orleans. (Chapter 15-1) 
 
La Maison Blanche avait été [probablement] informée de la faiblesse de la FEMA 
The White House also may have received warnings that FEMA lacked the support and 
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capability to prepare for and respond to a Katrina-like catastrophe. Brown claims to have 
warned President Bush, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card, and White House Deputy 
Chief of Staff Joe Hagin as early as January 2005 that “[w]e [FEMA] weren’t getting the 
money we needed [and] we weren’t getting the personnel that we needed” and that, 
consequently, FEMA was not ready to handle a disaster like a tsunami. It is not clear what, 
if anything, the White House did to address these concerns and to help ensure that FEMA 
was ready when disaster struck. (Chapter 15-3) 
 
Des alertes précises, multiples, convergentes, pressantes et répétées 
There were also ample warnings specific to Hurricane Katrina. The National Weather 
Service, FEMA, other Department of Homeland Security components, such as the 
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, and state officials warned the 
White House repeatedly over the weekend before landfall that Katrina was likely to be 
catastrophe. The documents the White House provided to this Committee show that prior 
to and after landfall, the White House Homeland Security Council (HSC) received large 
amounts of information from DHS’ Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), as well 
as other federal agencies and departments, including the U.S. National Guard, the 
Department of Energy, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
concerning the situation that could develop. The American Red Cross and other 
organizations were also briefed. Moreover, as Secretary of Homeland Security Michael 
Chertoff said, the President was “acutely aware of Katrina and the risk it posed” during the 
weekend before landfall. “[W]e went into the weekend before,” Chertoff said, “with an 
understanding and with warnings that this was potentially the nightmare scenario that I 
think people have talked about for years in terms of New Orleans.” 
On the Saturday before the storm, FEMA Director Michael Brown relayed to state 
local, and federal officials—including the White House—his fears of the devastation 
Katrina could cause. During FEMA’s August 27,7 noon-time video-conference call, Brown 
voiced the following concerns: 
I know I’m preaching to the choir on this one, but I’ve learned over the past four and a 
half, five years, to go with my gut on a lot of things, and I’ve got to tell you my gut hurts 
on this one. It hurts. I’ve got cramps. So, we need to take this one very, very seriously. 
 
La difficulté de s’inscrire dans le jeu : on rassure 
Joe Hagin, White House Deputy Chief of Staff, participated on the same conference call 
while in Crawford, Texas, and listened to the warnings presented by Brown and others. He 
asked no questions and offered only the following statement:  
“we’re here, and anything we can do, obviously, to support you, but it sounds like the 
planning, as usual, is in good shape, and good luck to the States and just know that 
we’re watching, and we’ll do the right thing as fast as we can.” 
 
Les alertes s’aiguisent ; le Président rassure, en repli 
The warnings continued through the night: At 11:24 p.m., the White House received a 
National Weather Service—National Hurricane Center report, stating: “The bottom line is 
that Katrina is expected to be an intense and dangerous hurricane heading towards the 
North Central Gulf Coast and this has to be taken very seriously.” 
At noon on Sunday, August 28, President Bush participated from his ranch in 
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Crawford, Texas with FEMA, Department of Homeland Security, and state officials in a 
video conference call, in which Dr. Max Mayfield, Director of the National Hurricane 
Center, predicted Katrina would be a “very dangerous hurricane” and said (Chapter 15 – 
3): 
The problem that we’re going to have here—remember, the winds go counterclockwise 
around the center of the hurricane. So if the really strong winds clip Lake Pontchartrain 
that’s going to pile some of that water from Lake Pontchartrain over on the south side of 
the lake. I don’t think any model can tell you with any confidence right now whether the 
levies will be topped or not, but that’s obviously a very, very grave concern…And, quite 
frankly, for the folks in Louisiana, if you can’t get people out, you know, if you’re ever 
going to, you know, talk about vertical refuge, this is the time to do it. 
During the same call, Brown stated: “My gut tells me—I told you guys my gut was that 
this (missing) is a bad one and a big one,” and that Katrina could be “a catastrophe within 
a catastrophe.” The State of Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness’ Chief of Operations, Bill Doran, also informed the President on the same call 
that the state was undergoing “catastrophic planning” for Katrina.The President asked no 
questions, but made the following statement: 
I want to assure the folks at the state level that we are fully prepared to not only help you 
during the storm, but we will move in whatever resources and assets we have at our 
disposal after the storm to help you deal with the loss of property. And we pray for no 
loss of life, of course. 
Unfortunately, we’ve had experience at this in recent years, and I—the FEMA folks have 
done great work in the past, and I’m confident, Mike, that you and your team will do all 
you can to help the good folks in these affected states. 
Again, I want to thank Governor Blanco and Governor Riley and Governor [Barbour], 
Governor Bush of Florida, for heeding these warnings, and doing all you can possibly 
do with your state folks and local folks to prepare the citizenry for this storm. 
In the meantime, I know the nation will be praying for the good folks in the affected 
areas, and we just hope for the very best. 
In addition to the conference call, the White House continued to receive additional 
warnings of the storm’s projected force and fury throughout the day. 
 
Des actions, mais pas les impulsions décisives qui auraient été nécessaires 
On the other hand, the President did take significant steps in preparation for the storm. 
On Saturday evening, in response to a request Governor Blanco made earlier the same day, 
President Bush took the unusual step of issuing an emergency declaration for the State of 
Louisiana, which the White House described as being “indicative of the recognition that 
Katrina had the potential to be particularly devastating.” The declaration effectively 
assured the state that the federal government would pay for costs associated with 
evacuating residents prior to the storm. 
In addition to authorizing funds to help with the pre-storm evacuation, President Bush 
urged that an evacuation take place. On Sunday, August 28, President Bush spoke with 
Governor Blanco to encourage her to order a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans. 
While these steps were important and commendable, the White House could have 
marshaled federal resources more proactively in advance of the storm. Katrina was a 
hurricane that the White House knew or should have known could cause massive 
 75 
devastation in and around New Orleans. The preparations simply were not proportionate 
to the likely imminent catastrophe. (Chapter 15 – 4) 
 
 
2. Sur le désastre, l’évitement 
 
Une information claire, sans ambiguité aucune 
The record indicates that as early as 11:13 a.m. ET, on Monday, August 29, the White 
House Homeland Security Council circulated to, among others, Homeland Security Adviser 
Frances Townsend, Deputy White House Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, Deputy Homeland 
Security Adviser Ken Rapuano, and White House Counsel Harriet Miers, a report 
indicating the following: 
•   A levee in New Orleans had broken; 
•   Through a report from the Homeland Security Operations Center, water was rising in 
the city’s Lower Ninth Ward; 
•   Through a report from the State of Louisiana, water was rising at one foot per hour; 
and 
•   Through a report from Mayor C. Ray Nagin of New Orleans, problems with a 
pumping station were causing flooding in New Orleans. 
Brown claims that, also on Monday, he reported to Deputy Chief of Staff Hagin on the 
 developing catastrophe in New Orleans. Brown told the Committee that, by no later than 6 
p.m. CT on the day of landfall, Hagin knew the 17th Street levee in New Orleans had 
broken, and that the city was flooding. (Chapter 15-5) 
 
Une visualisation absente, le soulagement, la confusion 
Still, the White House does not appear to have been cognizant that Katrina was flooding 
the streets, homes, and hospitals of New Orleans on Monday, the day of the storm. 
President Bush later characterized the mindset on Monday, August 29, after learning that 
Katrina did not hit New Orleans directly: “a sense of relaxation.” In addition, as late as 
Friday, September 2, the President expressed the belief that the levees broke on Tuesday, 
the day after landfall, even though they broke on Monday, the day of landfall. 
On Tuesday, August 30, the White House received confirmation that Katrina was an 
undeniable catastrophe. 
At 12:02 a.m. ET, the White House received a report from the Homeland Security 
Operations Center that included the following statement by FEMA’s lone official in New 
Orleans that day, Marty Bahamonde: “There is a quarter mile [breach] in the levee near 
the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to flow into 
the City—an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water.” 
At 6:33 a.m. ET, Tuesday morning, The White House received a Department of 
Homeland Security situation report confirming the extent of damage and flooding in New 
Orleans:  
Widespread and significant flooding has occurred throughout the city of New Orleans, 
extending eastward, across the Mississippi gulf coast into coastal Alabama. The 
following flood reports have been received for the city of New Orleans: 
•  Industrial Canal at Tennessee St.: levee has been breached with water to a depth of 5 
feet at Jackson Barracks; 
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•  17th St. at Canal Blvd.: levee has been breached—breach extends several 100 meters 
in length; 
•  Much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater, depth unknown at this 
time. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates are in progress and project that it could 
take months to dewater the City of New Orleans. 
A report at 10:23 a.m. ET from the Homeland Security Operations Center detailed the 
location of the breached levees and noted specific concerns about the 17th Street Canal and 
Tennessee Street levees. 
Brown also told the Committee of a secure telephone call he said was held on Tuesday 
afternoon with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Chertoff, and Deputy 
Chief of Staff Karl Rove. Brown claims to have told them that at least 90 percent of the 
City’s population had been displaced and he “needed military assets [because] this was the 
big one.”  
Brown also told them that he “needed the help of the entire cabinet…DOD and HHS and 
everybody else,” and that there was a “discussion about convening the cabinet.”25 Brown 
opined that, up until that conversation took place, he believed that the White House had 
failed to comprehend fully the  catastrophic nature of Hurricane Katrina. (Chapter 15–4,5) 
 
Une réponse hésitante 
Despite these reports of a catastrophe, the White House failed to grasp the gravity of 
the situation as it unfolded. As a result, the White House’s initial response appeared 
halting and inadequate. Throughout Monday, the day of the storm, the President 
maintained his regular schedule. In the morning, he celebrated Senator John McCain’s 
birthday at Luke Air Force Base near Phoenix, Arizona. Later that morning, the President 
had a “Conversation on Medicare” at the Pueblo El Mirage RV Resort and Country Club in 
nearby El Mirage, Arizona. He also spoke to the people in the Gulf region, offering that, 
“[w]hen the storm passes, the federal government has got assets and resources that we’ll be 
deploying to help you.” 
Likewise, on Monday afternoon, the President flew to California and gave a speech in 
Rancho Cucamonga on Medicare and the new prescription drug benefit. There, he reassured 
his audience that the government was prepared to respond to Katrina.30 But this did not 
turn out to be the case. 
The hesitancy continued into the following day. Despite mounting reports on the extent 
of the catastrophe, no one from the White House participated in FEMA’s 
intergovernmental conference call on Tuesday at noon. 
At 12 noon ET that day, the President stood at a naval base in San Diego and offered a 
picture of a fully prepared federal government that was ready to respond to Katrina: “Our 
teams and equipment are in place and we’re beginning to move in the help that people 
need.” 
On the same day, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan announced the 
President would return to Washington, D.C. the following day in order to “oversee the 
response efforts from there.” 
Thereafter, the White House began to chart a more aggressive course of response to 
Katrina. At a 5:11 p.m. briefing Wednesday evening, President Bush, surrounded by his 
Cabinet, addressed the nation from the Rose Garden and announced that he had called the 
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Cabinet together, and that he “directed Secretary of Homeland Security Mike Chertoff to 
chair a Cabinet-level task force to coordinate all our assistance from Washington.” 
The task force demanded a list of available resources from each federal agency assigned 
responsibility under the National Response Plan. For example, the White House asked 
FEMA on Wednesday for “the inventory of all department agency operations/activity…are 
there any Federal powers or other processes that could be implemented to expedite the 
response or make it more efficient…[w]hat are the plans for providing housing 
to…displaced people...” Had these questions been asked and this sense of urgency imparted 
earlier, vital federal help might have arrived sooner. 
The more vigorous response continued throughout the week. For example, despite 
reports of lawlessness in New Orleans and the need for federal assistance, there were only 
a handful of FBI and other Department of Justice law enforcement officers in the New 
Orleans area as of Thursday morning. As DOJ continued to formulate a response plan, 
President Bush discussed with the Attorney General the situation in New Orleans, and 
Justice Department officers began to deploy that day. Likewise, on Saturday, the President 
ordered thousands of active duty military forces to deploy to the region to assist in what 
he saw was an unacceptable response to the suffering of thousands of Katrina victims in 
various locations around the city. (Chapter 15– 6,7) 
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Chapitre 11 
 
LES ÉVACUATIONS PRÉ-IMPACT :  
DES AVANCÉES, MAIS DES RÉALITÉS ENCORE LOIN D’ÊTRE MAÎTRISÉES 
 
 
 
 
Les observations de la Commission permettent de cerner un certain nombre de réflexions :  
• Le grand enjeu, en matière de crises hors-cadres, est de parvenir à comprendre l’hyper-
complexité du problème. Il ne s’agit pas d’un processus simple : alerte, ordre 
d’évacuation, évacuation, retour. Les données en matière de populations, de lieu, de 
durée, de coûts ne sont plus connues, circonscrites, planifiées. Le script ne suit plus le  
beau déroulement des plans-papier, comme lors de ces évacuations de référence en 
Floride. Ici encore, les règles du jeu sont bouleversées, nos repères rapidement explosés.  
• A La Nouvelle Orléans, près d’un million de personnes ont été évacuées en prévision de 
l’arrivée de Katrina. C’est en soi un exploit. Mais il restait plus de 100 000 personnes, 
souvent vulnérables : personnes âgées et infirmes, pauvres, malades. Ou des gens qui 
refusaient tout simplement de partir.  
• A La Nouvelle Orléans,  il y eut une grande innovation : la mise à disposition de toutes 
les voies d’autoroute pour une sortie de la zone. Il y eut des progrès sur les traitements 
précédents : une meilleure coordination entre les zones, les états, de façon à ce que les 
flux s’opèrent au mieux, et que l’on évite les gigantesques embouteillages connus par le 
passé. Ce qui suppose, par exemple, que le nord de la zone ne bouge pas avant que le 
sud ait pu évacuer. Le succès n’a pas été dû au hasard : le processus avait été étudié très 
précisément avant l’événement en réunissant responsables de la police et de la 
circulation, juristes, élus locaux ; on avait même utilisé la démarche des « focus 
groups » pour mieux associer les populations à cette planification. Le plan prévoyait 
notamment une phase 1, débutant 50 heures avant l’impact pour un cyclone de catégorie 
3 ou supérieur ; le dispositif du flux unique étant engagé 30 heures avant l’impact. Ce 
plan fut mis en œuvre le samedi 27 août à 16 heures, et la région put éviter des 
embouteillages de plus de deux à trois heures, à comparer aux 12 à 15 heures connus 
pour Ivan en septembre 2004.  
• On nota pourtant des améliorations à apporter au dispositif, notamment – comme on le 
voit de plus en plus sur tous les dossiers24 – la nécessité d’une information des 
conducteurs bien avant qu’ils n’abordent l’autoroute.  
• La question de l’évacuation – obligatoire ou non – suscite beaucoup de discussions et de 
nombreux points sont évoqués : il ne s’agit plus seulement de mettre à l’abri un quartier, 
comme on peut le faire lors d’une opération déminage, limitée dans le temps, mais 
d’une très lourde opération aux effets économiques très importants ; il y a toujours la 
crainte d’être perçu comme criant au Loup à tort et à travers ; à l’opposé, certains sont 
sans états d’âme : “quand on sauve des vies, la question des coûts n’a pas à intervenir”. 
Ces problèmes sont juste effleurés par la Commission qui, comme souvent, se contente 
de juxtaposer des faits, des avis, des prises de position.  
• Entre autre avis, est reprise l’idée bien connue que le succès dépends bien plus de 
l’information préalable que du caractère obligatoire ou non d’une évacuation.  
• La Commission souligne aussi un point que l’on négligerait aisément dans nos cultures-
                                         
24 Par exemple à Londres, lors de la grande menace terroriste sur l’aérien en août 2006 : on s’aperçut qu’il était 
nécessaire d’informer les passagers dès leur départ du centre-ville, et pas seulement à leur arrivée à l’aéroport 
(Retour d’expérience conduit avec Jean-Pierre Roche, Aéroports de Paris, sur la gestion de la crise d’août 2006 
par Bristish Airport Authority).  
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papier : lorsque le maire de la Nouvelle Orléans, le samedi 27 août à midi, a demandé à 
ses équipes de commencer à travailler sur un ordre d’évacuation obligatoire, il a fallu 24 
heures pour émettre l’ordre en raison de divers problèmes légaux et logistiques. Sur les 
36 heures qu’il restait, cela fait tout de même les 2/3 en délai de mise au point.  
 
Il faudrait cependant aller beaucoup plus loin et accepter d’ouvrir des dossiers difficiles sur 
le fond :  
• Les limites de la communication : nous avons désormais donné toute priorité aux 
questions de communication, d’information, etc. Cela est bien, mais il ne faut pas 
s’illusionner : les vrais obstacles ne se diluent pas aisément dans les éléments de 
langage. Même la communication la plus claire ne peut forcément avoir raison d’une 
difficulté. Nagin fut parfaitement clair sur la nécessité vitale pour chacun de partir au 
plus vite. D’autres furent encore plus brutaux dans la transparence : « Partez, je n’ai pas 
assez de sacs mortuaires pour tout le monde ». Et pourtant, cela ne suffira pas : il faut 
prendre en considération tout un ensemble de facteurs de fond qui ne se laissent pas 
dissoudre dans de la communication médiatique de dernière heure. Et même par de la 
« formation » préalable.    
• La pauvreté : évacuer est hors de portée pour qui n’a pas sa carte de crédit, un matelas 
bancaire, la possibilité culturelle de naviguer dans un maillage social dépassant le 
quartier, etc. Nous sommes bien loin de la simple mise à disposition de bus de transfert 
— qui n’est déjà pas simple d’un point de vue logistique.  
• Le caractère contre-intuitif, contre-historique d’un événement : il prendra à revers toute 
la culture de désastre sur laquelle est fondée l’action de préparation.   
• Le syndrome de paralysie et d’anesthésie mentale qui bloque dans un « business as 
usual » protecteur : il peut s’emparer de quiconque est confronté à une menace hors-
cadres –même chez des personnes hautement éduquées.  
• “L’ingérable”, selon les normes habituelles : si la règle doit être désormais de 
s’apprêter à partir plusieurs jours à l’avance, avec probabilité non négligeable de devoir 
le faire à tort, de façon répétée, on ne voit pas très bien comment trouver ses marques.    
• Le très faible intérêt porté à ces grandes questions de sécurité, la fuite viscérale devant 
ces problèmes : dans le cas de La Nouvelle Orléans, le problème était central, connu ; 
on avait commencé, notamment, à envisager des dispositifs plus sérieux pour une 
évacuation des personnes incapables de s’évacuer elles-mêmes. Mais, comme toujours 
sur ces questions, les dossiers n’avançaient guère. Parce que c’était La Nouvelle 
Orléans, certes. Par incompétence, sans doute. Par manque de volonté, certainement. 
Mais aussi, et bien plus généralement, parce que les questions de vulnérabilité de grande 
échelle ne sont pas dans les priorités de nos sociétés. Plus profondément encore : parce 
que ces questions inquiètent à ce point que quiconque soulève le problème a toute 
chance de se voir biologiquement exclure des cercles influents.  
• Le spectre de fiascos humanitaires de grande échelle : si les événements majeurs sont 
placés sous le signe du hors-cadres ; si les anticipations de risques et les probabilités ne 
sont plus des indicateurs fiables dans ces circonstances ; si les institutions ne sont pas 
configurées pour traiter des embardées de l’histoire, ou se révèlent intrinsèquement 
incapables de  le faire ; si nos contextes deviennent de plus en plus imprévisibles et 
sujets à ces embardées. 
• L’absence d’appui intellectuel à la hauteur de ces enjeux : contrairement à ce que l’on 
pourrait croire, les grandes questions de crise restent très peu explorées par la 
recherche ; et lorsqu’elles le sont, le travail reste largement marqué par des conceptions 
datant de plusieurs décennies, pour lesquelles on dispose d’outils consacrés, de 
littérature à citer – autant de protections qui permettent de faire tourner une activité 
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académique, à défaut de faire avancer l’intelligence des enjeux réels. Nombre d’études 
sur Katrina sont d’ailleurs un révélateur de cette culture : elles consacrent l’essentiel de 
l’effort à expliquer pourquoi et comment Katrina entre dans les logiques connues et 
convenues ; les défis nouveaux sont le plus souvent passés sous silence. Certes, le 
premier point est justifié et précieux. Mais il peut être dangereux. Nous aurons fait un 
grand pas en avant lorsque nous verrons organisé un colloque organisé sur le thème : 
« En quoi Katrina a-t-il pu mettre en question certaines de nos hypothèses, de nos 
connaissances de base ? ».  
 
Un succès, un problème résiduel pourtant colossal 
Louisiana’s successful evacuation of about one million people from greater New Orleans 
through phased movements and the one-way “contraflow” use of highways was a great 
improvement over the Hurricane Ivan evacuation a year earlier.  
Still, officials expected that 100,000 to 150,000 persons would be unable or unwilling to 
evacuate the region before Hurricane Katrina struck. This included those with special 
needs, such as the elderly and infirm; the poor, those lacking means to leave; and those 
simply refusing to evacuate regardless of reason or means, and choosing to take their 
chances in “hurricane roulette. (Chapter 16-1) 
 
Des progrès en matière d’évacuation : un très important travail préalable 
Careful planning is essential to a successful pre-landfall evacuation because of the 
problems that traffic congestion and timing pose for the evacuees. Evacuation from the 
Greater New Orleans Area faces unique challenges for at least four reasons. First, 
evacuating the area requires at least a 45 to 80-mile trip (as compared to the 10 to 15-mile 
trip out of the affected areas in Mississippi). Second, there are only two or three ways out 
of the area. Third, one of those ways out of the area runs into Mississippi, requiring that 
state’s cooperation. Fourth, because of the limited number of ways to exit the metropolitan 
area, the northernmost parishes within the area (e.g., Orleans and Jefferson) must wait 
patiently for the southernmost parishes within the area to evacuate first; otherwise, the 
northern parishes will choke off the southern parishes’ ability to evacuate. When these 
problems go unaddressed, thousands of people might be precluded from evacuating or 
delayed in Hurricanes Ivan- or Rita-like traffic jams extending for hundreds of miles. 
After the pre-landfall evacuation for Hurricane Georges first exposed these problems in 
September 1998, the 13-parish Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force asked the 
Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness5 to solve these problems by creating a 
“contraflow” plan. Generally speaking, contraflow turns all highway lanes in one direction, 
creating additional roadways for the execution of evacuation. […] 
Louisiana did not use its contraflow plan until the pre-storm evacuation for Hurricane 
Ivan in September 2004. In that initial experiment, the state and the parishes encountered 
serious problems with the execution of the contraflow plan, including disagreements among 
parishes as to which parishes should evacuate first and the emergence of traffic choke 
points in Baton Rouge and Slidell, Louisiana. These problems resulted in delays of 12-15 
hours for people evacuating from the New Orleans metropolitan area, as well as the deaths 
of nursing home residents who died on the road in the heat and chaos of evacuating for 
Hurricane Ivan.  
To address the problems with contraflow that arose before Hurricane Ivan made landfall, 
the Governor ordered the Louisiana State Police (LSP) and the Department of 
 81 
Transportation and Development (DOTD) to develop a better evacuation plan. Those 
agencies assembled a task force and worked with private consultants, traffic engineers, 
parish leaders, and local lawenforcement organizations in the relevant communities and 
conducted focus groups with residents to revise the plan. What resulted from this effort 
was the state’s 2005 contraflow plan, known as the Southeast Louisiana Emergency 
Evacuation Plan (LEEP). The plan resulted from cooperation between the governors and 
state police forces of Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as the state’s successful brokering 
of an agreement signed in April 2005 by the 13 parishes of the Southeast Louisiana 
Hurricane Task Force. 
The LEEP addressed the problems identified in Ivan by (a) directing as much traffic as 
possible away from what had been chokepoints at Baton Rouge and Slidell, (b) creating 
special procedures for coordination between Louisiana and Mississippi, and (c) requiring 
Jefferson and Orleans Parishes to wait to evacuate their residents until after their 
neighboring parishes announced the evacuation of their residents. 
As to the last point, the LEEP seeks to manage the order in which parishes evacuate by 
establishing three phases for the pre-storm evacuation, based on geographic location and 
the time in which tropical storm force winds are forecasted to reach the affected area. 
Under the plan, Phase 1 of the evacuation begins at the 50-hour mark before landfall of a 
Category 3 or higher hurricane, but contraflow only begins in Phase 3, once Jefferson and 
Orleans Parishes have ordered evacuations, at around the 30-hour mark before landfall and 
after. 
Once the Governor finalized the plan in the spring of 2005, the state initiated a media 
blitz and public education campaign, with media outlets, the American Red Cross, and 
businesses like Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and Lowe’s all helping to distribute more than 1.5 
million copies of the “Louisiana Citizen Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide.”  
Governor Blanco initiated contraflow at 4 p.m. on Saturday, August 27, and ended it at 
5 p.m. on Sunday, August 28, with no vehicles waiting in queues to leave the potential 
impact area. By all accounts, Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Southeast Louisiana parishes 
successfully executed the 2005 LEEP, before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. With that 
plan, Louisiana evacuated approximately 1 million people before landfall. The post-Ivan 
revisions to the plan also contributed to the success of the pre-landfall evacuation, a traffic 
jams exceeded two to three hours at most before Katrina made landfall, compared to the 12 
to 15-hour traffic jams evacuees experienced before Ivan made landfall. 
There was also close consultation between Louisiana and Mississippi officials, including 
conversations between Governor Blanco and Governor Barbour, which resulted in 
coordination between the two states on the execution of the pre-landfall evacuation. 
Despite the success of the revamped contraflow plan, some officials saw opportunities 
for more improvement. Major John Miller, from the Mississippi Department of Public 
Safety, said that he would have state troopers stand farther back from the road next time: 
“[E]very third or fourth carhas to stop and ask him a question,” snarling traffic. Other 
suggestions included diverting some traffic to avoid the bottlenecks at the northern ends of 
I-55 and I-59, and working for better state-to-state communications interoperability. 
(Chapter 16-1 à 4) 
 
Une communication vigoureuse 
In St. Bernard Parish, Larry Ingargiola, the Director of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness for St. Bernard Parish […] recalled mentioning on the news that 
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“we strongly recommend that you leave now because I don’t believe I have enough body 
bags to cover the people that stay.” (Chapter 16–4)  
On Friday, August 26, Mayor Nagin held a press conference at City Hall to announce 
that city officials were monitoring Hurricane Katrina. On Saturday, August 27, Mayor 
Nagin joined Governor Blanco, and other officials for a press briefing at 1 p.m., during 
which the Mayor advised, according to talking points prepared for that briefing, that 
citizens should prepare for the storm, to include checking on neighbors and particularly the 
elderly, and announced the city would be calling for a voluntary evacuation later that 
afternoon or the morning of August 28 to coincide with the initiation of contraflow. 
According to a press report, Mayor Nagin said, “This is not a test. This is the real deal. 
Things could change, but as of right now, New Orleans is definitely the target for this 
hurricane,” later adding, “We want you to take this a little more seriously and start moving 
– right now, as a matter of fact.” (Chapter 16–7) 
 
Le problème de l’évacuation obligatoire  
When Mayor Nagin issued a mandatory evacuation order on Sunday, August 28, at 
approximately 9:30 a.m. CT, it was the first time the City of New Orleans had ever issued 
a mandatory evacuation order, 58 even though state law has authorized any parish to issue a 
mandatory evacuation order. He had ordered his staff to begin working on the order on 
Saturday, August 27, at noon. According to witnesses, the city took nearly 24 hours to 
issue the order because it first needed to resolve legal and logistical questions.  (Chapter 16–
7) 
Ingargiola [the Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for St. 
Bernard Parish] described some of his parish’s concern about issuing a mandatory 
evacuation as follows:  
The big decision on mandatory evacuation is monetary, the businesses themselves. When 
you do a mandatory evacuation, the businesses are required to close down. The 
refineries are required to close down. We have three very large refineries down 
[here]…It takes them roughly 8 to 12 hours to close down the refinery. Every time they 
close it down, it’s over a million dollars to close it down and another million to bring it 
up...It’s not something you do easy. 
Despite these challenges, Ingargiola noted that St. Bernard Parish was able to 
successfully evacuate 92 percent of its population of approximately 66,000. When asked 
whether he felt he called for the evacuation early enough (on Friday night), Ingargiola said it 
might have been wiser to do so on Thursday. But Thursday, he noted, was a sunny day – 
had he called for an evacuation then, “the people would have thought I was crying wolf. 
That is your biggest fear, believe me. […](Chapter 16–4) 
In Plaquemines Parish, Jesse St. Amant, Director of the Plaquemines Parish Homeland 
Security Office of Emergency Preparedness, described its pre-storm evacuation policy and 
results: 
[P]eople like myself, as emergency managers, should not be thinking, if I make a 
mandatory declaration and I make that recommendation to the governor, that he 
hesitates to do that because it might cost too much, you’re putting a dollar value on [a 
life]. And in my business, if you ask how much it costs to do something, you’re in the 
wrong business cause you could in fact cost someone their life. You have to do what you 
must do to save life, and promise, and I take it very seriously. I’ll give you an example. 
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By declaring a mandatory evacuation, it cost Philips Conoco millions of dollars to safely 
shut down a petrochemical facility, and then it cost millions of dollars to start it up. The 
two most dangerous kinds of petrochemical facilities is the shutdown and the start-up of 
that facility. Very dangerous; very costly. Yet I don’t hesitate to advise parish presidents. 
He does not hesitate to support me. I have his ear. He has – since I’ve been here, he has 
– he hired me. And let me suggest this to you…I will relate success. We had a 93 percent 
evacuation rate, one [of] the highest in the area, probably in the whole state. But we 
know we’re also the most vulnerable. So the options aren’t that great. You have to be out 
of this high-risk area. (Chapter 16–5) 
In Jefferson Parish, Walter Maestri, Ph.D., is the Director of Emergency Management 
and Homeland Security. Dr. Maestri recalls that Jefferson Parish President Aaron 
Broussard announced to the parish residents on late Friday afternoon, August 26, “that 
they should be ready to go [i.e., evacuate] Saturday morning.” He believes that about 70 to 
80 percent of the residents of Jefferson Parish evacuated prior to the storm, a “successful 
evacuation.”  Dr. Maestri noted that Broussard’s call for a parish evacuation on Friday 
afternoon to take effect the following Saturday morning was not a call for a mandatory 
evacuation:  
None of the Southeast Louisiana parishes, the larger ones, Orleans, Jefferson, St. 
Tammany, make mandatory evacuations. The reason for it, guys, is it’s unenforceable. 
You can’t do it…[N]ow as you know, Mayor Nagin later changed that. He went to 
mandatory, after first going to recommended. But the bottom line is that we did not and 
never will in Jefferson call mandatory because you can’t do it. (Chapter 16–6) 
 
Des moyens d’alerte réadaptés, une forte préparation du public 
In St. Tammany Parish, Dexter Accordo has been the Director of Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security for St. Tammany Parish since July 18, 2004. He said 
that St. Tammany used the EarthCall notification system – a “reverse 911 [system] where 
you can dial up people by geographic area, and you can broadcast an audio message to 
them, giving them directions of what’s going on” – to warn residents to leave. When you 
order a mandatory evacuation, Accordo said, “At no point for the most part is it logistically 
feasible to go and knock on everybody’s door, reach in and grab that person and yank 
them out of their house.” So a broader program of education is called for: 
We reinforce it with the brochure [of evacuation maps], we reinforce it with the phone 
calls, we reinforce it with the outreach program training, we reinforce it with other forms 
of media…If I tell you, you need to do this, you’re going to probably hesitate, but if you 
know why because we educate you why you need to do it, then there’s a stronger 
probability you’re going to do it. (Chapter 16–5) 
 
Le transport des personnes incapables d’évacuer d’elles-mêmes : des initiatives, tuées 
par le système 
Although the city’s emergency plans anticipated at least 100,000 people without the 
means to evacuate after a catastrophic natural disaster, the city’s top officials failed to plan 
and prepar adequately for the pre-landfall evacuation of this less-mobile segment of the 
population. 
When Terry Tullier, the former Director of the New Orleans Office of Emergency 
Preparedness, who served in that position from May 2001 to his retirement in 2004, 
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realized “that the city did not have the resources and at the time ... perhaps not even the 
political will” to move this segment of the population, he began exploring other 
transportation options. One was a volunteer program called Operation Brother’s Keeper, 
which would enlist private citizens to help those who lacked transportation to evacuate. A 
second involved informal discussions with the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), 
the Orleans Parish School Board, and Amtrak to determine whether they would agree to 
provide transportation for a pre-landfall evacuation of New Orleans. 
Operation Brother’s Keeper (OBK) was a faith-based initiative developed in 
collaboration with Kay Wilkins, the area’s local Chapter Director of the American Red 
Cross. Through the program, churches would identify those within their congregations who 
did not have the means or ability to leave the city and match them with those who could 
help. Tullier recalled briefing 
Mayor Ray Nagin and Col. Ebbert, with Wilkins, about the initiative: “Mayor Nagin 
said in no uncertain terms, anything that the city can do to support you, I’m all for this 
initiative.” There was apparent financial support for OBK, including a grant of $216,000 
from a private organization. 
Although Operation Brother’s Keeper was in place before landfall, it was not fully 
developed as logistical issues such as rally points and destinations had not been 
determined. 
The second of these initiatives, seeking alternative transportation from a variety of 
providers, was developed in late 2004, when Dr. Kevin Stephens, Director of the New 
Orleans Health Department, resumed Tullier’s work after he stepped down as the City’s 
Director of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), leaving the post vacant for almost six months. 
Between Tullier’s retirement in December 2004 and the appointment of Chief Joseph 
Matthews in March 2005, the OEP director’s position was vacant. During this time, Dr. 
Stephens entered the breach and went to work on securing transportation for an evacuation 
of the city. Dr. Stephens explained why he saw the need to contract for transportation and 
shelters: 
All of our plans had primarily been [to] evacuate [to] the Superdome. And so I just 
thought that maybe as a general shelter, refuge of last resort, we should probably try to 
get some places outside the city and not at the Superdome because of the limitations of 
the Superdome…. So I called Amtrak and I called the school board and RTA and other 
guys...and asked them would they be willing to transport people out of the city, and they 
said sure, we’d be happy to. 
Dr. Stephens prepared draft memoranda of understanding (MOUs) among the City of 
New Orleans and Amtrak, the RTA, the Orleans Parish School Board, and the Cities of 
Baton Rouge and Hammond, Louisiana contemplating use of various transportation 
resources to evacuate people from New Orleans prior to a hurricane.  
Responsibility for the MOUs returned to the City’s Office of Emergency Preparedness, 
shortly after the Mayor appointed Chief Joseph Matthews to replace Tullier as Director in 
March 2005. Throughout the spring and summer of 2005, logistical obstacles dogged 
planning for the MOUs. Once people were evacuated from the city, was there enough 
shelter space to accommodate them? Once Amtrak delivered them to the Hammond train 
station, how would they be moved to state shelters? Most importantly, in the view of 
Chief Joseph Matthews, there was a shortage of drivers qualified to participate in an 
evacuation. 
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However, the City’s Office of Emergency Preparedness, part of the City’s Office of 
Homeland Security and Public Safety, did not follow through sufficiently to ensure the 
execution on a single one of those agreements. Shortly thereafter in June 2005 – three 
months before Katrina made landfall – the City’s Director of Homeland Security and Public 
Safety, Col. Ebbert, effectively decided to halt the negotiations on these MOUs, based on 
the following rationale: “June starts the hurricane season. You can’t go to war still drafting 
you[r] plan, so you have to make decisions of what you’re going to do this season.” With 
that decision, Col. Ebbert lost opportunities to push his subordinate, Chief Matthews, to 
close these deals, and to ask the Mayor, the state, and the federal government for assistance 
in brokering these agreements. The Committee disagrees with Col. Ebbert that the city 
would be incapable of continuing work on long-term preparations for a catastrophic storm 
in the midst of hurricane season, as was evidenced by the city’s participation in a July 
2005 workshop on transportation staging and distribution of commodities. (Chapter 16-8 
et 9) 
 
La question des conducteurs de bus : l’impuissance publique en majesté 
Although the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness Director, Chief 
Matthews, informed state and federal officials – over a month before Katrina hit – that 
New Orleans lacked bus drivers for a pre-landfall evacuation, that need went unaddressed 
before landfall. 
Informed of this need for drivers for over a month before Katrina hit, state and federal 
officials failed to explain why they did not take steps to recruit and retain drivers to 
participate in the prelandfall evacuation. This inertia on the part of the state and federal 
government, which had been on notice of the city’s inability to muster drivers on their 
own, added to the city’s failures and resulted in a paucity of drivers available to participate 
in the pre-landfall evacuation – indeed, only 100 RTA [Regional Transport Authority] 
drivers volunteered for duty. 
The state failed to provide any transportation to New Orleans for the pre-landfall 
evacuation mainly because the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Transportation 
and Development (LA DOTD) chose to ignore the Department’s responsibility under 
ESF-1 (transportation) of the April 2005 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan to take the 
lead for coordinating transportation for the evacuation of at-risk populations.  
 […] the LA DOTD Secretary Johnny Bradberry and his Department took no steps to 
fulfill its responsibility. Secretary Bradberry erroneously assumed that the National Guard 
would handle mass bus transportation. 
Testifying before the Committee, Secretary Bradberry attempted to defend his agency 
by saying that the plan was “in transition,” and that he signed the plan to “keep things 
moving,” meaning he did not want to hold up the state’s overall emergency operations 
planning process because of this issue. Nevertheless, he didn’t “necessarily agree with the 
idea that the Department of Transportation needs to have this transportation function.” 
In a letter to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 
Secretary Bradberry commented on his Department’s lack of ESF-1 planning: 
To criticize the Louisiana Department of Transportation for failure to have a plan in 
place for transportation assets which were never requested is wholly unfair and unjust. 
Yes, DOTD should have acted sooner transitioning into the new responsibilities under 
the 2005 State Emergency Operations Plan, but the fact remains that DOTD did not 
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receive any requests for transportation prior to Hurricane Katrina.111 
Secretary Bradberry’s defense that there were no requests for transportation prior to 
Katrina rings hollow. The city discussed their lack of buses and drivers needed for a 
successful evacuation with state and federal officials at the July 2005 transportation, 
staging and commodities distribution workshop. Had LA DOTD taken meaningful steps to 
develop a plan, they would quickly have seen the inability of local government to manage 
its evacuation needs as a potentially catastrophic hurricane approached. Second, the state 
was not required to wait – and should not have waited – for a request from the city before 
offering assistance, particularly when a catastrophe was imminent. 
As Katrina approached, some state officials were “[l]eaning forward in the foxhole with 
[their] finger on the trigger.” Secretary Bradberry was not one of those officials. 
 
100 000 personnes à l’abandon : perdues de vue 
On trouve ici un enseignement important pour toutes les cellules de crise : la pression des 
événements, le fait qu’ils ne s’inscrivent pas dans les cadres habituels, l’impossibilité d’avoir 
tout prévu, doivent faire inscrire une fonction de sécurité de pilotage, avec cette question 
centrale : « Mais quel paramètre décisif, voire incroyablement central, évident, pourrions-nous 
avoir oublié ? ». C’est là une fonction clé pour les Forces de Réflexion Rapide. En l’espèce, on 
a tout simplement « oublié » les 100 000 personnes, dont on n’a pourtant cessé de parler 
depuis des années, et notamment à travers l’exercice Pam – mais la Gouverneure, le Maire, 
participaient-ils à cet exercice ?  
Although it is unclear precisely what transportation assets the state could have 
mobilized over the weekend to assist the city with the pre-landfall evacuation, neither the 
Governor nor any other state official offered to provide transportation to assist with the 
pre-landfall evacuation or requested federal assistance. 
On August 27, the Governor sent President Bush a letter, requesting $9 million for 
assistance for emergency protective measures under the Stafford Act, the federal law that 
coordinates federal disaster assistance to states.120 Although the Governor, in this letter, 
requested that $2.5 million be directed to evacuation needs, she did not specify a need for 
transportation. The President issued an emergency declaration the same day, effectively 
granting the Governor’s request. 
During video teleconferences with local, state, and federal officials on Saturday, Augus 
27, and Sunday, August 28, state officials discussed the success of contraflow,122 but did 
not raise the issue of additional transportation assets, despite the long-standing realization 
that 100,000 people in New Orleans lacked transportation. Although LOHSEP Acting 
Deputy Director Colonel Jeff Smith noted on that call that the Governor “is very 
appreciative of the federal resources that have come into the state and the willingness to 
give us everything you’ve got because, again, we’re very concerned with this,” neither he 
nor the Governor made a specific request of the federal government for transportation 
resources before landfall. 
This lamentable failure by the Governor to request transportation resources shows not 
only a lack of initiative, but also a failure of leadership. (Chapter 16-14) 
 
La défaillance de l’échelon fédéral : un problème connu, un manque d’initiative 
In public-hearing testimony, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary 
Michael Chertoff acknowledged the critical importance of pre-landfall evacuation: “In a 
 87 
situation like a flood in Katrina or an earthquake, the critical, the number one most 
important thing is to get people out of the area in advance. Once the event has occurred, 
it’s going to be very difficult to rescue people.” […] 
The federal government played no role in providing transportation for pre-landfall 
evacuation. Both in the run-up to Katrina and subsequent interviews, federal officials 
provided the same explanation: they were accustomed to the longstanding practice of 
generally deferring to the primary emergency response to state and local governments. […] 
Throughout the weekend of August 27 and 28 it had become increasingly clear to 
federal, state, and local officials that Hurricane Katrina would be a catastrophe. Mayor 
Nagin took the unprecedented step (albeit with some hesitation) of calling for a mandatory 
evacuation of New Orleans. Both President Bush and Governor Blanco actively encouraged 
that step. There was no question that evacuation before landfall was the highest priority. 
While the widespread support for mandatory evacuation is laudable, it is unfortunate 
that the federal government did not take a greater interest in the practicality of that 
evacuation in a city widely known to have made no arrangements for evacuation of the 
thousands of its citizens lacking personal transportation. Federal officials had participated 
actively in the Hurricane Pam exercise, which predicted that some 100,000 New Orleanians 
would lack means of evacuation. Federal officials did not need to wait for a request before 
offering help. 
Federal officials were both aware of state and local shortfalls, and had both the capacity 
and opportunities to help. But in the absence of adequate plans and policies, federal 
officials were paralyzed to act. (Chapter 16-18,19,20) 
 
Pour en finir avec les arguments spécieux sur l’impossibilité du fédéral d’intervenir 
La Commission, encore une fois, clarifie que les bureaucraties fédérales ne peuvent s’en 
tenir au principe selon lequel elles n’interviennent qu’après épuisement des ressources locales, 
qu’après demande express des autorités locales. La loi, si on la connaît, et le bon sens, 
réduisent en pièces ces esquives trop faciles. En d’autres termes, les textes sont là pour 
stimuler la responsabilité, non pour lui donner des terrains sans fin de controverses permettant 
de justifier l’inaction, la réserve, l’irresponsabilité, le manque de leaderdship.  
Due to disagreement among officials as to whether, when, and to what extent the federal 
government could assist with a pre-landfall evacuation, it is helpful to examine the law and 
policy directing the way in which federal officials could have assisted with the pre-landfall 
evacuation. 
Federal law imposes no requirement for the federal government to aid pre-landfal 
evacuations. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the principle that local and 
state authorities have primary responsibility for emergencies, only receiving federal 
assistance when their own resources are overwhelmed. However, federal law does not 
prohibit the federal government from extending assistance, even without a request from the 
state, when preparing for or responding to an imminent catastrophe such as Hurricane 
Katrina. 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the “Stafford 
Act”) gives the federal government the authority to assist the state and local governments 
with an evacuation. Congress made clear in the Stafford Act that its purpose was to “vest 
responsibility for emergency preparedness jointly in the Federal government and the states 
and their political subdivisions.” Included within the Stafford Act’s definition of 
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“emergency preparedness” is any measure “undertaken in preparation for anticipated 
hazards,” such as “the non-military evacuation of the civilian population.” 
The Stafford Act also authorizes the President – and, through Executive Orders, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security – to direct federal agencies to “provide assistance essential 
to meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting from a major disaster,” including 
but not limited to the “movement of supplies or persons” and the “reduction of immediate 
threats to life, property, and public health and safety.”189 A common-sense reading of this 
language would indicate that the Stafford Act authorized the President to direct a federal 
agency to help state and local governments move people out of New Orleans both before 
and after landfall to meet the “immediate threat” of Katrina. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 enumerates FEMA’s functions which include 
assistance with evacuations. Under the Act, FEMA’s mission is “to reduce the loss of life 
and property and protect the Nation from all hazards by leading and supporting the Nation 
in a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program,” including the 
responsibility for mitigation of risk to people and property, planning, and responding “to 
save lives … through evacuating potential victims.” 
FEMA’s mission under the Homeland Security Act was to take steps to mitigate the 
risks to people that could arise from Katrina; plan to help officials prepare for Katrina and 
similar catastrophic storms; plan for an evacuation in the event of a catastrophic storm; 
respond to Katrina by “evacuating potential victims”; and coordinate efforts by other 
officials. 
The Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) to the National Response Plan delineates 
federal policy on a more proactive response to catastrophes. (Chapter 16-21,22) 
 
Un casse-tête supplémentaire : les animaux de compagnie, critiques dans l’évacuation 
More than 50 percent of U.S. households have pets.194 In the aftermath of Katrina, the 
media brought to light many stories of individuals who refused to evacuate without their 
animals. One study revealed that childless households with pets were twice as likely to fail 
to evacuate as households with children. In other words, in childless households, owners 
“were apparently willing to jeopardize their lives to stay with their pets.” In his after-
action report on Hurricane Katrina, Captain Mark Willow of the Homeland Security 
Division of the New Orleans Police Department wrote that “Some of the fatalities in New 
Orleans and surrounding areas may be attributable to the fact victims would not leave their 
pets at home or would not consider leaving without them.” 
Evacuation with pets before the storm was difficult for many since emergency shelters 
usually prohibit animals. The American Red Cross did not allow animals in its shelters.198 
Animals can cause allergic reactions for some residents of the shelter, increase hygiene 
problems, and may become dangerous or unruly in the stressful setting of a shelter.199 Even 
after the storm passed, the media reported on many individuals unwilling to leave their 
homes despite dangerous conditions unless rescuers agreed to rescue their pets as well.200 
The national organization of the American Red Cross works cooperatively with animal 
welfare organizations to develop procedures for stationing animal shelters close to its own 
shelters. In this way, owners are able to evacuate with their pets and maintain contact after 
arrival at the shelter. The American Red Cross implements this policy by encouraging local 
chapters to work with animal organizations to establish local agreements. However, Gulf 
Coast victims did not have pet accommodations inside or in close proximity to many of the 
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available shelters. In particular, the New Orleans Superdome, the city’s refuge of last 
resort, had no pet shelter facilities inside or close by, and the Committee has seen no 
evidence of formal arrangements for Superdome refugees’ pets. 
During Katrina, the Lamar-Dixon Expo Center in Gonzales, Louisiana, (approximately 
30 miles from Baton Rouge) was designated as an animal shelter. […] During Katrina, the 
Lamar-Dixon Expo Center handled approximately 8,500 rescued animals. 
For Katrina, FEMA activated all four of its Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams 
(“VMAT”) to the Gulf Coast. This involved more than 200 veterinarians and was FEMA’s 
largest simultaneous deployment of veterinary relief.208 The National Guard and Louisiana 
State police assisted in collecting stray dogs. On September 2, 2005, the American Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) and the Humane Society of the United 
States (HSUS) began a coordinated campaign with a dozen local organizations and 
volunteers from across the country to rescue animals from the aftermath of Katrina. 
For Katrina, no standardized system for tracking rescued animals was in place. The 
website Petfinder.com came to play an important role in allowing owners to find rescued 
pets. (Chapter 16-23, 23) 
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Chapitre 12 
 
LES MOYENS DE COMMUNICATION :  
BLACKOUT QUASI TOTAL, DÉFAILLANCES DE PILOTAGE 
 
 
 
 
La Commission présente un tableau touffu de la défaillance quasi totale des moyens de 
communication. Si l’on prend un peu distance avec l’amas de détails fourni, on peut sans 
doute poser les quelques repères suivants :  
• Le niveau des destructions fut tel que toutes les organisations clés – qu’il s’agisse des 
centres de crise, des agences support essentielles, des centres d’hébergement – perdirent 
quasiment tous leur moyens de liaison. Même les liaisons satellite n’apportèrent pas ce 
qu’on attendait d’elles, probablement, indique la Commission, parce que les utilisateurs 
n’avaient pas été formés à utiliser ces moyens, ou parce que les bâtiments faisaient 
écran.  
• Certains, et notamment dans le secteur privé, furent moins touchés. Par exemple, le 
groupe hôtelier Starwood mit en place un système de liaison qui résista (satellite et 
Internet) et qui permit à quelque 2 100 personnes – collaborateurs et clients – de 
continuer à communiquer. Pour y parvenir, deux employés spécialistes des liaisons 
avaient été envoyés sur place, avec des batteries de secours pour les ordinateurs. Ce 
système privé fut aussi utilisé par des personnels de secours et des journalistes. 
Mississippi Power put s’appuyer sur un système maison qui se montra très résilient, en 
dépit de destructions majeures ; en trois jours, il fonctionnait à nouveau à 100%. Mais le 
secteur privé eut quelque difficulté à obtenir des appuis en termes de sécurité. Et il 
connut des préemptions non négligeables : la FEMA n’hésita pas à détourner, par exem-
ple, des camions de fuel engagés sur la maintance d’équipements importants. Certains 
personnels des opérateurs furent aussi bloqués à des points de contrôle de sécurité.  
• Il aurait été possible d’injecter des moyens fédéraux mais, ici encore, le manque de 
réactivité conduisit à des délais très pénalisants.  
 
On prolongera les développements de la Commission par quelques observations :  
• Le point essentiel de l’épisode fut la surprise : l’inondation, la durée de l’inondation, 
l’impossibilité de réparer, les problèmes majeurs posés par l’humidité, la boue, la 
pourriture, etc. Nous n’étions pas du tout dans le registre de la rupture d’un câble, et de 
la réparation d’urgence.  
• La faible réactivité est une nouvelle manifestation de l’absence générale de capacité des 
institutions en charge des crises pour faire face à une situation hors-cadres.  
• On peut se demander si la dimension Liaisons-Communication ne souffre pas d’être 
encore mal positionnée dans le tableau des priorités. Dans un monde hyper-complexe, 
marqué par la vitesse et la connectivité, nos organisations n’ont sans doute pas encore 
perçu à quel point les liaisons étaient devenues vitales. Cela reste un moyen d’appui, 
quand il devrait être considéré comme une ressource absolument critique. Ce n’est pas 
là une question technique, mais de vision du monde tel qu’il est devenu.  
• Dans la mesure où ce type de problème est récurrent, et qu’on ne semble pas en mesure 
de le traiter (le point avait été clairement établi après le premier attentat contre les Tours 
Jumelles en 1993, puis à nouveau souligné en 2001, et toujours mentionné depuis), on 
peut se demander si les organisations ont véritablement le souhait de voir des avancées 
dans le domaine. Une stratégie agressive de communication très nettement améliorée  
supposerait une détermination à s’ouvrir, à coopérer, à partager, à s’exposer, ce qui 
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n’est pas du tout dans nos références culturelles les plus ancrées.  
 
L’importance critique des communications 
The inability of government officials and first responders to communicate during a 
response to an emergency, results in the loss of lives during terrorist attacks, natural 
disasters, and every-day operations. The problems of operability and interoperability of 
communications were a central part of the failures in the governments’ response to 
Hurricane Katrina. (Chapter 18-1) 
The storm and flooding severely damaged both the commercial and public safety 
communications infrastructure.22 This created chaos for every aspect of the governments’ 
response – search and rescue, medical care, law enforcement, and the provision of 
commodities. (Chapter 18-3) 
 
Exemple : le Maire, totalement isolé 
In New Orleans, Mayor Nagin’s command center at the Hyatt Regency Hotel lost all 
communications.3 Before the flooding, but after landfall, Mayor Nagin had to walk across 
the street to City Hall in order to speak to city emergency managers. One phone line in the 
Mayor’s room in the Hyatt would sometimes connect a call out but could not receive 
incoming calls.5 It was not until Thursday, September 1, three days after landfall, that the 
Mayor’s command center began to receive e-mails. On Friday, September 2, the White 
House provided the Mayor with a mobile phone but he had to lean out of stormdamaged 
rooms at the hotel in hopes of getting a signal on it. (Chapter 18-1) 
 
Contre-exemple : certains opérateurs privés remarquables 
In its testimony before the Committee, the Starwood hotel company discussed how it 
managed events on the ground in New Orleans, backed up by its corporate headquarters, 
which enabled the company to help approximately 2,100 guests, employees and their 
families weather the storm at two hotels in safety. Through effective planning and pre-
positioning of phones, Starwood never lost contact with areas outside the affected region. 
Satellite phones were deployed to the hotels, and Starwood maintained its Internet 
connection, which permitted employees and guests to communicate with the outside world. 
One of its New Orleans hotels had two IT employees onsite and battery back-ups for their 
computer systems, which enabled the Internet connection. Through media reports received 
via the Internet, managers on the ground knew what was going on around them when all 
other forms of communications had failed. Local responders and journalists sometimes 
relied on Starwood’s communications capabilities since the city’s communications system 
was largely lost. 
Wal-Mart stressed the importance of “efficient” communication, and described it as 
“absolutely the key to success at a higher level.” Flowing timely, accurate information is 
another essential element for success. Wal-mart developed situational awareness at the local 
level and passed quickly to its emergency operations center, which compiled a big picture 
for the company. The business unit representatives in the emergency operations center 
made decisions on tactics and strategies based upon the “big picture” information and then 
moved aggressively to disseminate objectives back to company response teams and field 
teams for further dissemination. Wal-Mart determined that the “face-to-face 
communication at the Emergency Operations Center level, where the decision-makers 
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congregate, is the most efficient method of communication.” 
Mississippi Power recognized the criticality of communications to an effective 
response, and especially, the ability to communicate with thousands of additional workers 
brought in from outside the region to help with restoration and repairs. Mississippi Power 
relied on its only viable form of communication – its internal system – Southern Linc 
Wireless. This system was designed with considerable redundancy and proved reliable 
despite suffering catastrophic damage. Within three days, the system was functioning at 
nearly 100 percent. Mississippi Power told the Committee that it “also installed its own 
microwave capability to 12 remote staging areas in order to transmit material inventory 
data into our automated procurement process.” When communication circuits of another 
company were down, our information technology group would find a way to bypass those 
circuits and restore critical communications.” (Chapter 18-2,3) 
 
Les rapports Public/Privé : le gouffre 
The generators supplying power to the central offices had limited fuel supply,30 and 
needed to be replenished about every three days. BellSouth obtained fuel trucks to top off 
its generators, proceeding into New Orleans with an armed convoy. Other companies had 
problems obtaining fuel for their generators. For example, Cox Louisiana Telecom LLC, 
which serves 85,000 customers, had fuel trucks that were destined for switch facilities 
intercepted by FEMA and turned away. FEMA also took fuel away from technicians with 
service trucks in the field. In addition, FEMA commandeered a fuel tanker from BellSouth 
in order to refuel helicopters.  
The commercial sector also had to negotiate security concerns. At BellSouth’s main 
central office on Poydras St. in New Orleans, which serves as a regional hub for multiple 
telecommunications carriers, reports of violence and looting caused the New Orleans Police 
Department (NOPD) and Louisiana State Police to advise employees to evacuate the 
building. Two days after the evacuation, the FBI and the U.S. Marshal’s Service provided 
security so that BellSouth workers could return to the Poydras St. building and bring fuel 
to the generators in the building, which were running low but never went out of service.35 In 
an effort to obtain security for all telecommunications providers, the National 
Communications System (NCS), the federal government’s lead agency for the response to 
communications problems, sought assistance from the Department of Defense (DOD), 
which forwarded the request to the Louisiana National Guard. In the end, however, security 
arrangements with the Louisiana National Guard fell through. Ultimately, 
telecommunications providers hired private security to protect their workers and supplies. 
Repair workers also had difficulty gaining access to their equipment and facilities in the 
field because police and National Guard in some cases refused to let them enter the disaster 
area. MCI sought a letter from Governor Blanco to access parts of New Orleans based on a 
requirement from the Louisiana State Police, and Verizon Wireless wanted access and 
security for technicians restoring cellular service in New Orleans. Industry representatives 
said that their technicians would benefit from having uniform credentialing that is 
recognized by the multiple law-enforcement agencies operating in a disaster area. (Chapter 
18-4) 
 
L’appui national : décalage stratégique, retard systématique 
Under the National Response Plan (NRP), Emergency Support Function-2 (ESF-2, 
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Communications) ensures the provision of federal communications support to federal, 
state, local, tribal, and private-sector response efforts during an Incident of National 
Significance. The coordinator for ESF-2 activities is the National Communications System 
(NCS), an interagency consortium managed within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). The Deputy Manager and Director of NCS is Dr. Peter Fonash.  
Before Hurricane Katrina, NCS never had to repair the land mobile radio (LMR) 
systems that are operated by local governments and used by first responders.61 In fact, the 
organization did not have an operational plan to systematically assess an incident’s impact 
on the LMR systems and respond to local governments’ communications needs for 
operability, or interoperability, during emergencies. Fonash did not know what 
communications assets were even available across the federal government, nor what 
communications assets DHS, DOD, or other agencies may have been deploying. “Even the 
federal agencies themselves, DOD, for example … didn’t even have the control within 
DOD of all the assets being deployed by DOD because different parts of DOD were 
deploying assets and there was no central control,” he said. Without knowledge of what 
communications assets federal agencies were bringing into the area, NCS could not 
effectively prioritize the use of those assets. 
Fonash acknowledged that NCS had inadequate information about the communication 
situation in the New Orleans area. According to NCS protocol, its headquarters receives 
such information only when its personnel on the ground have run into “problems [they] 
can’t fix.” The magnitude of the damage in Louisiana proved this system to be inadequate. 
Fonash said that NCS staff was “so busy handling the crisis that they were probably not 
giving us the situational awareness that we should have been getting…. We just didn’t have 
enough people down there.” Eventually, Fonash sent additional staff to the region and 
placed a contact at the Louisiana state EOC. 
There were several communications assets were not deployed at all, or could have been 
deployed sooner: 
•  The U.S. Forest Service maintains over 5,000 radios, the largest civilian cache of 
radios in the United States, but many remained unused.67 
•  FEMA Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) units, which include trucks 
with satellite capabilities, were at Barksdale Air Force Base in Shreveport, Louisiana 
outside the disaster area during landfall, and did not travel to the State EOC in Baton 
Rouge until the day after landfall. 
•  DOD had communications assets, including radio systems, which could have been 
deployed sooner. 
•  DHS’s Prepositioned Equipment Program (PEP) pods that contained 
communications equipment did not start deploying until a week after landfall. 
The NCS did identify and provide satellite communications vans to the New Orleans 
City Hall, Louisiana State Police in Baton Rouge, Mobile Army Surgical Hospital at the 
New Orleans Airport, and to the National Guard in Jefferson Parish.71 NCS also provided a 
cellular unit on a truck to the Louisiana state EOC.72 In addition, NCS identified the need to 
provide a temporary LMR communications solution to the eight-parish area around New 
Orleans, working with FEMA to initiate the contract.73 But most of these NCS assets were 
not provided until days after the storm struck or were only provided to select locations. 
Indeed, satellite vans were not en route to the Louisiana State Police in Baton Rouge until 
September 1, and high water kept one satellite van from reaching New Orleans City Hall 
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until three days after landfall. 
It appears that some requests for the NCS to provide communications capabilities to 
local governments were not made until a few days after landfall. For example, Colonel Jeff 
Smith, Louisiana’s Acting Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness, did not submit a 
form requesting “communications with the affected parish EOCs” until 5 p.m. on 
September 1 – more than three days after landfall. In fact, Dr. Fonash said that he wasn’t 
aware that the State EOC had communications problems until the state made its request on 
September 1. An e-mail indicates that Governor Blanco did not ask for assistance with 
communications until the evening of August 31, two days after landfall; in that case, the 
federal ESF-2 representative in Baton Rouge met with a state official the next day. Under 
the NRP, though, the NCS could have offered assistance even before the state made an 
official request for help. (Chapter 18-6,7) 
 
Téléphone-satellite : de l’utilité de la formation des dirigeants 
Ce n’est pas là une préoccupation anecdotique. On note souvent, dans un même ordre 
d’idée, l’impossibilité de faire venir des dirigeants en salle de crise avant les événements pour 
découvrir un peu l’environnement technique qui serait le leur. Dès lors, cet environnement leur 
apparaît plus inquiétant qu’utile le jour J, et ils trouvent toutes les bonnes raisons pour ne pas 
y venir ; ou bien ils y viennent mais ne savent pas utiliser les ressources du lieu. Le problème 
ne fait que s’accentuer avec l’explosion de l’innovation technique. On a ainsi remarqué, lors de 
Katrina25, que les jeunes communiquaient bien mieux que les adultes, via les SMS, qui peuvent 
passer encore quand la voix ne passe plus.  
Satellite phones don’t rely on the terrestrial (ground-based) infrastructure that is 
necessary for land mobile radio, land-line, and cellular communications. But there is 
anecdotal evidence that satellite communications experienced their own problems: New 
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin said that he had “a huge box of satellite phones that did not 
work.” […] 
The problems with satellite phones do not appear to have been caused by the phones 
themselves or the satellite networks; rather, a combination of user error and buildings or 
other objects obstructing satellite signals are the more likely culprits. In fact, NCS was not 
aware of any problems with the satellite phone networks. And Walt Gorman, a vice-
president at Globalstar, which supplied many satellite phones to the federal government, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi, said that users with difficulty operating satellite phones 
probably did not know how to use them properly because they had not received training. 
Therefore, users may have had problems putting them in the correct mode, directing the 
antennae, or dialing the correct numbers. (Chapter 18-9) 
 
Une double difficulté : une guerre de retard, des guerres bureaucratiques 
Les télécommunications sont devenues vitales dans des systèmes désormais foisonnants, 
interdépendants, qui ne peuvent plus fonctionner sans une très forte capacité d’interconnexion 
généralisée. Mais la dimension télécommunication n’est pas encore perçue comme à ce point 
vitale. On se souvient de ce ministre français des PTT qui, avec une morgue inimitable, à la fin 
des années 1960, avait raillé le téléphone, comme « simple gadget permettant aux femmes 
esseulées d’appeler leurs amants ». Il faudrait se demander si nous ne sommes pas aujourd’hui 
également en retard d’une guerre alors que les télécommunications sont devenues essentielles à 
                                         
25 Témoignage de Julie Hernandez, étudiante  normalienne, présente sur place.  
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la résilience de nos systèmes de vie.  
Mais, autre front, la question de la tenue de nos sociétés face aux grands risques de rupture 
semble une préoccupation souvent très secondaire quand ce qui compte véritablement est en 
jeu : la sauvegarde des territoires d’influence bureaucratique.  
Much of the communications in southeastern Louisiana is outdated and has been at 
various stages of disrepair for several years. In Orleans Parish the communications system 
is an 800 MHz system, which supports police, fire, EMS and the Office of Emergency 
Preparedness. (MHz (Megahertz) denotes the frequency on which the equipment operates 
and public safety radio equipment often can only operate on a specific frequency.) The age 
of the equipment created problems in getting technical support. In St. Bernard Parish, the 
communications system – 400 MHz – is so old that it must be maintained by purchasing 
repair parts through the eBay auction site on the Internet. […](Chapter 18-10). 
Well before Katrina struck, Louisiana agencies encountered funding problems as they 
sought to enhance communications interoperability. In 2004 and again in January 2005, the 
Louisiana State Police attempted to secure $105 million to upgrade its communications 
infrastructure from an outdated, 800 MHz analog system which is no longer supported by 
the vendor to a modern 700 MHz digital interoperable network. That amount was 
considered an “inexpensive” way to connect existing operating systems in the state to a 
common, statewide network. The State Police sought funding from Congress, via earmark 
requests to Louisiana’s Congressional delegation, through Louisiana’s state budget process, 
and explored grant opportunities with the Office of Domestic Preparedness within DHS 
but was not successful. 
The greater New Orleans area analyzed options for creating a region-wide, modern 800 
MHz system, also well before Katrina struck. However, estimates ranged as high at $45 
million, which local officials considered “cost prohibitive.” […](Chapter 18-11). 
 
In addition to funding, interoperability also always raises technical and policy issues. As 
Colonel Joseph Booth of the Louisiana State Police put it, “there’s always issues about 
who’s going to control it, who’s making decisions, what technology to go with, what 
capabilities, what kind of local control there is.” (Chapter 18-12). 
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Chapitre 13 
 
LE CENTRE NATIONAL DE CRISE : SOUS L’EMPIRE DE LA CRISE 
 
 
 
 
La Commission examine avec une assez grande précision le fonctionnement du centre de 
crise national, le Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). Il en ressort l’image d’un 
centre de crise dépassé, incapable de traiter l’information qu’il reçoit, incapable de détecter 
tout problème grave, incapable de passer l’information, d’une lenteur stupéfiante, peu articulé 
aux responsables clés. Bref, une « usine à gaz » qui sert finalement à « lisser » l’information : 
en dégageant cette dernière de tout ce qui pose problème ; en imposant un rythme d’une 
lenteur qui dépasse l’entendement.  
Les analyses de la Commission restent plus marquées par la stupéfaction que par la 
maîtrise profonde du sujet. En vérité, dans ce fonctionnemement de la cellule de crise 
nationale, on voit à l’œuvre des pathologies bien connues :  
• Le centre national de crise est davantage une couche organisationnelle supplémentaire 
qui stocke de l’information dans l’attente de confirmations générales et définitives, 
qu’un outil stratégique au service des dirigeants.  
• Les dirigeants semblent coupés de cette instance : on ne sait pas ce qu’ils attendent, ils 
n’impriment pas leur marque, ils ne sont pas bien branchés sur le système ; comme des 
chefs d’orchestre restés dans leur loge ;  
• Le centre national de crise est dans une posture d’attente : que l’information lui arrive 
est la pente naturelle retenue, on ne va pas la chercher ;  
• Le centre national de crise est branché sur les sorties naturelles de tout un empilement 
administratif, il ne va pas chercher en direct de l’information sur le terrain ;  
• Le centre national de crise n’a pas de vision claire de ce que pourrait être la situation, 
pas de questionnement, pas de clarification des éléments d’informations critiques, 
discriminants, qu’il faudrait s’acharner à rechercher ;  
• Dès lors, le centre national de crise se met lui-même à la merci du « fog of war », notion 
qui sera utilisée ensuite pour expliquer l’impuissance. Il attend que son écran radar soit 
illisible, au lieu de piloter sa propre recherche d’information ; il attend qu’il redevienne 
lisible, après la bataille ;  
• Surtout, et c’est de loin le plus important, il prend pour validée une information 
rassurante, et « attend confirmation » si d’aventure une information arrive qui ne cadre 
pas avec les bonnes nouvelles ;  
• Si les informations non-optimistes s’accumulent, le centre national de crise fonctionne 
en mettant à l’écart ces informations, et en retardant de plus en plus leur diffusion 
interne.    
En d’autres termes, un tel dispostifi est, de par culture fondamentale, mis sous anesthésie 
par toute crise non conventionnelle.  
La réponse n’est pas d’édicter des normes du type : « Un rapport tous les ¼ d’heures » – le 
système trouverait d’autres voies efficaces pour ne pas avoir à s’approcher du non 
conventionnel. La réponse est de former les membres du dispositif aux situations de grande 
surprise. Et aux pathologies habituelles qui gèlent les cellules de crise.26 Sinon, ne surnagera 
                                         
26 Je me souviens notamment, à l’inverse, de la grande leçon de pilotage de crise que donna Claude Frantzen, 
alors responsable à la Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile, le jour d’un accident aérien. Une nouvelle 
« réconfortante » arriva qui aurait dû contenter tout le monde. Claude Frantzen intervint et dit en substance au 
messager (que bien d’autres auraient loué pour son message si « rassurant ») : « Vous savez très bien que c’est ce 
que nous voudrions tous entendre. Alors, maintenant, vous allez reprendre contact avec le terrain et vérifier cette 
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qu’une instance écran, qui continuera à jouer le rôle de tête de pont de la crise, au sommet du 
système.  
Quiconque ne s’est pas formé, personnellement, en équipe et en réseau, aura peu de chance 
d’échapper au joug de la crise, dont le premier « objectif » est de mettre sous sa coupe les 
cellules de crises les plus essentielles. Une cellule de crise n’est pas un lieu où l’on tente de se 
rassurer, pour pouvoir envoyer des messages rassurants à la couche supérieure, et obtenir ainsi 
la bénédiction de qui s’apprêtait déjà à être terrorisé. 
 
Le centre clé de voûte du pays, tête de pont de la crise 
Having an ability to “connect the dots” was a main goal during the creation of the  
Department of Homeland Security. The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) is 
a key element and was designed to be “the nation’s nerve center for information sharing and 
domestic incident management.” Hurricane Katrina was the HSOC’s first major, public test, 
and it failed. At the federal level, there was a startling lack of situational awareness as 
Katrina came ashore. On the day of landfall, DHS ignored, disregarded, or simply failed to 
obtain readily available reports that would have – and should have – led to an 
understanding of the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans and the remainder of the 
Gulf Coast. DHS witnesses have offered essentially two explanations for the lack of 
situational awareness on Monday, August 29. First, they fault Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s (FEMA) former Director Michael Brown and his agency for failing 
to provide the HSOC with crucial information. Second, they invoke the “fog of war” 
metaphor and assert that conflicting reports rendered the HSOC unable to develop any 
sense of the “ground truth.” 
But these are at best only partial explanations for the HSOC’s failure to understand the 
scope of the unfolding disaster. Brown did fail to forward critical information in his 
possession, which is inexcusable. However, the HSOC’s failure to obtain reports of 
breaches and massive flooding issued by the National Weather Service (NWS), the Army 
Corps of Engineers, and the media, was unrelated to anything Brown or FEMA did or did 
not do. Indeed, throughout the day of landfall the HSOC received reports – including from 
two DHS Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) stationed in the region – that uniformly 
reflected a growing catastrophe. To the extent these reports “conflicted,” it was only in 
terms of the scope of the catastrophe described, not the existence of the catastrophe itself. 
(Chapter 19-1) 
 
Des points de situation trompeurs 
The failure to “connect the dots” is best captured by the situation report (“sitrep”) 
issued by the HSOC at 5 p.m. CT on Monday. During hurricanes and other significant 
incidents, the HSOC issues sitreps at 5 a.m. and 5 p.m. to many customers, including DHS 
leadership and the White House. In crucial areas this sitrep was both incorrect and 
incomplete. It was incorrect in stating that “Preliminary reports indicate the levees in New 
Orleans have not been breached; however, an assessment is still pending.” In fact, most 
preliminary reports stated just the opposite. It was incomplete in stating generically that 
“Flooding is reported in New Orleans,” but failing to provide any detail about the widely 
reported scope of the flooding or the devastating results – for example, that residents were 
                                                                                                                               
information, dans quelle condition elle a été recueillie, par qui, etc. Et vous allez revenir avec de l’information 
rigoureuse ».  Il est simple de l’écrire ici. C’est autre chose de le faire en direct, en situation de haute tension.  
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seeking refuge from rising water in their attics and on rooftops. 
In a dynamic situation such as Katrina, time was of the essence, as people were in 
desperate circumstances. We will never know for certain how the lack of awareness 
contributed to the overall failure of the federal government to respond adequately in a 
timely manner. We do know, however, that the 5 p.m. sitrep was the last report Secretary 
Chertoff received on the day of landfall, and he went to bed Monday night with the 
incorrect belief that the levees had not been breached and that Katrina had not done the 
worst that had been predicted. This incorrect sitrep was also forwarded to the White 
House. Several days later President Bush later remarked that “I myself, thought we had 
dodged a bullet.” (Chapter 19-1,2) 
 
Une vigilance sur les grands événements bien notés à l’agenda, pas sur l’impromptu 
C’est là une règle générale : un grand événement annoncé longtemps à l’avance, bien 
cadré, dispose de tous les tampons administratifs voulus pour mobiliser les instances idoines. 
Une coupe du monde de football, la venue du Pape, peuvent réserver plusieurs mois à 
l’avance les cases voulues dans l’appareillage. Par contre, une canicule, jusqu’à ce que l’on 
dispose d’un plan ad  hoc, ne sortira pas du registre des événements aberrants, donc non 
habilités à déranger de façon impropre le fonctionnement des hautes instances.  
The HSOC’s failure to maintain situational awareness during Katrina grew out of a lack 
of planning and flawed analysis. Though plans for obtaining situational awareness are 
developed for events like the Superbowl and for the national political conventions, HSOC 
Director Matthew Broderick acknowledged that “there was no plan developed” for 
maintaining situational awareness during Katrina. (Chapter 19-2) 
 
Le centre national de crise coupé de ses propres bases sur le terrain : faille verticale 
Neither HSOC Director Broderick nor HSOC Deputy Director Frank DiFalco knew that 
DHS had a representative in New Orleans and another in the Louisiana State Police 
Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge sending reports to the HSOC. Indeed, on the 
day of landfall, the HSOC failed to recognize, or disregarded as unconfirmed, many of the 
reports that it did receive. The HSOC similarly failed to obtain reports and information 
that it should have gotten. As the week progressed, situational awareness improved little if 
at all, evidenced most pointedly by DHS’s late awareness of the thousands gathering at the 
Convention Center. (Chapter 19-2) 
 
Le centre national de crise coupé du terrain : aucune attention prêtée aux bureaux 
locaux de la météo 
Pathologie également classique. Les intances nationales ont déjà tellement de difficultés à 
trouver leurs marques quand on les convoquent ainsi à l’improviste qu’il ne leur reste plus 
énormément d’énergie et de disponibilité pour aller rechercher de l’information auprès des 
mieux renseignés. Surtout : ces mieux renseignés, directement au front, risquent d’exposer à 
des données qui n’auront pas subi le processus voulu de dénaturation, filtration, édulcoration, 
que garantissent les circuits administratifs de référence.  
The apparent failure to obtain the NWS reports issued by the local offices is a 
particularly troubling example of how the HSOC’s failure to plan for Katrina manifested 
itself. These reports contained some of the earliest indications of levee breaches and 
catastrophic flooding and were readily available – NWS’s parent agency, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), maintains a desk in the HSOC.  
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When asked about these reports, Broderick [HSOC Director] suggested that they may not 
have been obtained because they were issued by local NWS stations. He did not know 
whether anyone at the HSOC was responsible for monitoring local weather stations during 
a major weather event. Common sense steps such as identifying and monitoring local 
sources of information – particularly ones run by the federal government – would seem an 
obvious course of action for the HSOC in the days before landfall. And yet, no one within 
the HSOC appears to have given this any thought. (Chapter 19-5) 
 
Le centre national de crise coupé des autres instances nationales : faille horizontale, 
lenteur de la transmission de l’information 
There were also structural flaws in the way the HSOC obtained information from other 
federal agencies and other sources. The twice-a-day HSOC sitreps contained information 
that in most cases, was at least three and, often, five or more hours old. During Katrina, 
FEMA input to the HSOC sitrep were due three hours before a sitrep was issued. 
FEMA’s internal deadline for submissions to the HSOC was, in turn, two hours earlier. 
Thus, by design a 5 p.m. sitrep reflects information that was, at a minimum, five hours old. 
(Chapter 19-2) 
 
Une attitude paradoxale vis-à-vis des informations médiatiques : prudence quand 
elles sont alarmantes, suivi aveugle lorsqu’elles sont rassurantes 
Même les sources les plus villipendées sont vénérées si elles se font rassurantes. Les 
médias deviennent crédibles dès lors qu’ils disent que tout va bien. Or, précisément, lorsque 
les situations sortent de l’ordinaire on voit souvent les médias, eux aussi, se recroquevillier 
dans un premier temps sur les références habituelles et « rassurer ». Ce qui, bien sûr, va les 
mettre rapidement, eux aussi, en situation délicate. Avec pour conséquence des changements 
de cap radicaux et expéditifs, dès l’instant où le média commence à percevoir que son 
audience « décroche ». Et quiconque les aura suivi dans les premiers instants d’aveuglement 
deviendra l’instance à abattre – à la mesure des dangers courus par les médias à qui on 
pourrait reprocher leur couverture à l’origine.  
The attitude of the HSOC and DHS leadership toward media reports was, at best, 
contradictory. On one hand, HSOC witnesses expressed an understandable reluctance to 
rely on media reports, which often carry outdated or preliminary information during an 
evolving event. On the other hand, Broderick relied on media reports in concluding that the 
situation in New Orleans was not catastrophic on Monday night: “The only one data point 
that I really had, personally, visually, was the celebration in the streets of New Orleans of 
people drinking beer and partying.” It is difficult to understand why DHS officials would 
find the credibility of alarming news reports suspect but had no such hesitation taking 
comfort in media stories that, superficially at least, suggested that the situation was stable. 
(Chapter 19 – 6) 
 
Des informations flashs, mais personne ne les consulte 
Between sitreps, HSOC issued Spot Reports when “breaking news” came in, and 
starting at approximately 6:35 p.m. CT, the HSOC generated numerous Spot Reports 
accurately detailing the devastation in New Orleans. However, many of those who were on 
the e-mail distribution list for these Spot Reports, issued late into the night on Monday, 
appear not to have read them when they were received. Witnesses also explained that, as a 
general matter, they viewed the sitreps as more authoritative than the Spot Reports. They 
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testified almost universally that they were not aware of the inundation of New Orleans 
until after the 5 a.m. CT sitrep Tuesday morning – 12 or more hours after the HSOC began 
issuing the grave Spot Reports detailed below. (Chapter 19-2) 
 
Le premier jour : une avalanche de rapports alarmants, des postures résolument 
aveugles et aveuglantes 
Nous avons ici un exemple parfait de mise sous anesthésie d’un système global de gestion 
de crise. Les rapports alarmants s’enchaînent, rien ne parvient à réveiller les instances en 
charge. Au contraire sans doute : la multiplication des informations préoccupantes, ne fait 
qu’aggraver la surdité générale. Et si d’aventure tel point du système fait montre un bref 
instant de lucidité, cette lucidité est rapidement désintégrée par le système dans son ensemble. 
Le moteur essentiel est que les dirigeants puissent à tout moment assurer que « tout est sous 
contrôle », même si ces affirmations sont sans fondement. La crise les tient solidement sous 
son joug : quelle que soit l’avancée de l’ennemi, la posture reste la même – le pire n’est pas 
survenu, « les digues tiennent ».  
Il suffirait de se pencher avec un minimum de liberté d’esprit sur les multiples informations 
qui circulent dans le système pour sonner le tocsin. Mais, précisément, personne n’a plus 
cette liberté de jugement. Et la seule préoccupation devient de trouver des raisons justifiant le 
fait que l’on n’ait pas besoin de sonner le tocsin.  
Pathologie normale : lors de la canicule en France, le mot essentiel était de la même façon : 
« Les services de secours font face ». Avant d’en arriver au pathétique : « Nous 
comptabilisons le nombre des morts ».  
Comme si, accroché à sa passerelle, le Commandant du Titanic, sous la dictée de la crise, 
continuait à proclamer : « Le Titanic est insubmersible ».  
Prior to issuing the flawed 5 p.m. sitrep, the HSOC issued two Spot Reports during the 
morning of landfall. One, at 8:25 a.m. CT, was based on a press conference by Mayor 
Nagin and stated in part that water was coming over the levees in the Ninth Ward. Almost 
two hours later, at 10:22 a.m. CT, the HSOC issued another Spot Report, including reports 
that water was rising at the National Guard’s Jackson Barracks in the Ninth Ward, but 
adding that it was unknown whether this was the result of breaching or overtopping. It also 
stated that the 911 call centers in St. Bernard and Orleans parishes had been shut down and 
evacuated. Ten minutes later, the information in this second Spot Report was also 
distributed in an e-mail to, among others, Chief of Staff John Wood and Deputy Secretary 
Michael Jackson. 
The Committee has discovered no other communications out of the HSOC prior to the 5 
p.m. sitrep. Both before and after the two morning Spot Reports, however, the HSOC 
received reports of levee breaches, levee overtopping, flooding, and people trapped on 
roofs. Equally troubling are the reports the HSOC apparently never got. As discussed 
below, some of this information was received by FEMA, but not forwarded timely to the 
HSOC. However, the majority of this information was available from other sources, 
including government agencies that have desks within the HSOC, and major media outlets. 
These reports are described below, with the ones that the HSOC received highlighted in 
bold: 
• At 8:14 a.m. CT, the New Orleans National Weather Service office reported a levee 
breach along the Industrial Canal.13 
• At 9 a.m. CT on the morning of landfall, the HSOC received an e-mail from 
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Louis Dabdoub, the PSA on the ground in New Orleans. Dabdoub’s report 
stated in part: “It is getting bad. Major flooding in some parts of the city. 
People are calling in for rescue saying they are trapped in attics, etc. That 
means water is 10 feet high there already. Trees are blowing down. Flooding is 
worsening every minute . . . The bad part has not hit here yet.”  
• At 9 a.m. CT the New Orleans NWS office reported overtopping in Orleans and St. 
Bernard Parishes and “[e]xtensive and life threatening storm surge flooding occurring 
along the Louisiana and Mississippi coast.” 
• At 9:36 a.m. CT, Dabdoub sent another e-mail to the HSOC, reporting that 
“[t]he lower parishes of La [Louisiana], Plaq[emines] and St Bernard parish’s 
[sic] are under water.” 
• At 10:13 a.m. CT, the White House Homeland Security Council issued a spot report 
– which appears not to have been sent to the HSOC – reporting that “Flooding is 
significant throughout the region and a levee in New Orleans has reportedly been 
breached sending 6-8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward area of the city. Per the 
Governor, water is rising at 1 foot per hour and the New Orleans Mayor reports 
problems with a pumping station, causing flooding.” 
• At 10:17 a.m. CT, PSA David Hunter, who was in the Louisiana State Police 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC), reported “continued heavy flooding in 
area of New Orleans just east of the Industrial Canal (9th Ward) . . . Calls 
coming into state EOC from citizens trapped in their houses, some in the 
attics or on the roof. State National Guard HQs at Jackson Barracks has 5 feet 
of water in some of its buildings.” 
• At 10:41 a.m. CT, the HSOC received a copy of a 8:00 a.m. “Katrina Brief” 
created by the Transportation Security Administration, which stated in part 
that “The National Weather Service has reported that a levee broke on the 
Industrial Canal near the St. Bernard-Orleans parish line, and 3 to 8 feet of 
flooding was possible… In the uptown area of New Orleans on the south shore 
of Lake Pontchartrain, floodwaters by have [sic] already intruded on the first 
stories of some houses and some roads are impassable… There is heavy street 
flooding throughout Orleans, St. Bernard, and Jefferson parishes.” 
• At 11 a.m. CT, the Louisiana State Police Emergency Operations Center issued a 
situation report which reported a breach of the levee on 17th Street Canal. 
• At 11:40 p.m. CT, the New Orleans NWS office issued one of the most stark 
warnings of the day: “Widespread flooding will continue across the parishes along the 
south shore of Lake Pontchartrain in the greater New Orleans area…This continues 
to be an extremely life threatening situation…Those seeking refuge in attics and roof-
tops are strongly urged to take the necessary tools for survival. For example. . . those 
going into attics should try to take an axe or hatchet with them so they can cut their 
way onto the roof to avoid drowning should rising flood waters continue to rise into 
the attic.” (emphasis added). 
• At 12:51 p.m. CT, the HSOC received a Coast Guard “Status Update” which 
reported that “[a] levee in New Orleans has been breached sending 3 to 8 feet 
of water into the 9th Ward area of the city.” 
• At 1:14 p.m. CT, PSA Hunter reported a “levee breach on the 17th St. Canal 
(the border between Orleans and Jefferson Parishes) reported by the New 
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Orleans Fire Dept.” 
• At 3:05 p.m. CT, and then again at 3:10, 4:20, and 8:13, the New Orleans NWS office 
issued a report stating that “extensive and life threatening storm surge flooding 
remains in progress at this time…especially in the New Orleans area…Widespread 
flooding has occurred and storm water runoff will exacerbate the problem…”24 
• A 4 p.m. CT Situation Report issued by the NWS Southern Region 
Headquarters stating that “[v]ery widespread and significant flooding has 
occurred throughout the city of New Orleans . . . Industrial Canal at 
Tennessee Street: levee has been breached . . . 17th Street at Canal Blvd: 
levee has been breached – breach extends several 100 meters in length[;] 
Much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater; depth unknown at 
this time.” 
• At 4 p.m. CT, LOHSEP issued a situation report detailing three levee breaches: “St. 
Bernard & 9thWard Levee breach (reported by Sewage & Water Board) . . . Haynes 
Blvd Pump Station Levee Breach (reported by Jackson Barracks) . . . 17th Street 
Canal levee breach, flooding Lakeview area.” 
• During the 4 p.m. hour, Fox News interviewed Ivor Van Heerden, Director, Louisiana 
State University’s Center For Study Of Public Health Impacts Of Hurricane, who 
stated that “the National Weather Service are reporting that one of the levees was 
breached, and obviously, as the reporters have said, there's very, very significant 
areas of New Orleans that did flood from the levee overtopping. In some areas we 
have about 11 feet of standing water. People have been forced out onto the roofs of 
their homes.” 
In addition to these reports, at 11 a.m. CT, Brown, Rhode, Secretary Chertoff, Deputy 
Secretary Jackson, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, representatives of the 
affected states, and individuals from numerous federal agencies attended the video 
teleconference (VTC) that FEMA hosted daily during Katrina. During this call, which was 
monitored by a Senior Watch Officer at the HSOC, a National Hurricane Center 
Hydrologist stated that [w]e have significant flooding occurring right now, beyond the 
storm surge flooding.” Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director of the Louisiana Office 
of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, stated “we are truly experiencing 
some devastation here.” William Lokey, FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), 
then the lead federal official in Louisiana, echoed this: 
[t]o give you an idea of what’s going on down there, there is eight to ten feet of water 
in St. Bernard Parish. In New Orleans Parish, we have got water in the eastern part. 
And down in the Ninth Ward that borders St. Bernard Parish, we’re going to have 
serious search and rescue efforts that are going to need to take place once we can get 
back in… We are pretty much inundated right now, and our next priorities are going 
to be search and rescue and saving lives. 
During the call, Hagin asked about the status of the levees. Governor Blanco responded, 
We keep getting reports in some places that maybe water is coming over the levees. We 
heard a report unconfirmed. I think we have not breached the levee. We have not breached 
the levee at this point in time. That could change, but in some places we have floodwaters 
coming in New Orleans East and the line St. Bernard parish where we have waters that are 
eight to ten feet deep, and we have people swimming in there, that’s got a considerable 
amount of water itself. 
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Blanco also reported “maybe as many as 30 or more calls from people who are 
trapped.” It appears that neither Mayor Nagin nor anyone else in New Orleans was on this 
call. 
It is difficult to understand why the 5 p.m. sitrep reflected few of the facts – and none 
of the urgency – conveyed by these reports. It is inexcusable that it included no mention of 
the reports of levee breaches that the HSOC received. On the contrary, the sitrep conveyed 
a false impression that there were multiple and uncontradicted reports that the levees had 
held. In fact, extensive investigation has uncovered nothing beyond Governor Blanco’s 
qualified statement on the noon VTC stating that the levees had held. All other reports 
received by the HSOC pointed to the contrary. (Chapter 19 – 2-5) 
 
L’avalanche de rapports négatifs continue, l’aveuglement est solidement installé, le 
système n’embraye pas 
Les rapports se font pressants ? La protection-défensive se fait de plus en plus rigide : 
« Les rapports sont non confirmés, contradictoires, peu sûrs ». En clair, pour être considéré, 
un rapport doit être confirmé dans tous les sens, il ne doit y avoir qu’une seule interprétation 
possible, le tout doit être dûment certifié – et fondamentalement rassurant. En d’autres termes, 
pour les responsables interrogés par la Commission, une cellule de crise nationale ne peut 
réellement fonctionner que s’il n’y a pas de crise. La défense elle-même est plus préoccupante 
que l’erreur commise. Elle manifeste de façon éclatante le décalage culturel qui ne permet pas 
de gérer une crise non conventionnelle.  
On voit aussi se manifester au travers des témoignages une pathologie étonnante liée aux 
situations de crise : la capacité à retourner toute réalité. Les témoins osent parler de situation 
parfaitement typique, normale, à propos de Katrina. Tout est lu dans le registre : 
« L’explosion d’une bombe n’est qu’une inflammation un peu rapide ». Ou encore : « Une 
bombe au phosphore, c’est juste une grosse allumette ». On voit à l’œuvre une formidable 
mobilisation psychique pour protéger l’individu de l’inconfort lié à la crise, inconfort qui le 
met en péril vital, l’obligeant donc à des travestissements vitaux. L’absurde arrive à mettre la 
rationalité à son service, à des degrés stupéfiants.  
On voit aussi une étonnante carence de vérification du fonctionnement du système. La 
Commission juxtapose par exemple deux éléments qui auraient dû poser question – si du 
moins on avait examiné les vulnérabilités basiques du système : les points flash d’alerte sont 
envoyés par mails ; “le Secrétaire Chertoff n’utilise pas le mail”.  
De façon générale, le fonctionnement du système est plus marqué par une culture de 
dossiers administratifs que par une culture d’urgence à la hauteur des enjeux de sécurité 
nationale – ce qui manifestement pose question pour le centre de crise essentiel du pays. Des 
informations critiques sont envoyées, mais la plupart des destinataires semblent bien loin de 
percevoir la gravité de la situation. Que ceux qui sont en charge de la sécurité du pays semblent 
aussi loin des informations données par le système DHS, auquel ils appartiennent, alors que 
l’on est clairement en situation connue pour être potentiellement gravissime, défie l’entende-
ment. C’est un nouveau signal indiquant que toute la culture de référence est à revoir.  
 
After the 5 p.m. CT Sitrep, the HSOC Issued Three Reports Reflecting the 
Growing Catastrophe But DHS Leadership Did Not Read or Did Not Understand 
Them 
After the 5 p.m. sitrep, reports of the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans 
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continued. Many were received by the HSOC, and, indeed, the HSOC issued three Spot 
Reports that detailed levee breaches and extensive flooding. These reports included: 
• At 5:08 p.m. CT, an American Red Cross Situation Report, received by the HSOC, 
which stated in part, “Reports of flooding vary based on region with some levees in new 
Orleans reportedly breeched [sic]. Extensive flooding in the Lower 9th Board [sic] and St. 
Bernard Parish may be a result of water going over the tops of the levees.” 
• At 6 p.m. CT, CNN’s Jean Meserve reported “a scene of utter devastation. In an 
entire neighborhood, water has come up to the eaves of the houses and [I] am told 
this is not the worst of it. That beyond this, part of the upper Ninth Ward, I'm told 
the main part of the ward further down is even worse. The water is over the houses. 
This is a life and death situation. I think by the end of the night we're going to find a 
lot more death than we ever imagined.” 
•  A 6:35 p.m. CT Spot Report issued by the HSOC was based on information received 
at some earlier time from the Corps of Engineers. It stated in part, “A small breach 
reported at 17 Street Canal by local firemen…Report that Duncan Pumping Station 
and Bonnebelle Pumping Station suffered roof damage, inundation of pumps, and are 
not operating at this time. Reported overtoppings of levee near Arabi and Inner 
Harbor Navigation Canal. Some level of widespread flooding has occurred. Report 
there has been a breach of the levee in the east of Harvey Canal, west bank area.”38 
•  A Situation Report issued at 7:34 p.m. CT by the Corps of Engineers described 
major flooding in New Orleans and stated, “All Jefferson and Orleans Parish 
Pumping Stations are inoperable as of 29 Aug.” 
•  At 8 p.m. CT on CNN’s Larry King Live, Brown said, “This is a catastrophic 
disaster. I’ve just started getting reconnaissance reports from my folks in the field 
and I’m anticipating now that I’m going to have to prepare for housing at least tens of 
thousands of victims that are going to be without homes for literally months on end 
... FEMA folks who have been with the agency for, you know, 15 or 20 years, ... call 
in and talk about how this is the worst flooding they’ve ever seen in their entire lives 
and talking about just neighborhoods after neighborhoods gone.” 
•  At 8:30 p.m. CT, PSA Hunter reported “[w]idespread flooding, and some suspected 
fatalities (bodies spotted floating in water) in an area of town near the Industrial 
Canal. The flooding cannot be alleviated due to the large water pumps which 
normally keep the city dry being out of service.” 
•  A 9:30 p.m. CT Spot Report based on two overflights of New Orleans by Marty 
Bahamonde, the only FEMA official in the city, said in part, “There is a quarter-mile 
breech in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake 
Ponchartrain allowing water to flow into the City…Only one of the main pumps is 
reported to still be working but cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is 
doubtful…an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water…Hundreds of people 
were observed on the balconies and roofs of a major apartment complex in the 
city…A few bodies were seen floating in the water and Coast Guard pilots also 
reported seeing bodies but there are no details on locations or numbers.” 
• At 10 p.m. CT, MSNBC interviewed Lt. Kevin Cowan, Louisiana Office of 
Emergency Preparedness, who said, “There’s a lot of heavy rain. There was some 
breaching of the levee system that pushed the water into St. Bernard Parish and into 
New Orleans proper itself, flooding neighborhoods. Streets are completely flooded . . 
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. There were some breaches where water was pushed over the top. I am sure there 
were areas that the levee did fail. We haven’t gotten complete reports.” 
•  At 10:47 p.m. CT, a Spot Report reporting that “According to Remote Sensing 
Imagery and available Census data, approximately 136,000 housing units in New 
Orleans have been impacted by flooding.” 
Though the three Spot Reports listed above were widely distributed by e-mail,45 few 
DHS witnesses recalled seeing them. Despite the fact that it was late at night and that 
Secretary Chertoff did not use e-mail, the HSOC made no effort to ensure that DHS 
leadership or the White House actually reviewed and understood the messages, or that they 
received this critical information in another form. 
Nearly all DHS witnesses, including those who were on the distribution list for the Spot 
Reports, testified that they did not know that the levees failed or that New Orleans was 
suffering catastrophic flooding until Tuesday morning. Many still did not know that the 
levees had breached and the city flooded on Monday as Katrina came ashore.  When shown 
these three Spot Reports, DHS witnesses consistently attempted to minimize their import, 
claiming that they were unconfirmed, conflicting, or unreliable.48 
The attitude of DHS witnesses toward reports of flooding was also surprising. From the 
time Friday afternoon when forecasts put New Orleans in the bull’s-eye, every indication 
was that Katrina could cause horrific devastation.49 Yet time and again, DHS witnesses 
suggested that the reports of flooding received during the day were “typical,” “expected,” 
“standard,” and the “normal, typical hurricane background stuff.”50 While such a reaction 
might be understandable in a “typical” hurricane, in light of all that was known about 
Katrina’s power and the risks peculiar to New Orleans, these reports warranted a greater 
level of concern. 
Moreover, in addition to these widely distributed reports, on Monday evening FEMA’s 
Acting Deputy Director, Patrick Rhode, spoke with Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson to 
update him on the deteriorating situation.51 Later that night, both Wood and Deputy 
Secretary Jackson received e-mails about Bahamonde’s overflight of New Orleans. At 8:29 
p.m. CT, Wood received an email from a DHS public-affairs official, which related that 
“The first (unconfirmed) reports they are getting from aerial surveys in New Orleans are 
far more serious than media reports are currently reflecting. Finding extensive flooding and 
more stranded people than they had originally thought – also a number of fires.” 
At 10:05 p.m. CT, Jackson received an e-mail from Rhode summarizing many of the 
same observations from Bahamonde’s overflight that had already been reported to the 
HSOC, including that there was a 200-yard-long failure of one levee and that most of the 
city was flooded. Neither recalled seeing the e-mails that night. In sum, there is no evidence 
that overnight Monday into Tuesday any senior DHS official saw the reports that would 
have informed them that Katrina was a catastrophe of unprecedented dimensions. (Chapter 
19–6-8) 
 
La Situational Awareness ne s’améliore pas au long de la semaine, le décrochage est 
manifeste dans l’épisode du Convention Center 
On trouve ici une illustration claire d’un constat de fond : quand une organisation décroche, 
elle ne parvient pas à reprendre la main. Les responsables apparaissent de ce fait 
systématiquement en retard sur l’événement, ce qui leur fait rapidement perdre toute 
crédibilité. Et toute capacité de pilotage. Mais il ne faudrait pas prendre ce constat pour une 
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donnée définitive. Il reste à inventer des capacités pour « reprendre la main », à partir du 
principe que ce type de situation risque d’être fréquent. Cela suppose une capacité forte de 
prise de recul, de remise en mouvement sur de nouvelles bases. La simple réaffirmation des 
références énoncées en début de crise serait encore plus pénalisante.  
Et l’on voit ici à quel point les pathologies peuvent jouer : même quelqu’un envoyé pour 
rechercher de l’information remonte de l’information fausse, fausse sur les chiffres, fausse sur 
les moyens dont on dispose au Convention Center. L’important est de pouvoir s’arracher aux 
visions qui se sont imposées, et qui s’imposent de façon d’autant plus impérieuse qu’une 
autre vision serait extrêmement perturbante. Certes, comme le soulignent les Sénateurs, il ne 
faut pas se jeter dans les bras de médias, mais on ne peut non plus rejeter purement et 
simplement ce qu’ils mettent à l’écran.  
In many regards, DHS’s situational awareness did not improve as the week went on. 
The situation at the Convention Center in New Orleans provided the most striking 
illustration of this. Despite media reports on Wednesday night and video Thursday 
morning of thousands of people at the Convention Center,53 and no later than shortly after 
noon CT, images of two dead bodies, HSOC reports do not even mention the situation until 
Friday morning. Secretary Chertoff himself learned about the Convention Center from an 
NPR reporter at 1 p.m. CT on Thursday. During that interview, the Secretary initially tried 
to dismiss the reporter’s questions about the Convention Center as “a rumor or you get 
someone’s anecdotal version of something.” 
Witnesses have offered no satisfactory explanation of how this breakdown occurred. 
Broderick testified first hearing reports of thousands at the Convention Center on 
Wednesday evening. However, “we actually and initially were confusing the Superdome 
with the convention center. 
We didn’t realize that it was a separate entity. Even on Thursday, we were sorting it 
out.” On Thursday, he dispatched Wendell Shingler, the Director of the Federal Protective 
Services (FPS), to investigate. Broderick testified that Shingler arrived that evening and 
reported that there were approximately a thousand people gathered at the Convention 
Center; that food and water was available; and that New Orleans police were present. 
Broderick believes that Shingler failed to appreciate the true size of the Convention Center. 
Because media reports  persisted, Broderick sent Shingler back Friday morning, at which 
point the accurate report of thousands stranded came back. The failure of DHS, and the 
HSOC in particular, to take note of ubiquitous media reports of the situation at the 
Convention Center is disturbing. Skepticism toward media reports in a crisis situation 
makes sense, but these reports were backed up by video. If there was some hesitation 
about relying on media report, reports to DHS leadership and the White House based on 
them could have included appropriate caveats. Instead, DHS and the HSOC did not 
forward mediabased reports, which left the country’s leadership woefully uninformed. 
(Chapter 19– 8-9) 
 
Les ruptures d’information : au moins éviter les énormités. Les failles FEMA/DHS 
Il est illusoire de demander une information parfaite en situation aussi complexe. Ce serait 
d’ailleurs une voie de réflexion irréaliste et très dangereuse, grosse de faillites assurées. Mais 
on peut au moins se centrer sur deux questions : est-ce que les principaux dirigeants peuvent 
se parler ? Est-ce que les informations cruciales circulent ? La pathologie courante est de 
saturer les réseaux avec de l’information peu utile, l’information cruciale restant bloquée. Le 
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rapport du Sénat est édifiant : le patron de la FEMA estime que ce serait du temps perdu de 
parler au patron du DHS ; les informations critiques ne remontent pas au DHS – qui ne va pas 
les chercher. Le rapport juxtapose deux interprétations : ou une volonté de ne pas informer 
l’autre bureaucratie, ou un problème de système. Les deux problèmes peuvent se rencontrer 
dans toute situation.  
 […] the FEMA leadership appears to have failed to send critical information to DHS 
and the HSOC. Though Brown testified that he provided reports to the White House at 
several points during the day of landfall, he did not call Secretary Chertoff because in his 
view “it would have wasted my time.”  He appears not to have communicated with the 
HSOC at all about the ground conditions. It also appears that several significant e-mails 
were not forwarded to the HSOC. These included a series of e-mails between 8:36 and 9:19 
a.m. CT containing reports, from a member of FEMA’s liaison team at the National 
Hurricane Center, that the Industrial Canal levee had failed. They also include a summary 
of a report from Bahamonde that detailed severe flooding, people trapped in attics, and 
failing pumps; and an 10:51 a.m. CT e-mail to FEMA’s Deputy Director of Response with 
Bahamonde’s news that the New Orleans Fire Department was reporting a 20-foot-wide 
breach in the 17th Street levee. 
Brown’s testimony made clear that he purposely refused to provide updates to the 
HSOC and to Secretary Chertoff. Though Broderick testified that he believed that FEMA 
intentionally limited its reports, investigation found no independent evidence to support 
this, and it does not appear that Lokey, Rhode, or others in FEMA did so. To the 
contrary, Lokey testified that “Michael Brown did not tell me to any way, shape, or form 
stop any flow of information” and that he was not aware of any other limitation on the 
transmission of information to the HSOC. Rhode sent several e-mails to, and had at least 
one phone conversation with, Deputy Secretary Jackson on Monday. Finally, nine of the 
Spot Reports issued by the HSOC on Monday were ascribed to FEMA, a clear indication 
that there was a steady information flow from FEMA’s National Response Coordination 
Center into the HSOC. 
Conclusion 
The HSOC did not devise and implement a system to ensure access to all significant, 
relevant information that became available as Katrina neared and then landed on the Gulf 
Coast. Compounding the problem, even though the HSOC had enough information by late 
Monday afternoon to conclude that the levees had failed, it issued a key situation report 
that reflected and propagated incorrectly optimistic information about the state of New 
Orleans. (Chapter 19-9) 
 
Quand l’ampleur de l’événement fait exploser les références habituelles : des 
documents de synthèse de 75 pages…  
Les consignes sont bien connues : faire remonter l’information, tenir une main courante, 
tenir des points de situation, bien informer les décideurs. L’expérience de Katrina semble 
montrer qu’au-delà d’un seuil de complexité les bons principes de base ne suffisent plus. On 
peut certes s’offusquer et demander plus d’information, plus de synthèses, etc. Mais il faut 
dépasser les vœux pieux de ce type. La seule solution, semble-t-il, est de disposer d’une force 
d’observation capable de faire de la discrimination en temps réel, de revoir les architectures, les 
principes, afin de donner toujours au système la possibilité de rester en phase avec le défi à 
traiter. C’est le principe d’action de la Force de Réflexion Rapide. Le problème à éviter est que 
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bientôt les informations cruciales ne remontent plus que par inadvertance, ou plus du tout. 
Ou, pour inverser le raisonnement, la Force de Réflexion Rapide doit s’interroger en 
permanence sur ces informations bloquées. Et bien sûr, toute expression minorante du type : 
« Oh, à tout hasard, on a vu…” sont des marqueurs fréquents d’informations explosives, qui 
ne peuvent prendre place sur les écrans radars du système.  
The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) 
addressed situational awareness in its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The SOP 
identified guiding principles for information handling, including that “[t]he prompt capture, 
assessment and rapid dissemination of information within the EOC contributes markedly 
to quick response and effective decision making during an emergency…” It also required 
“all personnel involved in the emergency” to “aggressively seek the status of these items as 
quickly as possible… before during and after an event” and to report it to the 
organization’s EOC. 
In fact, first responders and others in the area affected by Katrina needed little 
encouragement to pass on information to the state EOC, since they relied heavily on the 
EOC to process their requests for assistance. But information came from numerous other 
sources as well, including National Guard on-the ground and fly-over reports, Louisiana 
State Police reports, and media coverage. Some information even came from callers in other 
states. LOHSEP compiled the data flow into situation reports (sitreps) that were updated 
several times a day. Topics included weather; status and staffing of the emergency 
operations center; data on injuries and fatalities; shelter populations; status of nursing 
homes and hospitals; road closures; utility and communications outages; and status of 
response missions. Naturally, the length of these sitreps grew dramatically as the response 
progressed. For example, a LOHSEP situation report at 10 a.m. CT on Sunday, the day 
before landfall, ran just nine pages; by Wednesday evening, the report was 75 pages. Senior 
officials at LOHSEP did not have to rely solely on sitreps, as they also received a steady 
stream of information “firsthand” from emergency management officials on the ground. 
And LOHSEP was not alone in having an information-gathering strategy in the state. 
The Louisiana National Guard, which supplied information to LOHSEP, also had an 
information network to meet its own needs. The senior Guard official in Louisiana, Major 
General Bennett Landreneau, was stationed with the Governor in the LOHSEP command 
room. As the hurricane approached, the command staff directed 10 air-squadron 
operations-support teams and troops on the ground to report to the Joint Operations 
Command at the Superdome every two hours. In addition, they stationed liaison officers 
with radio equipment at local parish offices, and held their own series of conference calls 
with parish emergency support officials throughout the night before landfall to monitor the 
hurricane’s effects. 
However, these elaborate information-gathering systems did not prevent serious 
breakdowns in the state’s situational awareness. One notable example was Governor 
Blanco herself, who evidently was unaware of earlier reports of levee breaches when she 
made the statement (quoted in the above discussion of federal government situational 
awareness) to state and federal officials in the noon video teleconference on the day before 
landfall that “[w]e have not breached the levee at this point in time.” This was a 
particularly unfortunate misstatement, as it may have contributed to the federal 
government’s confusion about the status of the levees. The record does not indicate when 
she learned her statement was inaccurate or whether she made any attempt to inform the 
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state and federal officials on the video teleconference, including the White House deputy 
chief of staff, of her mistake. 
The state’s response was also hampered by lack of information about the locations of 
people in distress. For example, the state was slow to learn about people brought by search 
and rescue teams to the major highway intersection in west New Orleans known as the 
Cloverleaf. Similarly, LOHSEP did not learn about people assembling at the Convention 
Center until well after crowds amassed there. Mayor Nagin bears some of the blame for the 
delay, as he apparently failed to inform other officials when he decided on Tuesday, 
August 30th to open the Convention Center as a shelter when the Superdome became 
overcrowded. Just the same, it was striking to hear the LOHSEP operations manager, 
Colonel William Doran, testify that his information on that situation was limited to what 
he saw on TV and occasional reports from security officers. 
The National Guard, which took charge of the Convention Center on Friday September 
2, initially learned about the Convention Center situation through inadvertence. Brigadier 
General Gary Jones of Louisiana, Joint Force Commander of all National Guard troops 
involved in the Katrina operation, said, “We had no knowledge of [the people there] until 
we sent out reconnaissance patrols [on August 31], and those reconnaissance patrols came 
back and said, ‘Oh, by the way, it looks like you’ve got another group of about 15,000 
sitting over there.’” 
[…] As Col. Doran testified, LOHSEP was simply not equipped for the volume of 
information it needed to assess […] 
(Chapter 19–10-12) 
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Chapitre 14 
 
PROTECTION DES INFRASTRUCTURES CRITIQUES,  
COMMUNICATION AVEC LE PUBLIC, RÔLE DES MÉDIAS  
 
 
 
 
 
Effets dominos 
La question des infrastructures critiques est désormais bien reconnue. L’épisode Katrina 
montre à quel point un événement peut déclencher des effets dominos majeurs. En l’espèce, 
pour leur approvisionnement énergétique, 12 états de l’Est des Etats-Unis étaient dépendants 
des installations de la zone, et du fonctionnement d’un pipeline majeur. De même, 
l’inondation d’une usine chimique produisant 31% de l’hydrogène produite aux Etats-Unis 
obligea à des réorganisations importantes dans le partage des stocks entre parternaires 
essentiels à l’échelon national.  
Because of the lack of coordinated restoration plans, significant infrastructure problems 
were left to be addressed in ad hoc manner: 
•   Immediately after landfall, the Colonial Pipeline, a 5,519-mile system that transports 
fuel from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama to distribution points 
throughout 12 states and the District of Columbia, reported that two major lines were 
shut down due to power outages. The company dispatched generation equipment, 
but FEMA regional representatives – understandably – diverted the generators to 
hospitals. However, additional planning would have readied enough generators for 
both purposes. It was not until a full week after the storm that the Colonial Pipeline 
was restored to full capacity. The Colonial pipeline is one of two key pipelines that 
carries up to 100 million gallons of gas, heating oil, and other petroleum products to 
the Southeast and the East Coast. A sustained shut-down could have a serious impact 
on our nation’s energy supply. 
•   A flooded chemical plant that manufactured liquid hydrogen used by NASA and 
Force and in the finishing process of some steel parts did not receive dewatering 
assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers until September 5. This plant alone 
responsible for 31 percent of North America’s industrial hydrogen production, and 
consequently NASA agreed to share its stored supply of hydrogen with the 
Department of Defense to compensate for this lost production. (Chapter 20-1) 
 
La question des rumeurs : lorsque les défaillances de tous se combinent 
Les situations de turbulences sont propices aux rumeurs. Si l’on conjugue les défaillances 
des responsables et la précipitation du sytème médiatique, on aboutit rapidement à des 
situations où les rumeurs dominent, deviennent de véritables événements, qui en arrivent à 
bloquer directement et la représentation du problème, et le déroulement de l’intervention. Le 
rapport mentionne le cas de la dissémination de rumeurs dans le drame du Titanic et souligne 
que le problème n’a fait que s’aggraver avec la puissance du système de transmission. Dans le 
cas de Katrina, on a vu successivement une sous-estimation de la gravité de la situation (« les 
levées ont tenu »), puis une sur-estimation (“dizaines de cadavres cachés dans des 
réfrigérateurs, viols de bébés”) qui, l’une comme l’autre, ont eu des effets très dommageables.  
 
Sous-estimations médiatiques 
It is essential that the news media receive accurate disaster information to circulate to 
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the public. News media can also help inform the public by reporting on rumors and 
soliciting evidence and comment on their plausibility, if any. They may inadvertently do 
damage by reporting on rumors without seeking context or confirmation, or by presenting 
them as established facts. The Evening Sun newspaper of New York City announced this 
news atop its front page on April 15, 1912: 
ALL SAVED FROM TITANIC AFTER COLLISION 
RESCUE BY CARPATHIA AND PARISIAN; LINER IS BEING 
TOWED TO HALIFAX AFTER SMASHING INTO A ICEBERG. 
The factual deficiencies of those headlines – based, if readers dove deeply enough into 
the article’s text, on a passing reference to an unquoted report by parents of a ship’s 
unnamed telegrapher – are now apparent, but they remind us that there is nothing new 
about the phenomenon of news media reporting rumor. 
Nearly a century later, the proliferation of news outlets, the competition to be first with 
a powerful story, the technologies that make broad reach and rapid reporting possible, and 
the 24-hour cycle of Web and broadcast news can increase the chance that rumors will 
creep unlabelled or unchallenged into news stories. And when public officials fail to    
provide timely, accurate, and credible public information – or stand before microphones 
and cameras to spread rumors themselves – rumor can become a serious threat to civil 
order and to relief efforts. 
For example, on August 29, the day of landfall, ABC’s “World News Tonight” 
reported: “In New Orleans, entire neighborhoods are underwater, but the levees held. The 
nightmare scenario of an entire city underwater did not happen.” Other broadcasters said: 
“New Orleans dodged the big bullet” (NBC’s “Today” show, August 29) and “They 
dodged the bullet, but they still got a sound bruising” (National Public Radio’s “Talk of the 
Nation,” August 29). As the public learned later, on-the-scene reports by emergency 
officials, residents, and the press had already described fl ooding from levee breaches and 
overtopping several hours earlier. For example, Ivor van Heerden, the Director of 
Louisiana State University’s Center for the Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, 
relayed that “the National Weather Service [is] reporting that one of the levees was 
breached … as the reporters have said, there’s very, very signifi cant areas of New Orleans 
that did fl ood from the levee overtopping. In some areas we have about 11 feet of standing 
water. People have been forced out onto the roofs of their homes.” Yet as late as the next 
morning, August 30, there were still news items like this Washington Post report: 
Some experts predicted the storm could become one of the worst catastrophes in U.S. 
history. But the city managed to avoid the worst of the worst. The Mississippi River did 
not breach New Orleans’s famed levees to any serious degree. 
Others issued conflicting reports, even within their own stories. Accurate reporting was 
at a premium, not only concerning the damage to the levees, but also with respect to 
security and law-enforcement issues, as discussed below. 
Getting news from the field, through the editing process, and to the public, all under 
time pressure, is a challenge. While modern technology makes correction of mistaken 
reports easier and faster than in the days of the Titanic, thanks to the same technology, 
news travels that much more quickly in the fi rst place, magnifying the potential damage of 
erroneous reports. (Chapter 20 –3-4) 
 
Défaillances des responsables 
Accurate information is never as critical as during an emergency. It’s also never more 
difficult to obtain. Emergency-response planning – in this case, the NRP and the State of 
Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan (LA EOP) – tasks federal and state agencies with 
delivering reliable information to the public and the media in the event of a disaster. 
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During Hurricane Katrina, however, officials at all levels of government either failed to 
comprehend these roles or ignored these obligations, though there were times when offi 
cials understood and carried out their duties.  
The NRP’s Public Aff airs Support Annex directs DHS, in coordination with its 
component FEMA, to “mobilize” federal assets to deliver information to the public 
regarding emergencies as well as “use media monitoring… and other techniques to identify 
rumors, misinformation, inaccurate reports…” and rapidly correct them. The NRP also 
calls for establishing a federal Joint Information Center (JIC) to support the Joint Field Offi 
ce (JFO) with public-affairs matters and information dissemination during an emergency, 
at the location of the disaster, depending on the incident’s requirements. However, the 
DHS reported that its federal JIC was not established until September 6 – over a week after 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall. 
[…] A DHS/FEMA after-action report attributed some of the difficulty and, ultimately, 
the failure of federal and state officials to ensure a flow of accurate, timely information to 
factors including the overwhelming damage to communication infrastructure, the early 
lack of co-location between federal (DHS/FEMA) and state public-information centers, 
reliance on field staff to relay information on sporadically functional equipment, and the 
pressure on public-information staff to react to media queries as opposed to pushing out 
new information. […](Chapter 20 –4-5) 
 
Exagérations médiatiques ; envolées officielles débridées 
As for the media, some of the rumor traffic in Katrina derived from the reliance of 
reporters on dubious sources. A New Orleans Times-Picayune reporter later chastised 
himself for passing along unconfirmed a National Guardsman’s comment that a freezer at 
the city’s Convention Center held “30 or 40” bodies, and another soldier’s comment that 
the dead included a “7-year-old with her throat cut.” As Brian Thevenot, the Times-
Picayune reporter, went on to note, “Neither the mass of bodies nor the allegedly expired 
child would ever be found,” but the rumor was eventually traced to gossip in the food line 
at a nearby casino where military and police personnel were staging. 
The impact of rumors – sharks swimming in downtown New Orleans, dead babies in 
trash cans, and stacks of bodies at the Superdome and the Convention Center – was 
compounded by misinformation from officials. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin told a 
nationwide TV audience about people “in that frickin’ Superdome for fi ve days watching 
dead bodies, watching hooligans killing people, raping people.” New Orleans Police 
Superintendent Eddie Compass reported that babies were being raped there. Both 
statements were unfounded. 
Inaccurate rumors reported without caveats, particularly with respect to law 
enforcement, included: “Violent gangs are roaming the streets at night, hidden by the 
cover of darkness” (Fox News), troops on rooftops looking for snipers as “gunfire crackled 
in the distance” (Los Angeles Times), “a young man run down and then shot by a New 
Orleans police officer” (Ottawa Sun), and “Girls and boys were raped in the dark and had 
their throats cut and bodies were stuffed in the kitchens while looters and madmen 
exchanged fi re with weapons they had looted” (Financial Times of London). 
The frequency and apparent authority of rumor-based reporting during Hurricane 
Katrina added to public confusion about events along the Gulf Coast. As two Washington 
Post investigators concluded: 
The sensational accounts delayed rescue and evacuation eff orts already hampered 
by poor planning and a lack of coordination among local, state, and federal 
agencies. People rushing to the Gulf Coast to fl y rescue helicopters or to distribute 
food, water, and other aid steeled themselves for battle. (Chapter 20 –5-6) 
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Conséquences de la mauvaise information sur l’effort de secours 
At 9:15 p.m. CT on Thursday, September 1, DHS issued a report that FEMA’s search 
and rescue forces “ceased operations until National Guard can assist TF’s [Urban Search 
and Rescue Task Forces] with security.” James Strickland, a member of FEMA’s Urban 
Search and Rescue team, explained that throughout the day there had been reports of 
shootings and rioting in the streets. 
And at that point, we said, okay, we’re not sending out any of our teams unless they 
have some type of force protection with them, which at the time was kind of scarce… 
So that day, by the time we got force protection kegged up with everybody, we had 
really lost most of the day, the daylight gone…If any went out, it was very limited as 
to what went out because we didn’t have a suffi cient protection plan. 
Many private-sector telecommunications were delayed by similar anxieties. Jeff Glick, 
the Division Chief for Critical Infrastructure Protection at the National Communications 
System, said “[B]e they true or not, the perception that the [communications sector] crews 
felt that they weren’t safe, and the companies would not let them go into the area because 
of lack of being able to get enough security, slowed initial response and reconstitution of 
the communications net.” Christopher Guttman-McCabe, the Vice President for Regulatory 
Affairs at Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association, agreed: workers feared 
they would be “assaulted, stripped of whatever they had with them” when they entered the 
disaster area to conduct repairs. Ultimately some companies hired private security guards 
to protect their employees. (Chapter 20 –6) 
 
Des officiels aux idées très étranges sur leurs responsabilités en matière 
d’information 
Federal, state, and local governments must also disseminate information critical to the 
health, safety, and security of the public, which includes evacuation or decontamination 
instructions and warnings. The NRP ascribes primary responsibility for this to state and 
local governments; when catastrophic events have overwhelmed state and local authorities, 
the federal government must step in. However, no level of government provided adequate 
safety information to the public during Hurricane Katrina. 
For example, neither DHS, through its component FEMA, nor Louisiana, nor New 
Orleans issued warnings about levee breaches or rising flood waters, though DHS/FEMA 
issued several other warnings, including one cautioning evacuees not to return to disaster 
areas prematurely. Nicol Andrews, FEMA’s Deputy Strategic Director for Public Aff airs, 
testified that she did not consider warning the public about the flooding nor even discuss it 
with colleagues, other than FEMA Director Michael Brown and one other FEMA official: 
That is not an action that FEMA has traditionally taken in the past; nor would I ever 
assume that it would be appropriate in this case… Public safety is not in the National 
Response Plan. It is not a FEMA responsibility… I’m not sure what good it would do 
to notify the public that the levees had been breached, even if it were a FEMA 
responsibility – which it’s not. 
When Ms. Andrews, one of only five individuals who accompanied Director Brown to 
Louisiana as staff support, was asked why she thought it would do no good to notify the 
public of the levee failures she said: 
Where are they going to go? I mean, the city had been evacuated and the roads 
Closed… And again, evacuation and sheltering – also not roles that FEMA can take 
care of. It would not have helped the situation at all… And it certainly, again, 
wouldn’t come from FEMA. 
These comments are inconsistent with responsibilities assigned under the NRP. 
FEMA’s Deputy Director of Legislative Aff airs, Thomas Bossert, has acknowledged that 
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communicating information to the public is “crucial.” 
The state also failed to effectively notify its citizens of levee failures. Louisiana never 
activated the Emergency Alert System that could have disseminated both audible and 
visual warnings to the public through radio and TV stations. The New Orleans Emergency 
Operation Plan’s Hurricane Annex indicates that the city intended to rely on the 
Emergency Alert System as “the primary means of advising the public of a localized 
emergency.” 
The failure of government officials on all levels contributed to rumor mongering and 
circulation of inaccurate and confusing information, signifi cantly impeding response eff 
orts. This was one of the greatest repercussions of the failure to grasp federal and state 
emergency-response planning. (Chapter 20 –7) 
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Chapitre 15 
 
RECHERCHE ET SAUVETAGE 
UNE AUTRE GUERRE, UN SYSTÈME DÉPASSÉ 
 
 
Ce chapitre est exemplaire dans son rendu de la confusion qui a marqué la catastrophe. Ne 
surnagent finalement que ceux qui étaient très bien préparés. Tout le reste n’est que confusion 
généralisée, y compris au sein des armées. Les hypothèses fondamentales, implicites, des 
dispositifs sont toutes anéanties et l’on se retrouve dans une situation non pensée où l’on fait 
juste ce que l’on peut, en ne comprenant pas grand chose au théâtre d’opérations.  
• En principe, la recherche et le sauvetage, c’est pour quelques victimes ensevelies dans un 
bâtiment effondré – pas pour une ville entière, un territoire entier.  
• En principe, la recherche et le sauvetage, c’est en milieu sec : on envisage pas un accident 
grave, dans un environnment lui-même déstructuré. Ici, le problème est que l’on est en 
milieu inondé – ce qui annihile la quasi-totalité des moyens, qui n’ont pas été prévus pour 
cela.  
• En principe, ce sont les sauveteurs locaux qui sont en première ligne – ils sont tous au 
nombre des victimes.  
• L’exercice Pam avait indiqué qu’il faudrait 20 000 bateaux et 1000 hélicoptères – on en a 
cent fois moins, ils n’arriveront que très tard. Et quand il y a des moyens, soit on ne les 
mobilise pas, soit on les prépositionne beaucoup trop loin, soit on les prépositionne dans 
un campement militaire qui se trouve être un point bas de la zone, avec des conséquences 
bien prévisibles lorsque l’inondation survient.  
• Un bateau est providentiel sur le papier – mais il y a bateau et bateau. S’il a un tirant d’eau 
trop important, il seras difficile à utiliser en environnement aussi accidenté. S’il est de type 
Zodiac, il risque de crever rapidement. Mais il ne faut pas se bloquer trop aisément dans les 
raisonnements : ainsi, un organisme refuse l’utilisation de bateaux de ce type ; d’autres 
responsables contestent cette appréciation et soulignent qu’on aurait pu utiliser ce type de 
bateaux. Il y a aussi de nombreux volontaires bénévoles : mais ils peuvent être dramatique-
ment sous-équipés, et certains décideront de les écarter, par sécurité ; mais pas toujours.  
• Un hélicoptère est une merveille – mais tous ne sont pas équipés pour le sauvetage ; ils 
peuvent être trop petits, ou trop lourds et, dans ce dernier cas, font tout simplement couler 
ceux que l’on voudrait sauver.  
• En principe, on dispose d’un contrôle aérien – là, on travaille en visuel, en prenant des 
risques énormes.  
• En principe, on dispose de moyens de liaison, permettant notamment à chaque base de 
suivre ses engins ; là, il n’y a plus de communication, les hélicoptères et avions communi-
quent juste entre eux, et s’arrangent entre eux comme ils peuvent, sachant qu’ils relèvent 
tous d’organismes différents, non reliés entre eux.  
• En principe, l’action de sauvetage s’intègre dans une chaîne générale de régulation – là, c’est 
au petit bonheur la chance (on reçoit par exemple l’ordre d’aller déposer une victime à deux 
heures de vol, ce qui gèle un hélicoptère).  
• En principe, il y a un système de pilotage – là, chaque organisme se juxtapose aux autres, 
sans communication ; et chaque organisme est en mutation constante au fur et à mesure de 
la montée en puissance.  
• En principe, on dispose de cartes de la zone – là, il n’y pas de cartes pour les intervenants 
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extérieurs, qui ne connaissent pas l’environnement ; on en trouve dans les répertoires 
téléphoniques, on les arrache et on en donne aux équipes. Plus délicat : la zone n’est plus 
dans son état initial, tout est bouleversé, et pas seulement le chantier spécifique, comme on 
peut le connaître dans un sauvetage-déblaiement classique et limité.  
• En principe, on vient aider des gens et on s’attend à être accueilli comme des sauveteurs 
héroïques : on se heurte parfois à des refus de quitter les lieux. Et on n’a aucune base 
juridique pour faire évacuer des gens en danger de mort – les textes viendront le 10 
septembre. Plus stupéfiant, on se retrouve en milieu hostile, ou rapporté comme tel (ce qui 
n’est pas certain, mais qui peut lever le doute ?). Certains décident de se retirer. D’autres 
non. On parlera de coups de feu. Mais est-ce un acte hostile, ou un signal de détresse d’un 
genre un peu spécial, pour se faire repérer ?  
Une difficulté spécifique pourrait être aisément absorbée par le système. Mais le système 
se trouve fondamentalement sujet à un tsunami de complexités. Il est totalement hors de ses 
repères. Ceux qui sont les mieux préparés pourront être efficaces, sauront s’adapter, inventer, 
tisser des relations nouvelles. Les autres feront comme ils peuvent, en se recroquevillant le 
plus souvent sur ce qui marche d’ordinaire, c’est à dire plus grand chose – ce qui justifie 
l’attente d’un environnement correspondant aux plans prévus. Le coût est considérable.  
La Commission souligne que les plans étaient déficients. Certes, mais ce n’est sans doute 
pas là le plus préoccupant. La faille, une fois de plus, est intellectuelle, culturelle. Pour engager 
une action efficace, nos organisations ont besoin d’une planification. Une planification est 
fondée sur une vision établie, qui permet de fixer un script de référence, et, sur ce sript de 
base, tout un échaffaudage d’organisations et de moyens. Le problème est qu’il faut désormais 
penser des fonctionnements organisationnels alors que le script de base ne tient plus. Il y a là, 
dans nos cultures, et tout particulièrement nos cultures d’urgence, un impensable souvent 
indépassable. Dès lors, nos crises émergentes ont le champ libre. « Attaquer la stratégie de 
l’ennemi », souligne Sun Tzu. Mais il n’y a là aucune fatalité : seulement une exigence de 
mutation.  
 
Recherche et sauvetage hors des grilles habituelles 
Un immeuble effondré ? Quelques personnes ou dizaines de personnes ? Un chantier bien 
identifié ? Un environnement habituel ? Non, toutes les références ont sauté.  
On the day of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, rescuers from Louisiana’s Department of 
Wildlife and Fisheries (W&F) didn’t need their standard grid system for searches. From 
every direction, thousands of people on rooftops were calling for help in the dark – that 
evening, lights from the search-and-rescue boats and helicopters were the city’s only source 
of illumination. […] Federal, state, and local officials combined to rescue over 60,000 
people after landfall. (Chapter 21-1) 
Prior to Katrina, the NRP [ National Response Plan] considered SAR [Search And 
Rescue] to be primarily, if not only, search and rescue of collapsed structures. The NRP 
reflects this belief by titling the mission as Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and by 
requiring FEMA, rather than some other agency, to act as the lead agency for ESF-9. 
However, Katrina required search and rescue efforts not only in urban collapsed structures 
but also in a water environment. U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Vivean Crea acknowledged that 
the federal response plan should be capable of covering more than one type of search and 
rescue. (Chapter 21–4).  
“Water rescue is not part of the USAR mission,” Lokey [FEMA Federal Coordinating 
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Officer (FCO)] testified before the Committee. Indeed, when FEMA search and rescue 
teams arrived in New Orleans, they did not have boats. Instead, the FEMA teams joined 
boats operated by volunteers or other agencies. (Chapter 21–5). 
 
Sauveteurs locaux : paralysés 
Le rapport souligne que l’hypothèse de l’exercice Pam se vérifia : les sauveteurs locaux 
étaient eux-mêmes victimes. Mais ce message ne fut pas entendu, et ce fut la consternation de 
découvrir cela au moment de l’événement.  
Cependant, la commission souligne aussi que pareille vision est sans doute liée au fait que, 
localement, on n’était pas du tout préparé à ce type de situation. Il n’est donc pas évident qu’il 
faille établir la règle selon laquelle les forces locales seraient par hypothèse hors-jeu. Le 
problème de fond est l’incapacité à prendre acte des réalités.  
Hurricane Katrina confirmed what Pam predicted: many local first responders had been 
incapacitated and thrown into disarray by the severe hurricane. The section on search and 
rescue in the plan that grew out of Hurricane Pam stated: “Parish resources in the most 
severely impacted areas will not be available for several weeks or even months, as they 
were not removed from the area prior to the storm.” But even if Pam predicted tha Parish 
resources would not be available, FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Officer, the organization’s 
lead officer in Louisiana, who was stationed in Baton Rouge before landfall, pointed out 
that Pam “did not envision the number of first responders in New Orleans that would 
become disaster victims and would not be available to take part in that plan.” 
Pam’s conclusion that parish resources wouldn’t be available for weeks, if not months, 
may have derived from the city’s inadequate preparedness for search and rescue. For 
example, the NOFD owned no boats; the NOPD owned only five. Although the NOFD 
was well trained in USAR and incident command, it had no training in water SAR The 
NOFD had applied in 2005 to DHS for water USAR training, even lining up an instructor, 
but DHS denied its application. In the absence of boats and water SAR training, NOFD and 
NOPD officers had to commandeer and hotwire boats to improvise rescue missions. 
Finally, the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted that a similar hurricane in real life would 
“result in flooding of many roads, limiting access into many areas until flood waters 
subside.” Such a warning required readiness for air and water rescue; specifically, Pam 
called for 20,000 boat-based rescues and about 1,000 helicopter rescues. Emergency 
planners at all levels of government should have realized that large-scale search and rescue 
operations would be likely if a major hurricane struck New Orleans.(Chapter 21–2-3) 
 
Les raisons du succès de la Coast Guard 
Une excellente préparation, une capacité de cohérence de pilotage, ont permis à l’US Coast 
Guard de faire un travail exceptionnel.  
Cependant, au-delà de ce que dit la Commission, il faut souligner que la Coast Guard n’eut 
pas à conduire le système global, mais seulement ses missions spécifiques. C’est certes déjà 
beaucoup, mais le problème le plus complexe – là où se mesurent nos décalages intellectuels 
et stratégiques – est bien celui de la conduite générale des opérations.  
In general, the Coast Guard performed exemplary work in its search and rescue 
missions. Several factors may explain why: (1) pre-positioning of assets close enough to be 
useful on Monday, August 29, the day of landfall, but still out of harm’s way; (2) training 
and equipment for water missions; (3) an organizational culture that encourages personnel 
to respond proactively; (4) a familiarity with incident response generally and the Incident 
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Command System specifically throughout the entire organization; and (5) a long-term 
presence in the affected areas, promoting familiarity with the region and working 
relationships with state and local agencies. […] 
A key factor in the Coast Guard’s rapid reaction is that, unlike FEMA, the Coast Guard 
sees itself as a first-responder. Prior to landfall, based on the forecasted intensity of the 
storm, the Coast Guard decided to move its headquarters to its alternate site in St. Louis, 
Missouri, and to use its alternate incident command post in Alexandria, Louisiana, 
approximately 200 miles away. The Coast Guard evacuated personnel and their family 
members from the direct path of the storm and pre-positioned personnel and assets north, 
east, and west of the predicted track, but close enough to maintain its ability to return to 
the affected area. 
As a result, the Coast Guard was able to begin search and rescue missions by 2:50 p.m. 
on the day of landfall. The winds were still consistently 45-50 knots strong39 when a rescue 
swimmer named Laurence Nettles was lowered by helicopter and navigated his way 
between tree limbs to rescue a four-month-old infant, her mother, and grandmother and 
their pet dog in Plaquemines Parish. Of the more than 33,000 rescues the Coast Guard 
completed, 12,500 were completed using helicopters.41 This was far more than the 
Hurricane Pam prediction of 21,000 total rescues, of which 1,000 would be helicopter 
rescuees. Within the first few days, about 40 percent of the Coast Guard’s national 
helicopter fleet converged on the Gulf Coast to assist in search and rescue and the air 
delivery of food and water. (Chapter 21–3-4) 
 
L’aveuglement : prépositionnement dans les zones inondables 
Il faudrait investiguer davantage que ne le fait la Commission pour mieux comprendre 
comment des responsables de secours peuvent en arriver à placer leurs moyens dans les 
zones qui seront inondées. Probablement parce que l’hypothèse de l’inondation est effacée 
du théâtre d’opération, alors que c’est bien l’hypothèse à prendre en compte. Nous sommes 
probablement là sur un exemple idéal-typique des pathologies déclenchées par la crise 
hors-cadres.  
Although W&F pre-positioned search and rescue assets both within and on the outskirts 
of the affected areas, the Louisiana National Guard pre-positioned its boats and high water 
vehicles primarily at Jackson Barracks, which flooded when the Industrial Canal levee 
broke and flooded the Lower Ninth Ward. The floodwaters rendered many of the boats and 
high water vehicles unusable on the day of landfall. As many witnesses said, a hurricane’s 
precise landfall and impact are difficult to predict. Nonetheless, placing a key element of 
local first response at Jackson Barracks, one of the lowest points in the city, was not an 
exercise in prudent planning. (Chapter 21–5) 
 
Anticiper la perte totale de communication, même chez les meilleurs 
The Coast Guard should have been better prepared for an anticipated breakdown in 
communications infrastructure. While not initially deployed for that purpose, aircraft such 
as C-130s and P-3 AWACs provided useful in relaying communications. More thought 
should be given to determining whether this or other temporary means of communication 
should be used in other large scale incidents like Katrina. (Chapter 21–7) 
 
La perte de tout repère géographique : pas de cartes, zone bouleversée 
Officials from nearly every search and rescue agency told Committee staff that they 
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lacked basic maps of the area. At one point, state and local officials tore maps out of 
telephone books, so that out-of-state search and rescue teams could have some sense of 
where they were going. However, high floodwaters in New Orleans hid street signs from 
view, complicating their efforts. (Chapter 21–8) 
 
La perte de toute coordination  
The lack of coordination had several significant consequences. Agencies searched areas 
without knowing whether those areas already had been searched by others. The agencies in 
boats were mostly unable to coordinate with the National Guard or the Coast Guard to 
request helicopters if victims needed to be airlifted. Finally, the lack of coordination 
prevented food, water, and other critical needs from reaching the rescuees gathered at the 
search and rescue collection sites. (Chapter 21–8) 
 
Des outils inadaptés, dans un contexte de confusion  
And although the total number of military helicopters – active-duty and National Guard 
– reached 293 on September 8, the number does not accurately reflect the number of assets 
devoted to SAR. Many of the helicopters in the region were not equipped with the hoist 
necessary for SAR, and many were light utility helicopters, without the necessary lift 
capacity. Others, such as the MH-53s from USS Bataan, are so large that the down-wash 
from their rotors would push a victim underwater, and thus can also not be used for SAR. 
While these aircraft served essential roles in medical evacuation, personnel transport, and 
logistical missions, hoist-equipped aircraft were a highly valuable asset, and far less 
numerous. Furthermore, the available SAR-capable aircraft were, at times, tasked with 
support missions more appropriate to the utility aircraft, detracting from the more urgent 
life-saving mission. (Chapter 21–16) 
 
La confusion organisationnelle, l’absence de contrôle aérien 
The hundreds of aircraft that arrived on the Gulf Coast faced an overwhelming task. 
From throughout the miles upon miles of destruction, the number of distress calls built by 
the day, and as SAR crews would fly to respond to calls, they would often pass by many 
more victims in need of rescue. The aircraft and crews flew long and difficult hours to the 
point of exhaustion, and at the same time, flew in extraordinarily dangerous and confusing 
conditions in congested skies, rescuing thousands of victims from rooftops, attics, 
apartments, and overpasses. The participants included not just the DOD, National Guard, 
and Coast Guard, but numerous civilian elements such as the DOI, state and local law 
enforcement agencies, and commercial entities. Yet in the chaos of Katrina’s aftermath, no 
network of coordination linked these resources; even the DOD assets remained under 
separate and changing commands for many days. No common strategy to a thorough and 
expeditious search existed, and no unified air traffic control system ensured safety of flight. 
At the root of these problems is the fact that the United States lacks an appropriate 
national plan for SAR in large scale disasters. (Chapter 21–16-17) 
Because the storm had incapacitated military and civilian air traffic control radar 
systems throughout the Gulf Coast, much of the airspace was uncontrolled, creating a 
hazardous and inefficient situation, with pilots relying simply on a “see-and-avoid” 
system, without the essential tracking or separation normally provided by an Air Traffic 
Controller. “I am amazed at the volume of traffic that was in that [Area of Responsibility] 
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and there was not a mid-air collision,” Rear Admiral Dan Lloyd, a Coast Guard 
representative at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), said. Coordination was poor 
because no overarching command existed to assign search sectors, communicate with all 
assets, or direct aircraft to respond to distress calls. Second Fleet recommended, 
“Centralized Command and Control, with subordinate sector command and control of air, 
land, and water-borne assets, in place as soon as possible, will maximize safety and 
capabilities.” The different services each directed their own aircraft, with the structure 
changing continuously due to the rapid buildup of assets in the operating area throughout 
the first week. 
From Tuesday, August 30 to Wednesday, August 31, DOD air assets operated with 
Coast Guard aircraft under the coordination of Coast Guard District Eight. Beginning 
Wednesday, August 31, all DOD air assets were controlled by Rear Adm. Kilkenny, based 
on USS Bataan. Beginning Wednesday, August 31, Army SAR assets reported to the 
Louisiana National Guard, stationed at Eagle Base at the Superdome. Beginning late in the 
week, Air Force and other shore-based SAR assets reported to the Joint Force Air 
Component Commander, who arrived at Camp Shelby, Mississippi on Thursday, 
September 1. On Saturday, September 3, Air Force Brigadier General Harold Moulton 
arrived from NORTHCOM to consolidate Command and Control of all Title 10 SAR units 
from a mobile headquarters unit at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base in Belle Chasse. 
Meanwhile, the National Guard established their SAR coordination headquarters at Zephyr 
Field, the New Orleans Saints’ practice field in Jefferson Parish. (Chapter 21–18) 
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Chapitre 16 
 
LOGISTIQUE 
UN MONDE PUBLIC SUBMERGÉ, UN MONDE PRIVÉ PRÉPARÉ 
 
 
Le système d’appui – déjà connu pour ses limites en matière de logistique – a 
explosé sous les coups de boutoirs d’un événement d’une puissance radicalement hors des 
limites habituelles :  
• On a bien acheminé des moyens, mais en proportion très insuffisante.  
• On était encore dans l’idée que l’on recevrait des commandes précises de la part des 
états, mais ce fut le silence, ou des demandes totalement disparates.  
• On aurait pu faire davantage avant l’arrivée du cyclone, mais on attendit, et après ce fut 
trop tard.   
• On ne mit pas en place un centre de crise avancé sur la zone (il fallut 12 jours pour cela), 
et il fallut passer par des PC beaucoup trop éloignés, qui ne connaissaient pas la zone.  
• On savait envoyer des moyens, mais pas suivre ces envois.   
• On pouvait faire des livraisons, mais pas dans un environnement pareil, avec des 
barrages de sécurité qui ne laissaient pas passer des livraisons de biens même essentiels ; 
• On dût finir par tout transférer au ministère de la Défense sous la forme d’un contrat 
d’un milliard de dollars, une mission un peu brutale pour la Défense.  
• On sait à peu près livrer des marchandises à un point planifié, mais pas à un nuage de 
points non planifiés ; et encore, lorsque les plans ont retenu pour point d’arrivée des 
matériels une zone inondable, même le schéma connu ne fonctionne pas.  
• Et le tout avec des moyens en personnels incroyablement pauvres : un seul agent pour 
établir les listes de demande pour toute la Louisiane.  
En regard, la Commission fait l’éloge des grandes entreprises qui apparaissent habiter un 
autre siècle : une forte anticipation, des contrats préalables, des stocks pré-équipés, une 
mobilisation sur l’ensemble des Etats-Unis, et même du Canada, une réactivité professionnelle.  
En résumé : d’un côté, on a des plans, qui explosent dès lors que les hypothèses de 
situation nominale ne sont plus satisfaites ; de l’autre, on a une compétence. Deux mondes, si 
l’on prolonge quelque peu la réflexion de la Commission, qui s’opposent radicalement dans 
leur esprit : d’un côté, on pense hiérarchie, formulaire, tuyaux, et il ne faut pas soulever à 
l’avance un problème qui révélerait une faille ; de l’autre, on pense adaptation stratégique, 
vitesse, opportunité, et la faille stimule l’envie de relever le défi.  
On pourrait sans doute penser que la Commission, à ce point consternée par ce qu’elle a 
observé, adopte des lentilles un peu trop favorables pour examiner les exploits du privé –
l’examen met surtout en exergue quelques cas, sans doute les meilleurs. Mais le défi est bel et 
bien posé. Et nul ne pourrait prétendre que nos exercices échappent totalement à ces 
tendances de fond – malheur à qui ose mettre en avant une question pour laquelle la puissance 
publique n’aurait pas la réponse dans ses plans. Quant au secteur privé, il est tenu le plus 
souvent comme un auxilliaire qu’il faut tout de même convoquer pour une participation à la 
marge, mais pas encore véritablement comme acteur majeur et à certains égards central.  
 
Effondrement 
Although when interviewed by the Committee staff some FEMA witnesses testified 
that FEMA pre-positioned more commodities before Hurricane Katrina made landfall than 
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before any other previous storm, it was not enough to sustain the tens of thousands of 
people left stranded by the hurricane. FEMA’s logistics system became critical to 
providing additional food, water, ice, portable toilets, fuel, generators, and other necessary 
supplies to the impacted areas. However, as Secretary of Homeland Security Michael 
Chertoff testified: “FEMA’s logistics systems simply were not up to the task.” Former 
FEMA Director Michael Brown agreed: “FEMA has a logistics problem.” 
In some cases, state and local officials faced such overwhelming circumstances that they 
could not assess or communicate their needs accurately to FEMA. At other times, the 
system itself revealed flaws, as red tape prevented the prompt and complete acquisition 
and distribution of assets. To some degree, each level of government shares some of the 
responsibility for the failure of the FEMA commodities system after landfall. Ordinary 
people forced to endure inhuman circumstances were the victims of these failures. Without 
generators, plumbing, or portable toilets, the Superdome became a stadium of human waste 
rotting in extreme heat. In Mississippi, victims who took refuge in public shelters found 
shortages of food and water, sanitation problems, and lack of electricity. (Chapter 23-1) 
 
Un problème récurrent 
FEMA’s logistics failure during the Katrina crisis was no surprise. FEMA already knew 
it lacked staff and systems needed to respond to a large disaster.3 William Lokey, Federal 
Coordinating Officer (FCO) in Louisiana, told Committee investigators that FEMA 
regularly fails to track supplies: “It has been a problem at every disaster I’m aware of.” 
(Chapter 23-1) 
 
Un décalage de compétence avec le privé 
Unlike many large private shippers, FEMA could not track assets en route to 
destinations, as Moore explained: “I can tell you today when they leave someplace and I 
can tell you when they arrive someplace because they’re manually counted when they got 
through the gate. In the middle of that, I don’t know where they are.” (Chapter 23-2) 
 
Une posture statique totalement en décalage 
FEMA’s decision to wait to determine whether pre-positioned assets were sufficient –
instead of maintaining a constant stream of supplies – compounded the problem, as 
admitted by FEMA Director Brown: “We pre-positioned and then tried to see what was 
going to happen and then started it back up again. We should have just kept pushing.” 
(Chapter 23-2) 
 
La FEMA submergée passe le tout au DOD : pour 1 milliard de $ 
FEMA recognized that it had failed.40 Perceiving an overwhelmed logistics 
system,FEMA Director Brown “reached back to headquarters and had discussions about 
[how he] wanted all logistics turned over to DOD.”41 On September 1, FEMA headquarters 
contacted the Department of Defense, requesting that DOD take over full logistics 
operations in Louisiana and Mississippi,42 thus proposing the transfer of one of its most 
important functions to another entity.  
Considerable attention has been paid to this attempt to turn over FEMA’s troubled 
logistical efforts to the Department of Defense. After discussions among FEMA and DOD 
officials, on September 2 FEMA issued a $1 billion mission assignment to DOD to plan 
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and execute the procurement, transportation, and distribution of commodities in Louisiana 
and Mississippi. FEMA officials authorized spending up to $1 billion on this mission, an 
estimate, as one FEMA official said, that was large enough to give DOD the authority to 
“cover the eventualities” that might arise in accomplishing this mission. 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale testified of this mission that DOD “got the 
largest request for assistance in the history of the United States. And it wasn’t anything 
other than . . . ‘full logistics support throughout the entire area of responsibility.’” McHale 
continued that he felt that this was a “very broad, fairly loosely defined mission 
requirement” but since it was a “crisis circumstance, we felt that we should take that on, 
and we did.”  
DOD’s performance under this mission assignment was ultimately considerably less 
than full logistical support. DOD appears to have identified certain areas of FEMA’s 
logistics system that required immediate attention – namely sourcing, tracking, and 
transportation – and restored the flow and distribution of commodities to both Louisiana 
and Mississippi. Hence, FEMA retained control over many of its traditional tasks. Of the 
billion dollars authorized, DOD has sought reimbursement from FEMA for approximately 
$100 million of work. Billing records compiled by FEMA indicate DOD has sought 
reimbursement from FEMA partly for substantial costs for ship leases, fuel, airlift 
support, personnel travel, and some food. (Chapter 23-4) 
 
Trois problèmes : l’eau, les communications, la sécurité 
Comme toujours, on plaide que tout irait bien si les conditions n’étaient pas ce qu’elles 
sont. On a tout prévu, mais pas l’inondation. La plaidoirie du Secrétaire Chertoff est d’un 
grand clacissisme.  
The day before the mission assignment to DOD, despite FEMA leaders’ 
acknowledgement of the logistics problems, DHS Secretary Chertoff was publically 
claiming otherwise: 
The limiting factor here has not been that we don’t have enough supplies…We not only 
had a hurricane; we had a second catastrophe, which was a flood. That flood made 
parts of the city very difficult to get through. If you can’t get through the city you can’t 
deliver supplies…I’m telling you that we are getting food and water to areas where 
people are staging…The limitation here on getting food and water to people is the 
condition on the ground. 
Other factors contributed to the logistics struggle. For example, communications 
between officials within Louisiana and with FEMA headquarters were almost nonexistent. 
As Scott Wells, the Deputy FCO in Louisiana said, “There was just a big communications 
void” in Baton Rouge. FEMA had done little before landfall to ensure communications 
capabilities after landfall. The FEMA team leader at the Superdome had very limited 
communication capabilities with superiors in Baton Rouge an elsewhere and estimated that 
this lowered his operational effectiveness by 90 percent. Additionally […] both FEMA 
and state officials cited security issues as a principal reason for delayed delivery of 
commodities. (Chapter 23–4-5). 
 
Le filtrage des demandes par des bureaucrates plus ou moins bien inspirés 
Le terrain demande des matériels en appui, à partir de ce qu’il observe. Par réflexe, la 
bureaucratie coupe dans ces demandes, en fonction des idées qu’elle croit pouvoir se faire à 
distance : on refuse des zodiac, on enlève quelques % dans le nombre de cars demandés, par 
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exemple. Comme si la compétence d’un service résidait dans sa capacité à rogner sur les 
demandes. Qu’il y ait des arbitrages à faire, des économies à envisager, n’est pas discuté par la 
Commission, mais elle critique le caractère discrétionnaire de ces mesures, prises sans 
discussion avec le terrain, et probablement par des ignorants.  
FEMA personnel admitted that there was a chance that an approved request would be 
denied at FEMA’s Regional or National Headquarters. For example, FEMA denied a state 
request for 1,000 small rubber rafts because the boats would not be useful for rescues in 
debris-filled water. A state official disagreed and testified that the boats would have been 
valuable for towing behind motorboats and picking up victims in shallow water. LOHSEP’s 
Colonel Jeff Smith felt that reasonable requests were being “filtered,” probably because not 
all levels of authority recognized the severity of the situation. (Chapter 23-7). 
 
Un exemple encore plus clair avait été donné au chapitre 22 – “vous demandez 500 bus, vous 
en aurez 455” :  
On the day of landfall, Governor Blanco had asked then FEMA Director Brown for 500 
buses. Brown agreed, but no buses arrived Tuesday morning. Governor Blanco asked 
Brown again. Once again, Brown agreed, but no buses arrived in New Orleans Wednesday 
morning either. The Governor turned to the White House. When former White House Chief 
of Staff Andrew Card called Governor Blanco later that morning, she requested his help in 
obtaining the promised 500 FEMA buses, adding that she may need as many as 5,000. The 
Governor reiterated her frustration about FEMA’s failure to deliver buses in a phone call to 
the President later that afternoon. 
FEMA did not ask the U.S. DOT to send buses to New Orleans until 1:45 a.m. on 
Wednesday, August 31, two days after landfall and 36 hours after Brown’s agreement to 
provide them. Brown could not explain why it took so long. 
Notably, when FEMA finally tasked U.S. DOT, FEMA requested 455 buses – not 500. 
According to LOHSEP Acting Deputy Director Colonel Jeff Smith, a FEMA official at 
headquarters had overridden the state’s request because that individual had found the 
request excessive in view of the “number of people” thought to have been left in the city. 
Col. Smith, a Certified Public Accountant, cited this episode as an example of how 
FEMA’s bureaucracy failed the state: “I’ll talk despairingly against one of my previous 
occupations; some bean counter looked at it and figured that, you know, we didn’t need 
this. And I mean, the situations when you’re going and it literally, it’s life or death issues, 
it's no time to be quibbling about, you know, what you have there.” (Chapter 22-5) 
 
Le défi de répondre à des nuages de cibles 
On conçoit de livrer de gros matériels à de gros pôles. Comme on l’avait vu lors des 
tempêtes de 1999 en France, le défi est aussi de pouvoir répondre à des myriades de 
demandes, en apportant du petit matériel, et sur des cibles disséminées.  
The Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan designates LOHSEP as the lead state agency 
for coordinating the distribution of commodities. In Katrina’s aftermath, emergency 
managers in Louisiana faced two distinct logistical challenges after landfall: (1) providing 
massive quantities of commodities to the enormous numbers of victims in the Superdome 
and Convention Center, and (2) disbursing relatively smaller amounts to the thousands of 
victims scattered across southeast Louisiana and the greater New Orleans metropolitan area 
– chiefly, the collection sites for rescuees along highway overpasses. Not surprisingly, they 
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performed best in delivering to locations where the need was rapidly identified and supply 
lines could be established. But LOHSEP failed to coordinate and establish supply lines to 
the ad-hoc, unplanned distribution points. (Chapter 23-8). 
 
Une cascade de défaillances, depuis l’impréparation jusqu’au choix de sites sous l’eau 
Some of the parishes’ needs could have been met through better long-term planning and 
preparation. First, had FEMA and the state had executed more contracts with vendors 
before the storm for critical supplies, that would have saved time during the post-storm 
crisis. Second, key commodities were not sent until two days after landfall from Zephyr 
Field, FEMA’s post-landfall operational staging area in Jefferson Parish, to the Superdome. 
Third, high-water vehicles were needed to deliver commodities to flooded areas (like the 
Superdome). The Louisiana National Guard failed to anticipate needing to use its high-
water vehicles to distribute commodities and failed to anticipate the manpower and 
equipment needs of a large-scale commodities distribution. Fourth planners failed to ensure 
that all supply PODs in affected areas would be set up on high ground. Many parish-
designated PODs were flooded.99 LOHSEP and the parishes had to establish alternative 
drop points. Fifth, although Hurricane Pam working groups had discussed establishing 
Search and Rescue Bases of Operations (SARBOOs), temporary collection sites for 
rescuees on highway overpasses, neither FEMA nor the state had planned or prepared for 
a coordinated system of commodities distribution to the SARBOOs, where the situation 
became critical as transportation to evacuate the rescuees was delayed. (Chapter 23-9). 
 
Entre grains de sables et impuissance : les check-points achèvent de bloquer le système 
On Tuesday, the New Orleans Police Department and the Louisiana National Guard 
requested portable toilets for the Superdome. A FEMA representative at the Superdome 
promised to have toilets delivered the next day, Wednesday. But law enforcement agencies 
had checkpoints set up on major highways and prevented individuals without credentials 
from getting past some checkpoints. According to one portable toilets vendor, he was 
turned away twice at security checkpoints in Plaquemines Parish (where his supply yard 
was located) when he tried to fulfill the order. Eventually, the National Guard provided an 
armed escort which enabled him to make the delivery onSaturday. By that time, the 
Superdome evacuation was nearly complete. (Chapter 23-9). 
 
Confusion : lorsque les responsables confondent Superdome et Convention Center 
Further complicating the response to the developing situation at the Convention Center 
was confusion by Department of Homeland Security HSOC officials, who were tasked 
with gathering and disseminating critical information, and who believed the Convention 
Center and the Superdome were the same location. (Chapter 23-11). 
 
Loin de l’amateurisme du secteur public, le professionnalisme du privé 
The companies that testified at the Committee’s private sector hearing all had in place 
deliberate plans for deploying and tracking materiel and personnel. From batteries, fuel, and 
generators to food and water, Wal-Mart, Starwood, IBM, and Mississippi Power knew 
what they would need, had those commodities either in place or at staging areas outside the 
storm’s path, and had a plan for moving them in immediately after the storm. These 
companies also had employees from unaffected regions at the ready, to assist in the region 
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once the storm passed, and they responded proactively. Within seven days of Katrina 
making landfall, Mississippi Power had 11,000 workers on the ground from 23 states and 
Canada. They utilized mutual assistance agreements, in place prior to the storm, to 
“borrow” employees from other utility companies. IBM knew their services would be 
needed after the storm and deployed a Crisis Response Team to Baton Rouge to 
immediately begin working with government and nongovernmental organizations to address 
critical needs. Starwood also had a corporate response team staged at a safe distance, but 
ready to move in once the storm had passed. 
Wal-Mart managed logistics effectively and delivered commodities quickly when 
responding to Katrina. Wal-Mart has it own fleet of trucks, 100 distribution centers, and 
stores located all over the country. Of the 100 distribution centers, 8 have reserved 
“disaster merchandise” square footage, with approximately $4.7 million in “disaster 
merchandise” stockpiled for emergencies, including more than 250,000 gallons of drinking 
water. Wal-Mart also has relationships with vendors that help with surge requests during 
times of emergency. The company has a specific protocol for responding to disasters, and 
operates an emergency operations center year-round to coordinate crises around the 
country. 
With Hurricane Katrina, Wal-Mart used its expertise to move in supplies and operate 
effectively. In the first three weeks after landfall, the company “delivered approximately 
2,500 trailers of emergency supplies…including trucks of water and supplies that flowed 
into the New Orleans metropolitan area beginning on Saturday, September 3 for emergency 
service workers, shelters, and hospitals. A total of three temporary mobile pharmacies 
[were] provided to support communities, and a 16,000- square foot ‘tent store’ was 
erected to serve a community where the store had been all but demolished.” Based on past 
experience with major storms and hurricanes, Wal-Mart knew what supplies would be 
sought prior to the hurricane making landfall and what would be needed for the recovery 
phase after the storm. (Chapter 23–14-15) 
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Chapitre 17 
 
LE SYSTÈME MÉDICAL CONFRONTÉ À UN AUTRE MONDE 
 
 
Au-delà des éléments factuels, qui sont connus, ce chapitre apporte des réflexions 
montrant comment le système de santé, notamment les hôpitaux, glisse vers des territoires 
hors références habituelles.  
• Les principes qui fondent habituellement les analyses coûts-bénéfices ne fonctionnent 
plus : une évacuation est certes un acte à haut risque, mais on se retrouve bien vite dans 
une impasse léthale quand l’institution de santé part à la dérive.  
• Les visions habituelles ne tiennent plus : on ne travaille pas sur des évacués extraits de la 
zone rouge, c’est l’ensemble du dispositif qui est en zone rouge.  
• Il est normal d’attendre une aide extérieure pour sauver des hôpitaux : mais, en la 
circonstance, cette aide n’est pas disponible, et il faut éventuellement aussi (on n’a pas 
de certitudes sur ce point, mais il n’est pas facile d’attendre une preuve convaincante 
avant de déterminer une ligne d’action) compter avec des paramètres inimaginables 
comme celui de snipers prenant les hélicoptères pour cibles.  
• La question d’une aide extérieure massive se pose, mais avec un problème 
d’accréditation qui relève rapidement du casse-tête. On ne saurait oublier toute sécurité 
dans l’embauche de volontaires, mais le processus d’accréditation, non préparé, se révèle 
impossible à établir (à noter que le risque, pour l’avenir, est une décision de 
centralisation bureaucratique interdisant toute flexibilité27).  
 
25 hôpitaux, 12 000 patients  
Hundreds of special-needs patients were cared for at the Superdome and eventually 
evacuated. In the end, 19 nursing homes evacuated pre-landfall, and leaving 34 to do so 
after the hurricane. Moreover, a total of 12,000 patients and caregivers were evacuated from 
hospitals before and after Katrina with 25 hospitals evacuating in the first five days post-
landfall. (Chapter 24-9) 
 
Une analyse bénéfice-risque, mais sur hypothèses conventionnelles, donc fausses 
L’habitude, les difficultés, et aussi des références solides – mais non fondées en l’espèce –
 conduisent à construire peu à peu une impasse. On tient qu’il y a moins de risques à rester 
sur place qu’à évacuer – mais toute l’analyse est faussée par le fait que les paramères habituels 
ne sont plus valides.  
In both Mississippi and Louisiana, the onset of Hurricane Katrina found significant 
populations of acutely ill patients in hospitals and patients in nursing homes who were not 
evacuated. In the case of acutely ill hospital patients, most hospitals decided that the 
medical risk of moving these patients outweighed the benefit, and chose to shelter-inplace. 
                                         
27 Michel Nesterenko m’a notamment signalé l’article suivant : ID Would Control Access to Disaster Sites, by 
Devlin Barrett, Associated Press, Tuesday, September 4, 2007, washingtonpost.com,  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/03/AR2007090301229_pf.html 
Le système de badge permettrait toute la rationnalisation voulue pour trier les volontaires ; aux détails près qu’il 
faudrait être en mesure d’établir les badges, de préparer une classification adéquate, et de pouvoir les lire sur site, 
ce qui supposerait bien évidemment de disposer du bureau voulu, et d’électricité. Entre l’avancée informatique 
remarquable et le labyrinthe kafkaïen, la limite peut être étroite.  
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Unfortunately, the majority were not adequately equipped to carry out this function in the 
face of a storm the magnitude of Katrina. Some nursing homes made similar decisions based 
on difficulties they encountered in previous evacuations or for other reasons. All told, some 
235 deaths occurred in 28 of Louisiana’s hospitals and nursing homes. Special-needs 
patients transported themselves or were evacuated to the Superdome and to other shelters. 
Although an estimated 450 special-needs patients were evacuated from the Superdome 
prior to landfall and transferred to a state-supported shelter in Baton Rouge, many more 
remained in the city. (Chapter 24-1) 
 
Un système qui va au fiasco, en le sachant 
La gravité des faits, la hauteur des contraintes, les règles du jeu qu’il faudrait avoir 
développé, font que l’on sait quelque part que le fiasco est au bout du chemin. Comme une 
tragédie qui se déroule, en toute connaissance de cause. Se mêlent ainsi des phénomènes tout à 
la fois d’aveuglement et de lucidité impuissante.  
So on the eve of Katrina’s landfall, federal, state, and local medical emergency managers 
found themselves confronted with the need to evacuate and care for thousands of medically 
compromised individuals – a circumstance forewarned in the Hurricane Pam exercise a year 
before Katrina.6 Even more telling is the fact that these officials were apparently well aware 
of the situation that they would face. For example, a U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) e-mail describes information communicated on a FEMA-arranged 
conference call on Sunday night, August 28, just hours before landfall. The e-mail stated 
that 40 to 50 patients at the Superdome special needs shelter were critical-care medical 
patients and that there were approximately 2,500 hospital patients still in New Orleans. 
The e-mail goes on to say, “Advanced planning was never completed on how the patients 
left in the hospitals will be evacuated after the event,” and later noted, “it is assumed that 
many of the hospital generators will lose power given the expected height of the water.” 
(Chapter 24-1) 
 
L’inverse du schéma de référence : non plus un “ground zero”, et un contexte préservé 
qui vient aider, mais un univers entièrement affecté 
All of this had to be done in areas where major portions of the health-care system had 
been damaged or destroyed. All but three hospitals in the New Orleans area were 
incapacitated10 and essentially all hospitals in the Mississippi Gulf Coast area sustained 
some level of physical damage and operational disruption (from loss of power, evacuation 
of staff, disruption of their supply systems, etc.). Charity Hospital in New Orleans, which 
was rendered inoperable by flood water, was one of only two major trauma centers located 
in the entire state. (Chapter 24-2) 
Some of the difficulties experienced in moving victims into the state’s medical triage 
system were compounded by the fact that the evacuation of hospitals was simply not 
addressed in Hurricane Pam, despite the presumption that New Orleans would flood and 
that the hospitals would become inoperable. In fact, the Hurricane Pam exercise assumed 
that some 2,000 patients would be sheltered in place in area hospitals which would cease to 
operate as functional medical facilities due to flooding – a prediction that came strikingly 
close to reality during Katrina. Though faced with this daunting scenario, little action was 
taken to address it prior to Katrina. As explained by Dr. James Aiken, Medical Director for 
Emergency Preparedness for the Medical Center of Louisiana in New Orleans (a.k.a. 
Charity and University Hospitals): 
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Well, to start with my own hospital, it [Pam] did not change our planning at all. I don’t 
think it changed anyone else’s planning that I am aware of…[T]he focus of the health 
care planning that I participated in [during the exercise] had to do with not what 
happens within what we call the affected areas [that] have flooding but what happened 
on dry land. And most of the activities that happened in the health care breakout 
sessions had to do with standing up the temporary medical support sites. 
[M]any of my colleagues registered our concerns that we were literally writing off 
any serious planning above and beyond what we had then, which was to tell the 
hospitals they were going to have to be self-sufficient for three to five and now seven 
days… So the Hurricane Pam, again, exercises and planning efforts, as far as I know, 
never addressed the issue of pre-threat evacuation or actually serious detailed planning 
for the affected area.  (Chapter 24-3) 
 
Une hypothèse hors-cadre : l’évacuation 
As Dr. Guidry [Medical Director rand State Health Officer] explained: 
When I had discussions with a number of these hospitals in this area over the years, 
the questions was, “How are you going to evacuate?” And their response was 
always, “We do not plan to evacuate. Our evacuation plan will be to get those people 
out that can travel, elective surgeries. But we will remain here with the people that are 
not able to get out and the people that are going to need ourcare so that we can be 
here after the event.” (Chapter 24-4) 
 
Aux confins de l’insaisissable 
In the end, hospitals in Southeastern Louisiana were simply reluctant to follow their 
plans and evacuate the critically ill because of the danger, expense, and uncertainty of the 
hurricane path itself. As LSU’s Dr. Aiken put it: 
Hurricanes have a remarkable capability of changing directions quickly. And so when 
you say, “In the line of the path of a storm,” you know, for us, that path actually gets 
realized after the fact. So when you talk about evacuating patients from the number of 
hospitals that now exist, and we have to expand this conversation beyond New 
Orleans, because, quite frankly, a lot of the destination hospitals that some of the 
areas use would be the same ones that we [LSU] would want to use. 
… how do you decide which hospitals should evacuate and where should they go? I 
mean, do we evacuate the entire coastline? 
… and again, remember 24 hours [prior to landfall of the hurricane], we do not want 
anybody on the road. So the risk benefit [issue arises], and also remember every 
single patient who is critically ill requires almost their own means of transportation, 
whether it’s an ambulance or helicopter. We certainly could put a couple in. But for 
our critical care patients, school buses [are] not usually the answer. 
In addition, evacuation would have required New Orleans area hospitals to confront the 
difficult problem of finding other hospitals that could take their patients. As Dr. Guidry 
explained, in Louisiana under normal situations, sick or emergency patients with pressing 
needs are sent to the New Orleans region, which hosts a large number of medical facilities, 
the state’s “medical mecca.” However, Katrina reversed that burden, causing 25 hospitals 
in the area to try to find places for their patients outside of New Orleans, and “the rest of 
the state can’t absorb it.” (Chapter 24–4-5) 
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Face à des impensables qui cristallisent brutalement 
However successful it had been in prior hurricanes, the strategy of hospitals to stay 
open for critically ill patients and storm victims proved untenable in Katrina. After a few 
days, most hospitals that had stayed open were running out of fuel for their backup 
generators, making it impossible to operate effectively or, in some cases, unable to operate 
at all due to flooding. In desperation, they appealed to DHH to help them evacuate. Dr. 
Guidry found that helicopters and other transportation assets were tied up in search and 
rescue efforts: 
And so their plan was stock up, be prepared to stay in place a few days. Most 
hurricanes, three days, five days out, you’re done with it and be ready to take care of 
people after. The calls started coming in saying we’re about to lose power, we’re 
going to have to bag [manually ventilate] patients. We got to get them out of here. We 
got to get them out of here. We got to get them out of here. And I was asking for the 
resources to move them. Search and rescue is going to have to move them. I got to 
have the helicopters, I got to have the planes to move them out…So it then becomes 
where do I send them, how do I get them there, how do I get them out of there. So the 
Hospital Association is coming to me in tears, the folks there are in tears trying to 
help their folks and I’m beating my head to try to get the help. And you’ve got the 
search and rescue that’s trying to get people out of water and rooftops and out of 
hospitals. And that’s all the competing needs for the limited assets. (Chapter 24-5) 
 
Plans-papier 
The Committee also found that there was no process to vet the plans for consistency 
and practicability. For example, many nursing homes rely on ambulance services to 
evacuate their populations. During a crisis, however, ambulance services may be in use by 
other nursing homes or hospitals. Furthermore, nursing homes and hospitals are not 
required to evacuate. The facility’s plan could simply be to weather the storm – even if the 
nursing home is in a flood-prone area. In short, nursing homes are only required to have 
their emergency plans on the books, which is a far cry from ensuring that they will actually 
work during a time of crisis. (Chapter 24-7) 
 
Les volontaires : la question des accréditations, et l’impréparation générale 
In the immediate aftermath of Katrina, HHS began receiving numerous calls from health 
professionals wanting to volunteer their time and services to the affected region. In 
response, HHS created an entirely new federal volunteer signup website.192 For lack of a 
national credentialing system, HHS decided to rely on a private contractor to individually 
verify the credentials of the 34,000 individuals who volunteered in the weeks after Katrina. 
The volunteering and deploying process was time and resource consuming at best. After 
registering on the website, volunteers were contacted by the private contractor to verify 
their credentials. Volunteers were sent to the HHS Human Resources Office to be hired as 
temporary employees, then to OPHEP for deployment. Credentialing became a significant 
bottleneck in the process, and there seemed to be no consistent plan as the weeks went on. 
Numerous documents indicate credentialing delays by the private contractor, who was 
hired and started work only after landfall. Because different organizations were handling 
credentialing, hiring, and deployment, HHS had limited information on volunteers in the 
system and where they were being deployed. The volunteers also posed a host of 
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difficulties for the HHS logistics department because volunteers were not familiar with 
travel regulations, procedures, and reimbursement protocols, among other issues. Creating 
this massive federal volunteer effort during the crisis took a significant amount of effort and 
resources at the federal and the local level and impaired HHS’s ability to function as 
efficiently as possible. 
Once created, the new volunteer system experienced many problems. Numerous 
documents indicate constant additions and changes to the website,198 underscoring the 
unplanned nature of this project in the midst of a significant national catastrophe. This was 
also singularly a federal effort. Staff to the Secretary of HHS made clear in an e-mail to 
those administering the database that there was a lack of coordination with states around 
volunteer recruitment. States felt that the HHS volunteer recruitment effort conflicted with 
their own efforts to recruit and organize volunteers which they would dispatch themselves 
and the HRSA-sponsored credentialing programs they had been encouraged to establish. It 
also failed to directly include state emergency-management agencies which were trying to 
fill requests for medical assistance from the Gulf Coast to ensure the efforts were 
coordinated and not duplicative. 
Eventually, approximately 1,400 out of 34,000 volunteers in HHS’s volunteer system 
actually deployed, or only 3.5 percent of those that signed up on the volunteer website. 
The costs of HHS’s constructing and maintaining this database, and of contracting with a 
private credentialing entity, are not known. In the end, it was unable to efficiently process 
volunteers. The federal volunteer-deployment effort was a haphazard attempt to respond 
to undoubtedly well-intentioned people offering help in the immediate aftermath of 
Katrina. While it is human nature to want to volunteer and assist in the face of a major 
disaster, the significant effort made to attempt to accommodate individual volunteers may 
not have been the best use of resources. 
To date, HHS has failed to meet its statutory mandate to create a national credentialing 
system to allow health professionals to work across localities and states to meet healthcare 
personnel surge needs. Had a national credentialing system been in place for Katrina, 
volunteer health professionals would likely have been utilized more quickly and effectively, 
obviating the need to create an entirely new federal volunteer database and deployment 
effort in the midst of a national crisis. (Chapter 24– 22-23) 
 
 132 
Chapitre 18 
 
LE DOMAINE MILITAIRE : ENTRE PESANTEURS ET INITIATIVES 
 
 
 
 
LCACs [Landing Craft Air Cushion], C-17s, C-130s, hospital ships, medical teams - 
whatever.  
Overkill is better than undershoot.  
POTUS is coming back to D.C. tonight just for this. 
Admiral Ed Giambastiani, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff,  
to Admiral Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern Command,  
August 30, 2005.  
(Chapter 26 – 23) 
 
Nous ne rentrerons pas dans les spécificités américaines, l’essentiel est surtout de relever, 
ici encore, des constats et réflexions de portée plus générale. On trouve ici de lourdes 
pesanteurs, et de remarquables capacités – en illustration de phénomènes bureaucratiques de 
portée générale.  
 
Les pesanteurs.  Avant de prendre quelque initiative que ce soit, si l’on veut se protéger (et 
échouer, mais cela n’est pas tenu pour si grave) un certain nombre de lois naturelles 
administratives sont à respecter à la lettre. Il faut :  
• Disposer d’une vision claire de la situation dans son ensemble. 
• Disposer de toutes les assurances garantissant que l’action est absolument nécessaire. 
Toute nouvelle grave doit faire l’objet de vérifications avant qu’elle n’engage à prendre 
une initiative – par défaut, la situation doit être considérée comme normale et sous 
contrôle, ne justifiant aucune action ou initiative inhabituelles ;  
• Imposer que les sollicitations éventuelles suivent rigoureusement les canaux 
administratifs prévus et les modes de transmission indiqués (même s’il n’y a plus de 
moyens de communication, plus d’électricité, il n’est pas question de tenir pour valide 
une demande arrivant par l’Internet, par exemple, s’il est stipulé qu’elle doit arriver par 
courrier – comme ce fut le cas de demandes d’aide en provenance de Louisiane) ; et s’il 
n’y a pas de sollicitation explicite, la situation doit être tenue pour nominale aussi 
longtemps que l’on ne dispose pas des preuves écrites et transmises par plusieurs 
canaux officiels indiquant le contraire de façon évidente et à l’aune des critères 
habituels. 
• Suivre un processus hiérarchique d’autant plus rigoureux, pointilleux et détaillé que les 
enjeux sont importants, et en évitant toute précipitation.  
• Pour prévenir tout risque de difficulté de frontière, et afin de bien borner ses propres 
responsabilités, clarifier de façon minutieuse les lignes de démarcation et les 
attributions des multiples acteurs concernés. 
• Ne rien engager sans plan détaillé et approuvé. 
• Disposer de 80 à 90% de l’information avant de s’engager en quoi que ce soit. Surtout 
dans les cas graves, et plus encore dans les cas inhabituels.  
 
Le sublime. A l’opposé, on trouve des démonstrations de professionnalisme et de 
responsabilité remarquables.  
• Une ligne de fond : sortir de l’état de « léthargie par défaut » – on prend les rênes avant 
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que la crise ait déclenché des états de sidération partout dans le système ; on ne laisse 
pas les différentes instances, à commencer par les plus éminentes, devenir les meilleures 
têtes de pont de la crise.  
• Une ligne de pilotage : le chef d’état major donne ses intentions, à chacun ensuite 
d’utiliser au mieux son jugement pour traduire ces intentions stratégiques sur le terrain. 
Il ne donne pas le script, il donne une page blanche en exigeant que chacun fasse usage 
de ses capacités pour y transcrire le meilleur de qu’il est en mesure d’inventer et de 
faire.  
• Une ligne d’audit implicite : vous ne serez pas jugé sur votre dextérité à utiliser toutes 
les ficelles des textes pour vous mettre aux abris, mais sur la pertinence de votre réponse 
à l’exigence de prise en charge. En d’autres termes, une mission d’enquête ne vérifierait 
plus que chacun a bien appliqué ce qu’il était censé faire d’après les textes édictés, mais 
examinerait la capacité d’intelligence et d’action des uns et des autres lorsque les modes 
d’emploi habituels ont été pulvérisés.  
• Un rythme en rapport avec les circonstances : l’acheminement des formulaires et la 
valse lente des tampons ne doivent pas être les déterminants du rythme de l’action.  
• Des initiatives créatrices : c’est par exemple cette décision du Général Honoré de lancer 
sur le champ un exercice pour légitimer un déplacement des troupes d’active sur le 
territoire américain. Non de code : Exercice Katrina.  
 
Un niveau d’engagement inédit 
In addition to being tasked by FEMA to provide support, the State of  Louisiana asked 
both the National Guard and DOD to provide large numbers of ground troops. The 
resulting movement of 50,000 National Guard and 22,000 active-duty troops in response to 
Katrina was the largest deployment of military capability within the United States since the 
Civil War. The National Guard and active-duty military response provided critical 
humanitarian relief that saved lives and eased the suffering of thousands. (Chapter 26-12) 
 
Des demandes inadéquates, des réponses mal maîtrisées 
Many of the state and federal requests for military support, however, lacked adequate 
specificity. The responses to the requests for military support often were poorly 
coordinated with each other, if at all. The deployments of the National Guard troops were 
not well coordinated with the active-duty forces. One result was that local, state, and 
federal officials had differing perceptions of the numbers of federal troops that would be 
arriving, the missions they would be performing, who was in command of the military 
forces, and who should be in command of those forces. (Chapter 26-12) 
 
Le piège de la précision, en lieu et place du jugement 
The challenge of obtaining rapid and reliable information about hurricane damage is not 
new. According to the what was then known as the General Accounting Office (GAO), "In 
the case of [1992's] Hurricane Andrew, it was several days before the local authorities 
realized how bad the situation was and how much assistance was needed." The GAO 
recommended "supporting state and federal agencies should not waste time waiting for 
accurate assessments but use their experience to push obviously-needed assistance toward 
devastated communities before citizens begin to die for lack of it." (Chapter 26- 18) 
 
Les pesanteurs naturelles 
Ces lignes sont essentielles et reflètent bien des références très souvent existentielles dans 
les grandes institutions régaliennes :  
The lack of situational awareness early in the response may have contributed to a delay; 
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other witnesses have attributed the time of response to Department bureaucracy and a 
"cultural reluctance" to commit Department assets to civil support missions unless 
absolutely necessary. 
In its own analysis, the White House asserted that DOD's "21-step" approval process – 
which included converting a mission assignment into a Request for Assistance and 
reviewing the request for legality and appropriateness, among other things - was "overly 
bureaucratic" and "resulted in critical needs not being met." FEMA Deputy Federal 
Coordinating Officer (FCO) in Louisiana Scott Wells and other witnesses'46 described the 
process of gaining assistance from DOD as a "negotiation" in which DOD, along with the 
other government entities, collaborates in dividing up what needs to be done and by whom. 
(Chapter 26-19) 
Prior to landfall, Lt. Gen. Honoré had asked Maj. Gen. Rowe, NORTHCOM Director of 
Operations, to identify certain assets for the response, including helicopters, boats, and 
communications equipment, but 12 hours after landfall Maj. Gen. Rowe replied that he was 
"somewhat hamstrung by JDOMS [Joint Directorate of Military support] desire to wait for 
[Requests for assistance]" and could not provide these critical assets to Lt. Gen. Honoré. 
To the Committee, Maj. Gen. Rowe explained: "I think the primary resistance is the 
organizational resistance and absence of a detailed, approved plan." 
"It's hard to get them to do anything where there is a chance of failure," Scott Wells 
said, adding that DOD wants "to know 80 to 90 percent of the information before they 
will commit an asset to work with you.” Wells asserted that DOD "could have played a 
bigger role. They could have played a faster and and a bigger role." (Chapter 26-20) 
 
Des initiatives qui terrorisent le système 
While FEMA and DHS officials have complained that DOD did not do enough, and was 
slow to process requests, our investigation has found that, in fact, FEMA originated very 
few requests in this early period. In one instance, DOD received complaints from DHS 
about actions it did take. As discussed above, the Navy had ordered the helicopter carrier 
USS Bataan to sail towards New Orleans behind the storm, and to prepare to provide 
assistance. However, on Monday afternoon, a senior DOD representative to DHS reported 
to Assistant Secretary McHale's staff that "folks over here [are hopping] mad about the 
news of the Navy ship that announced their deployment without evident legal authority." 
The USS Bataan, the military's most significant pre-landfall deployment, with helicopters 
prepared to assist with search and rescue, was challenged by DHS. The Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense had to reassure DHS that USS 
Bataan was simply prepositioning, and in fact would not engage in the response without 
the proper request and authorization. As discussed below, USS Bataan's helicopters 
launched on Tuesday, the first active-duty aircraft to assist with search and rescue. 
(Chapter 26-20) 
 
Un système qui reste lourd 
The Committee has found that the JDOMS was slow in approving the initial request for 
helicopter support in Louisiana. The record shows that the time required to process this 
initial request was not consistent with the scale of the disaster. This timeline and the 
testimony of witnesses both within and outside of DOD indicates that, while the extent of 
the damage may not have been known, both a traditional treatment of civil support as a 
secondary mission and a bureaucratic process slowed the response within the Department. 
The expeditious response by the helicopters themselves demonstrates that the Army was 
ready to mobilize, but that in this case, orders slowed the response. As the following 
sections will show, however, any reluctance and bureaucracy gave way beginning 
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Tuesday, as top DOD officials took steps to expedite the responsiveness and bypass the 
ordinary approval process in moving assets forward. (Chapter 26-21) 
 
Un système très mal informé à haut niveau 
During the first two days after landfall, then-Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Gordon England exercised primary authority over the Department's response because the 
Secretary was traveling with the president. Deputy Secretary England described the level 
of accurate information in the Pentagon for the first 24 hours as "no input except what was 
on the news;" his primary source of information was the television. He said he attempted to 
contact FEMA Director Michael Brown and other DHS officials early Monday morning, 
but was unsuccessful.  
Assistant Secretary McHale appears to have received a situation report at 5 p.m. 
Monday, which said that the Industrial Canal and the 17th Street Canal levees had 
breached and that "much of downtown and east New Orleans is undenvater." There is no 
evidence that his office took action on this report. Early on Tuesday, he received, from 
DHS, an Army Corps of Engineers confirmation of the breach at the 17th Street levee. At 
the time of his interview with the Committee on November 9,2005, Col. Chavez, the 
Senior Military Advisor to the Assistant Secretary still believed the levees did not actually 
breach until Tuesday evening,'" and that he did not receive confirmation of the breach until 
Wednesday morning, 48 hours after landfall and the first breaches. (Chapter 26-21) 
 
Manque d’information, ou incapacité à détecter de l’information non classique ?  
NORTHCOM Operations Directorate had been conducting daily interagency 
teleconferences since August 24 to coordinate the military response. By 1:30 p.m. 
Mountain Time Monday, damage assessments were beginning, but were not conclusive. 
NORTHCOM’s Deputy Director of Intelligence, Captain Brett Markham, told the 
Committee that "we relied heavily, on the 29th, on our National Technical Means" 
(sensory equipment managed by national intelligence agencies to collect information for 
the benefit of the entire federal government). He said that some information - including a 
graphic representation of flooding received from the National Geospatial Agency collected 
on August 29, but that it didn't present a sufficiently clear picture. Colonel Wesley 
McClellan, a senior member of NORTHCOM's Interagency Coordination Group, which 
comprises numerous interagency representatives, said that it also lacked damage 
assessment information, and was unable to specify the types of support needed from DOD. 
Like his counterparts at the Pentagon, Admiral Keating, the NORTHCOM Commander, 
also woke up on Tuesday believing that "New Orleans dodged a bullet."' However, as the 
extent of the damage became clear on Tuesday, NORTHCOM staff clearly saw the need 
for military assistance, but was frustrated by the paucity of requests for assistance. 
Brigadier General Harold Moulton, who later in the week deployed from NORTHCOM to 
establish a command-and-control headquarters in New Orleans, described the growing 
frustration that developed as the damage became apparent: 
The National Response Plan process establishes a sequence which goes from local 
asking for help from the state, state asking for help from the federal government, the 
federal looking around and choosing which appropriate spot through the mission 
assignment process to eventually get into… That whole concept seemed to be, for lack 
of a better term, frustrating for this staff and for Admiral Keating as they were trying 
to figure out how to respond to this compelling human tragedy that they could see 
unfolding on TV. 
Col. Daskevich, who had deployed from Oklahoma on Saturday to serve as the DCO –
 NORTHCOM's direct representative - in Baton Rouge, reported to the State Emergency 
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Operations Center at 4:30 a.m. Monday. He spent most of Monday struggling to gain an 
accurate picture of the situation, and acknowledged that from Baton Rouge, he in fact had 
very little awareness of the developments in New Orleans. Col. Daskevich appears to have 
received a report of levee failure on Monday. However, because he was unfamiliar with the 
significance of the levees, he did not recognize the potential implications of this limited 
infprmation. The hunt for information in the first 24,48 hours after the storm was a 
challenge," he said. Having deployed with only one additional staff member, as ordered by 
NORTHCOM, Col. Daskevich acknowledged that a lack of manpower, communications 
equipment, and operating space within the state Emergency Operations Center rendered it 
"extraordinarily demanding to try to keep up with all of the information flow and, or 
course, to actually do business" during the first several days. (Chapter 26–22-23) 
 
Malaise croissant en raison du silence de la FEMA – comment respecter des règles 
dont on voit qu’elles mènent au fiasco ?  
Though officials had begun to learn more about the extent of the damage, through 
Tuesday morning the Department remained in a posture as dictated by the NRP, to allow 
FEMA to coordinate the response. At the same time, senior officials within the Department 
responsible for Homeland Defense were becoming concerned that they were not receiving 
requests from FEMA, and that awaiting such requests could further delay the movement of 
military assets. Assistant Secretary McHale, who that morning met with Deputy Secretary 
England, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Myers to discuss the hurricane 
and the Department's response during the daily morning briefing, said that notwithstanding 
media reports "that were less sobering than the scope of the actual damage," the leadership 
recognized that the Department needed to mobilize its assets for the support requests they 
anticipated: 
We were much more focused and concerned than the published reports of the damage 
might have justified. In part that was because certain key individuals expressed a deep 
concern that the damage was more severe than was being reported and so there was a 
collective sense that Hurricane Katrina was likely to be equal to or greater in damage 
than that of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. (Chapter 26–23-24) 
 
Et l’on finit par passer à une posture plus offensive 
Yet officials within the Pentagon were surprised at the silence from FEMA. First thing 
in the morning, Gen. Myers inquired from his Operations Directorate how many requests 
the Joint Staff had received, "and the answer was, We hadn't got any." A resulting 
discussion with the Deputy Secretary, then, led to the conclusion that "we need to start 
leaning forward - they're going to need some Department of Defense assets.  
During a meeting at 7:30 a.m. Central Time, Deputy Secretary England informed senior 
Pentagon officials, including representatives of the military services and the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the Department's commitment to quickly provide to the 
NORTHCOM Commander whatever assets were needed to support the overall hurricane 
response, and urged all commanders to "lean forward" to be able to quickly meet requests 
for assistance. In a subsequent call that morning to Adm. Keating, Deputy Secretary 
England made clear that NORTHCOM would be provided any asset Adm. Keating deemed 
necessary.  
Deputy Secretary England reported to Secretary Rumsfeld: 
[W]e are leaning forward on all fronts. I have authorized all local commanders to 
provide their assistance and have authorized NORTHCOM and the Chairman to take 
all appropriate measures to push forward available DOD assets that could be useful 
to FEMA.  
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In a meeting at 3:40 p.m., Gen. Myers then instructed his service chiefs to work together 
with NORTHCOM in determining necessary assets, telling them to pre-position resources 
in anticipation of a request for assistance from FEMA, if they thought it prudent. To 
expedite the deployment process, he instructed the services to proceed on the authority of 
this vocal command - Secretary England's direct instruction to Adm. Keating, and his own 
guidance to the service chiefs - and that the necessary paperwork would follow later." 
Think large," he told them. 
A vocal command of this magnitude is extremely rare in DOD. For the purpose of 
ensuring legality, availability of resources, and documentation of the chain of command, 
all deployments are normally processed rigorously through specific written orders and 
electronic tracking systems. Deputy Secretary England's command represented an 
extraordinary delegation of military judgment, on the assurance that Adm. Keating would 
keep the Department informed. It was a “blank check”, Deputy Secretary England said. 
Assistant Secretary McHale elaborated: "What was communicated… was what we in the 
military call 'commander's intent.' The message from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
consistent with the counsel provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was to act with a 
sense of urgency and to minimize paperwork and bureaucracy to the greatest extent 
possible. As Adm. Keating understood the direction, "We're moving anything we think 
FEMA will need. No obstacles from DOD or Joint While DOD's inherent authorities to 
respond had not changed, and it was understood that all the necessary paperwork would 
follow, the decision reflected an extraordinary delegation to the military commanders. 
Assistant Secretary McHale said, "The climate in the decision-making process in this 
department could not have been more proactive than it was.  
Although individual commanders had already begun moving assets and conducting 
predeploymen preparations, many witnesses have credited these actions with 
fundamentally shifting the overall response of DOD, particularly at the Departmental level, 
into a proactive mode. Capt. McDaniel, who represented the Navy to FEMA, said: 
The pendulum swung from one extreme to the other through this. I mean, it went from 
having to pry Secretary Rumsfeld's fingers off of a helicopter package… and this 100-
pound gorilla just goes, 'Okay, we've got it.' Boom, and then the floodgates open. 
Col. Harrington agreed that the "cultural reluctance" had now been overcome, and that 
attitudes within the Department "dramatically shifted" as "things got a little crazy." 
On Wednesday morning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs issued guidance to Joint 
Forces Command (which maintains control of most military assets within the United States 
until they are assigned to Combatant Commanders such as NORTHCOM), consistent with 
his guidance to the service chiefs on Tuesday: "(1) Continue to lean forward; (2) Remind 
services to work through Joint Task Force components; and (3) Be aggressive but don't get 
in FEMA's way." Forces had begun to deploy in large numbers to the region, some 
requested by NORTHCOM, and many others volunteering on their own initiative. The 
initial result was a "wide open barn door," according to Maj. Gen. Rowe, with 
NORTHCOM having difficulty tracking selfdeployed assets. Chapter 26 –24-25) 
 
Blocage et frustration 
Mais qu’il est frustrant de constater que l’on en englué dans l’impuissance ! « Il ne nous 
demandent rien ! ». Le problème serait de sortir de la situation de blocage, au-delà de la 
frustration. 
Colonel Darryl Roberson, Assistant Deputy Director for Antiterrorism and Homeland 
Defense in the Joint Staff, described his frustration at not being asked to do more sooner: 
I will tell you that I personally felt very frustrated that we had not been called in 
earlier. We had assets available. We were all leaning forward. We knew we were 
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going to receive them. We responded, in my opinion, in an unprecedented manner to 
everything that we got. I am absolutely convinced in my heart that it is a good-news 
story that DOD came to the rescue. That may sound strong. Obviously I'm biased. But 
in my mind, DOD saved the day to a large extent, and it was because of what we did. 
[M]y frustration comes from the fact that I think we could have done it earlier if we 
had been asked. 
Assistant Secretary McHale expressed a similar frustration, stating that throughout the 
first week, he believed that FEMA's requests for assistance were still not commensurate 
with the scale of the catastrophe and the types of efforts that would be required of DOD, 
and that even "by Saturday it was clear that the [requests] we had received, reviewed, and 
approved were pretty narrow in scope." Yet on the message conveyed by Deputy Secretary 
England, military forces converged upon the Gulf Coast. (Chapter 26–25-26) 
 
Ce que l’on a fait, en rongeant son frein, tandis que la FEMA était aux abonnés 
absents 
Despite an overall lack of awareness within the Department about conditions in 
Louisiana and Mississippi, a number of military commanders within the services took 
action, pursuant to their own command authority, to prepare assets for potential requests 
for assistance. In general, it is possible to characterize commanders' actions throughout the 
first week as one of three types: (1) preparation and mobilization into the Joint Operating 
Area in coordination with NORTHCOM; (2) mobilization into the Joint Operating Area, 
but without full coordination with NORTHCOM; and (3) individual preparations 
conducted within the services, in absence of specific orders to do so. To characterize the 
response most broadly, commanders took action consistent with the guidance of Deputy 
Secretary England and Gen. Myers, making all reasonable efforts to preposition assets or 
prepare for their deployment. And indeed, the overwhelming majority of deployments 
occurred prior to a request by DHS or FEMA. As will be discussed below, the lack of 
expected requests in fact led the Department to draft requests for FEMA, in recognition 
that such military assistance was required, but that FEMA had either failed to ascertain the 
requirements, or had inadequately expressed the requirements to DOD. (Chapter 26–25-26) 
 
La Marine : une forte capacité d’initiative 
The Committee found that, overall, the Navy showed a strong willingness to push assets 
into response efforts, ultimately sending more than 20 ships and 100 aircraft into the Gulf 
of Mexico, often in advance of a request or an order. The Navy provided a wide variety of 
mobile platforms for landing and servicing aircraft, treating patients, transporting 
enormous quantities of cargo and commodities, in addition to land-based assets which 
included engineering battalions of "Seabees" and logistics support.21 But more than other 
services' assets, which may often arrive by air in a matter of hours, the mobility of the 
Navy's primary assets is limited by the "timedistance" problem: An immutable factor in a 
ship's ability to arrive on scene is the distance it must travel and its maximum steaming 
speed. In this case, the presence of the helicopter carrier USS Bataan in the Gulf prior to 
Katrina proved extremely fortunate, for many of the ships had to steam from Norfolk, 
Virginia, and with the combined preparation and steaming time, arrived in the Gulf of 
Mexico on Saturday and Sunday. But preparations for the ships' deployment began shortly 
after landfall, even as the initial lack of damage assessments created an information 
vacuum. 
In accordance with standard practice for hurricanes, Second Fleet Commander Vice 
Admiral Mark Fitzgerald placed a group of three amP h ibious warfare ships in port in 
Norfolk, Virginia, on 24-hour alert for possible deployment. These three ships-the USS 
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Iwo Jima, USS Shreveport, and USS Tortuga - had been previously designated as the 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) to respond to contingencies on the East Coast or in the 
Atlantic The ESG has large deck vessels for landing helicopters, "well-decks" for 
retrieving amphibious landing craft, significant hangar and deck space for supplies, 
refueling capacity for helicopters already engaged, and facilities to provide showers, food, 
and water for both victims and response personnel. Vice Adm. Fitzgerald also contacted 
Coast Guard Vice Admiral Vivien Crea, on Tuesday morning, and "offered help" from the 
Navy. He credits this channel of coordination as essential to the events of the first week; he 
had difficulty communicating with Lt. Gen. Honoré and with NORTHCOM because of the 
initial focus on National Guard and Army land-based missions. Vice Adm. Crea confirmed 
that, "The Navy was very proactive in sending things down. We didn't have to ask them... 
They started diverting ships and aircraft that direction." 
Meanwhile, having been stationed in the Gulf of Mexico at the conclusion of a 
previously scheduled exercise held prior to Katrina, the USS Bataan followed Katrina, and 
by Tuesday morning was within 150 to 200 miles of New Orleans. Watching the news, the 
vessel's commanders began identifying ways to help. At 3 p.m. CT, the USS Bataan 
received orders from Second Fleet to send helicopters into New Orleans to conduct search 
and rescue missions in coordination with Coast Guard District Eight .The Navy and Marine 
Corps helicopters were in the air by 5 p.m., and reported to the Coast Guard Air Station 
Commander, who, as the designated On-Scene Commander, held responsibility for 
coordinating all air search-and-rescue assets. They were joined by two Navy SH-3 
helicopters from Pensacola who arrived unannounced at the Coast Guard station, offering 
their services. In all, USS Bataan's aircraft rescued, evacuated, or transported over 2,000 
persons. (Chapter 26-27) 
Fleet Forces Command and Second Fleet identified Rear Admiral Joseph Kilkenny, 
Commander of the USS Hary S Truman Carrier Strike Group, to represent the Navy on the 
proposed Joint Task Force Katrina under Lt. Gen. ono ore.'^^ The Task Force was formally 
established late Tuesday night; Rear Adm. Kilkenny flew to Naval Air Station Pensacola 
Wednesday morning,223 where he began coordinating the deployment of Navy helicopters 
to the region.224 Rear Adm. Kilkenny echoed Vice Adm. Fitzgerald's statement that Lt. 
Gen. Honoré was difficult to reach during the first few days, but that he was able to report 
back on his actions through Second Fleet;" Rear Adm. Kilkenny said that he knew Lt. Gen. 
Honoré's general intentions to focus on the immediate saving of lives through search and 
rescue, and could proceed by simply coordinating with Second Fleet.  
At 3 p.m. CT Tuesday, Fleet Forces Command had directed Second Fleet to launch the 
ESG. USS Iwo Jima, USS Shreveport, and USS Tortuga left Norfolk, Virginia on 
Wednesday, scheduled to arrive off the Louisiana coast on Sunday They carried a standard 
load of equipment called the Disaster Relief Kit. The kit included supplies such as 
bulldozers, medical supplies, water purification, and other equipment.228 Fleet Forces 
Command then deployed the aircrafi carrier USS Hary S Truman (without orders from 
NORTHCOM) in order to provide fuel and deck space for the rapidly increasing fleet of 
helicopters. The aircraft carrier departed Norfolk on Thursday. On Friday NORTHCOM 
submitted a Request For Forces to the Joint Staff asking that USS Truman be committed to 
the response, and USS Truman was tasked with supporting the Joint Task Force upon its 
amval off the coast of Biloxi, Mississippi, on Sunday, September 4. 
On Thursday, Vice Adm. Crea requested that Second Fleet assist with clearing channels 
in order to reopen shipping lanes into New Orleans and the Mississippi River, one of the 
nation's most critical commercial routes, as quickly as possible.23' USS Grapple deployed 
the same day, assisting with salvage operations in Pascagoula, Mississippi, on September 
6. The mine countermeasures ship USNS Altair deployed from Ingleside, Texas, on Friday, 
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September 2, and commenced port clearance operations on Saturday, September 3, arriving 
alongside the pier in New Orleans the same day.232 With the channel clear, the USS 
Tortuga was able to proceed up the river on Sunday, followed by the USS Iwo Jima on 
Monday, September 5. 
In addition to serving as Lt. Gen. Honoré's headquarters for the Joint Task Force in New 
Orleans, USS Iwo Jima provided showers, food, and rest for the first responders who had 
operated in the devastated city for a week. As the ship's captain described in an e-mail on 
September 6: 
We are one [of] the few full service airports in the area and have been operating 
aircraft… for almost 15 hours each day. We are also one of the only air conditioned 
facilities within a 10 mile radius and… we are also the only hot shower within miles. 
All day long we have been accommodating local policemen, firemen, state troopers, 
National Guard, 82nd Airborne division personnel with hot showers and hot food.  
Numerous other ships and forces deployed, including the High Speed Vessel USS Swift, 
to replenish USS Bataan with disaster relief supplies, three Logistics Support vessels, and 
four amphibious hover-landing craft to transport supplies into New Orleans. The hospital 
ship USNS Comfort, had begun its preparations on Sunday before landfall; because its 
specialized personnel and equipment require additional preparation time, it deployed from 
Baltimore, Maryland, on Friday, September 2, arriving in Pascagoula, Mississippi, on 
September 9. The Navy also deployed medium-lift and heavy-lift helicopters from 15 
squadrons throughout the country. In addition to those already operating from the USS 
Bataan, a total of 50 rotarywing aircraft deployed from Jacksonville, Norfolk, Corpus 
Christi, and San Diego with search and rescue, evacuation, and logistical operations. […] 
The heavy-lift H-53 aircraft assisted the levee repair operations, dropping sandbags into 
the breaches. (Chapter 26–26-29) 
 
L’armée de Terre : la détermination inventive du Général Honoré – le déclenchement 
d’un « exercice Katrina » pour tourner les impossibilités 
Lt. Gen. Honoré, based at Fort Gillem, Georgia, as Commanding General of First Army, 
planned to deploy to the Gulf Coast as soon as the storm had cleared. Although he had not 
been ordered to do so, he wanted to establish himself in the area to be positioned 
advantageously as the response progressed: "My thought was 'get there,' because the first 
rule of war is you've got to get there," he said. His authority as an Army commander 
permitted him to move from one military installation to another provided that such a 
movement could be considered training. Thus, he created an "Exercise Katrina," and in 
coordination with NORTHCOM and his superior officer at Army Forces Command, 
planned his move to Camp Shelby, an Army facility in South Mississippi. 
Lt. Gen. Honoré explained that it was not in his nature to wait for a Request for 
Assistance of deployment orders prior to moving: "That is a response, sometimes, by folks 
to say, 'Let's wait until they ask for something.' But in this case, we've got a case where we 
need to save life and limb. We can't wait for a [Request for Assistance] or shouldn't be 
waiting for one. If there's capability, we need to start moving." 
Lt. Gen. Honoré informed NORTHCOM and Adm. Keating of his plan to deploy to 
Camp Shelby on Monday but because Katrina continued to track northward from the Gulf 
Coast, he could not move until Tuesday morning. He arrived at 11 a.m. C T and surveyed 
the base and the surrounding region of Gulfport and Biloxi, which looked to him like they 
"had been hit by a nuclear weapon." Lt. Gen. Honoré had previously received 
NORTHCOM’s warning order to "be prepared to establish [Joint Task Force] Katrina 
covering the states of LA, MS, AL, FL, KY, TN, and GA for command and control of 
consequence management operations resulting from the severe weather caused by 
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Hurricane Katrina . "(A Warning Order instructs a commander to take all necessary 
preparations so as to be able to react immediately to a likely forthcoming Deployment 
Order or Execute Order). The Execute Order, which officially converted his training 
mission into an operational mission, arrived at 4 p.m. C T. Lt. Gen. Honoré assumed 
control over all active-duty forces then and subsequently involved in the response within 
the above states, now designated as the Joint Operating Area; he would report to 
NORTHCOM. (Chapter 26–29) 
 
Des problèmes de coordination : l’intervention des Marines, comme OVNI 
Il est toujours difficile de trouver le bon ajustement entre une belle coordination venant 
après la bataille, et un empressement justifié mais qui peut rester en dehors des cadres qui se 
mettent en place.  
Evidence and testimony received by the Committee suggest that the Marine 
deployments were not fully coordinated within DOD, and that NORTHCOM was not hlly 
aware of Marine Corps efforts in the Gulf. Lt. Gen. Amos e-mailed Lt. Gen. Honor6 on 
Thursday morning, writing that he was sending helicopters and engineering equipment. 
"What can I do for you?" he asked. Lt. Gen. Honoré responded, "HELLO BROTHER GET 
HERE AS FAST AS YOU CAN." Friday morning, when Lt. Gen. Amos told Lt. Gen. 
Honor6 of his intentions to send a commandand-control suite to New Orleans, Lt. Gen. 
HonorC replied: "[it's] hitting fan get here fast as you can." That day Lt. Gen. Amos flew 
five aircraft to Belle Chasse carrying 150 Marines – the majority of the battalion's 
command element - along with a mobile communications suite, capable of establishing a 
command-and-control headquarters anywhere in the An email to Maj. Gen. Rowe of 
NORTHCOM from one of his planners shows that the Marines' preparatory movements 
were not coordinated with NORTHCOM: "They do not have orders to move out yet but 
they are inside our [Joint Operating Area] w/out [Joint Task Force Katrina] or 
[NORTHCOM visibility]." (Chapter 26–34) 
 
Des liens plus souples qu’il faut savoir reconnaître 
L’important est moins la coordination « totale » que la capacité globale du système. Tout 
ne peut pas être vissé comme une pièce d’horlogerie, l’obsession d’ordre absolu aurait 
rapidement raison de l’intelligence de l’action.  
[…] the deployment order appears to have been given in the spirit of Gen. Myers's 
guidance encouraging the services to pre-position assets to enable their rapid employment 
when requested by FEMA. However, the deployment does not appear to have been fully 
coordinated within DOD. In particular, unlike all other troop deployments into the area 
under NORTHCOM's command, there had been no corresponding request for forces from 
NORTHCOM. Maj. Gen. Rowe stated that although he knew Lt. Gen. Amos and Lt. Gen. 
Honoré were communicating, he was unaware of the specific exchanges leading up to the 
order: "[Tlhat's one part of the help that I will have to give you that we did not ask for. 
However, I am aware that General Amos and General Honoré corresponded. General 
Honoré shared that with me, that General Honoré at that point said the help would be 
appreciated." Furthermore, this urgent need for the deployment of Marine troops does not 
appear to have been fully communicated to other DOD officials considering whether there 
was a need to deploy active duty troops. (Chapter 26–34) 
 
Une posture très proactive 
The next day, Saturday, September 3, the President issued a broad order for the 
deployment of active-duty ground troops. Because Lt. Gen. Amos had anticipated the 
deployment for several days, with his Marines "sitting on their packs," they were "ready to 
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go… I was determined that when we got the Execute Order, we were going to darken the 
skies with C-130s and get them down there as quickly as we can." Over the next 28 hours, 
aircraft ferried 1,250 troops, now reporting to Maj. Gen. O’Dell, who had been appointed 
as Marine Component Commander for the Joint Task Force, reporting directly to Lt. Gen. 
Honoré. 
Maj. Gen. O'Dell confirmed that the Friday order from Marine Forces Atlantic was 
subsumed by the President's order on Saturday: "Prior to the President's order, for 
planning, I knew that we would have elements of my division as I've described and 24 
MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] from Camp Lejeune… available." Most significantly, 
he added that the only thing that the President's order changed about the Marines' plans 
was that an element from the West Coast joined the 24 MEU. (Chapter 26–34-35) 
 
Se préparer à des bouleversements dans les rôles 
Soudain, la FEMA demande au DOD, non pas de venir en appui, mais de prendre tout 
simplement son rôle.  
After speaking with Buikema [Regional Director, FEMA] on Thursday morning, Burris 
[Director of Operations, FEMA] called Col. Chavez in the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Burris told Col. Chavez that "The FEMA 
logistics capability has been overwhelmed," and that he "wants DOD to take over logistics 
operations in Louisiana and Mississippi." Chavez viewed this request as extraordinary 
because it appeared FEMA was asking DOD to take over its job. Col. Chavez says he 
asked Burris, "is this really what you want us to do, take over the function? He indicated 
that that is indeed what they wanted to do." Col. Chavez told Burris that the request "would 
require a Secretary DHS to Secretary DOD call to initiate and significant General Counsel 
input." 
The NRP stipulates that DOD is a supporting agency to all 15 ESFs [Emergency 
Support Functions]. Thus, they are on notice that they may be called upon to assist civilian 
authorities in a variety of ways. However, in this instance, the civilian agency - FEMA - 
was asking DOD to take over a role it had not traditionally played in disaster response, and 
which is not listed as one of DOD's support functions in any of the listed ESFs. Thus, Col. 
Chavez's surprise is understandable. After conferring with Col. Chavez, Burris modified 
his request to state that FEMA wanted DOD to "provide the support and planning and 
execution of the full logistical support to the Katrina disaster in all declared states in 
coordination with FEMA. (Chapter 26–39) 
 
Ou, à tout le moins, à des ajustements un peu chaotiques 
In the words of Assistant Secretary McHale, it "may well have been the single most 
complex civil support mission in the history of the U.S. military."  Ultimately, for reasons 
discussed below, DOD did not take over all logistics operations from FEMA, although 
they did provide significant assistance. DOD plans to or has sought reimbursement from 
FEMA for only $118 million of the $1 billion dollars obligated under this mission 
assignment. 
The Secretary of Defense approved the request orally on Friday, September 2, and 
Assistant Secretary McHale notified Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Michael 
Jackson of the approval on Friday in an e-mail.  
On Saturday, September 3, the paperwork was approved, and DOD issued its order 
directing the commander of NORTHCOM, Adm. Keating, to "plan and develop a concept 
of operations to execute logistical support operations in affected states of Louisiana and 
Mississippi”.  
On Friday, September 2, before the mission assignment was officially approved, 
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NORTHCOM's planning staff began gathering information in "excruciating detail" about 
what orders FEMA had already placed with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), "how 
many trucks are lined up, how many trucks have left, how many trucks have been loaded." 
They started calling the operational staging areas and collecting detailed information from 
the FEMA representatives on the ground there. (Chapter 26–40) 
 
Et l’on découvre que le partenaire central n’a pas du tout les compétences attendues 
They learned that, unlike DOD, FEMA did not have "detailed supply accountability and 
the intransit visibility of assets." There was no tracking methodology, and no one within 
FEMA "owned" the complete commodities-movement process. They also learned that the 
DLA was sourcing the MREs from only two facilities where loading was additionally 
constrained by space limitations and material handling equipment. (Chapter 26–40) 
Katrina demonstrated that DOD has well-developed expertise in logistics management, 
but there is no reason that FEMA could not develop a similar level of proficiency. (Chapter 
26–42) 
 
Avant, finalement, de se voir assigner une liste impressionnante de missions 
Given the level of devastation on the Gulf Coast, it was clear to Assistant Secretary 
McHale that "a much greater level of DOD activity was going to be required."374 On the 
morning of Saturday, September 3, shortly before the President announced his decision to 
deploy 7,200 active duty troops to Louisiana, Assistant Secretary McHale and Deputy 
Secretary Jackson met at the White House. […] 
Deputy Secretary Jackson and Assistant Secretary McHale met later that day with 
Deputy Secretary England at the Pentagon to begin "aggregating and classifying and 
categorizing what types of mission assignment activities we thought were needed by DOD. 
Assistant Secretary McHale reported that they then "drew up a list of approximately 10 
mission areas" in which DOD help had not yet been, but was likely to be, requested. The 
intent, according to Deputy Secretary Jackson, was to formulate "what are we trying to 
accomplish, what do we need to get done, how are we going to do it?" On Saturday, 
September 3, and the following day, DOD and DHS officials "at very senior levels" drafted 
a group of new DOD mission assignments: 
• conduct search and rescue operations, 
• perform security capabilities assessment and provide security capabilities advice 
and technical assistance, 
• collect and evacuate live persons to temporary processing centers, 
• collect and remove bodies of deceased persons, 
• restore flood control systems, 
• transport and distribute ice, water, food and medical supplies,38' 
• disease prevention and control, 
• planning for the quarantine of areas within New Orleans, 
• quartering and sustaining of FEMA headquarters support element and relief 
workers, 
• health and medical support, 
• debris removal, 
• restoration of basic utilities and key transportation routes (land and water), 
• geospatial surveillance products and evaluations, 
• logistical support at key air and sea distribution nodes, 
• temporary housing, and long range communications between headquarters nodes 
and firefighting. (Chapter 26–42) 
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Mais, en réalité, beaucoup de dispositions avaient été prises et engagées 
préalablement 
Our investigation has shown that DOD was moving assets in many respects before they 
were either requested by FEMA or approved by the Secretary of Defense. The record 
indicates that DOD logisticians were gathering information and developing a plan to 
execute the logistics mission assignment on Friday, September 2, prior to its oral approval 
by the Secretary of Defense later that same day, and prior to its formal approval on 
Saturday, September 3. In addition, DOD was already involved in search and rescue 
operations, evacuation operations, health and medical support, geospatial surveillance, and 
logistical support at key air and sea transportation restoring flood control systems;" and 
transporting commodities. (Chapter 26-43-44) 
 
La question du retard dans l’intervention de l’Armée 
In the afternoon of Monday, August 29, several hours after Katrina's landfall, Governor 
Blanco telephoned President Bush. "We need your help," the Governor told the President. 
"We need everything you've got." Based on their conversation, the Governor believed the 
President had "every intention to send all of the resources and assistance within the power 
of the federal government." Yet although over the next several days Governor Blanco 
made at least two more personal pleas to the President, by phone and in person aboard Air 
Force One, asking for a total of 40,000 federal troops, it was not until Saturday, September 
3, five full days after landfall, that the President ordered 7,200 Army and Marine ground 
forces to Louisiana. 
One of the key questions about the response to Katrina is, "Why did it take so long for 
the President to respond to the Governor's requests for federal troops ?”. (Chapter 26-46) 
 
Les limites de l’enquête, en raison de l’opacité de la Maison Blanche et des ordres de 
silence envers la Commission 
Unfortunately, much of the story of the President's decisions remains opaque. The 
White House refused to permit the Committee to interview White House personnel about 
the President's decision or the actions of the White House staff. DOD instructed its 
personnel not to discuss communications with the White House. Because the Committee 
has been unable to develop a complete and accurate record regarding these decisions, it is 
unable to make any findings regarding the President's decision to order deployment of 
federal active-duty troops on Saturday, September 3, including the reasons why the 
President did not order that deployment sooner.  (Chapter 26-46) 
 
Entre complexité et confusion 
Nevertheless, the Committee has extensively interviewed Louisiana, DOD, and National 
Guard officials about their own decisions and actions. From their recollections, the 
Committee has been able to assemble a picture of a rapid but uncoordinated military 
response to the various requests for assistance. 
Two more specific findings also have emerged. First, the large numbers of National 
Guard troops deploying into Louisiana was a major factor in DOD's decision not to deploy 
additional active-duty troops into Louisiana prior to the President's deployment order. 
Second, the difference in opinion between state and federal officials about whether 
more active duty military ground troops should have been deployed sooner appears to 
stem, in part, from the lack of coordination in the formulation and consideration of the 
various state and federal requests for military support. Requests for military troops were 
made to the EMAC [Emergency Management Assistance Compact, accord régional 
d’assistance mutuelle] and the National Guard Bureau within DOD. Requests for military 
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troops also were made directly to the President, White House officials, and the commander 
of the military forces in Louisiana, Lt. Gen. Honoré. Other requests for military assistance 
were made through FEMA according to the process set forth in the NRP for requesting 
DOD support. Many of the state and federal requests for military support lacked adequate 
specificity as to the missions to be performed or the capabilities being requested. The 
responses to the requests for military support often were poorly coordinated with each 
other. One result from this lack of specificity and coordination at all levels was that local, 
state, and federal officials had differing perceptions of the numbers of federal troops that 
would be arriving, the missions they would be performing, who was in command of the 
military forces, and who should be in command of those forces.  (Chapter 26–46-47) 
 
Le changement d’échelle, qui dépasse les dispositifs prévus 
In Katrina, the EMAC [Emergency Management Assistance Compact, accord régional 
d’assistance mutuelle] process proved neither suitable nor capable to handle the type of 
largescale deployments of military troops that were needed in the Gulf region. The EMAC 
was never intended or designed to coordinate large military troop deployments. As a result, 
both Louisiana and Mississippi turned to the National Guard Bureau to "expedite" the 
deployment of National Guard troops from other states. (Chapter 26-49) 
 
Confusion toujours,  même si l’on passe par le sommet, à n têtes 
[…] the transmission of the state's request for resources directly to the White House 
does not appear to have expedited the response to the state, at least with respect to federal 
military resources. White House officials did not understand what the Governor was 
requesting. There also appears to have been poor coordination between the White House 
and FEMA. Even after the Governor clarified the nature of her request directly with the 
President - that she wanted federal troops but not "federalization" -Brown continued to 
advocate to the White House that the response be "federalized." Additionally, Brown does 
not appear to have consulted with DOD regarding the need for federalization, either prior 
to or after advocating that position to the White House. (Chapter 26-56) 
 
La rupture de langage traduit une rupture de système de référence : Babel 
Le problème n’est pas de mieux définir le vocabulaire, comme on le dit habituellement –
 comme ici le concept de « fédéralisation » des secours. Si les mots implosent c’est que la 
situation n’est plus compréhensible pour les intervenants. Les discussions sur la notion de 
fédéralisation ne font que traduire une désarticulation par la crise.  
At about the same time that the Governor informs the President that she did not want 
federalization, senior FEMA officials began discussing it. Lokey recalled a conversation 
with Brown: 
I remember going to Michael Brown and saying, this is beyond me, this is beyond 
FEMA, this is beyond the state. We need to, and I used the term, we need to federalize 
this or get a massive military invasion in here to get some help. And Mike said, "I'll 
talk to headquarters. I'll talk to DHS about that and I'll talk to the attorneys." 
Lokey said to the Committee staff he did not understand what he meant when he used 
the term "federalization": 
I don't exactly know what I meant. What I meant was that -what I was talking about 
was turning this over to somebody that can manage something this size. I've never 
done something like this. I was trying my best. I wasn't doing very good at it. So that 
was just a term I used.  
Brown stated that he recommended the entire response be "federalized," meaning that 
the President invoke the Insurrection Act and place the National Guard under the control of 
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the active duty forces: 
Because at that time, we're looking at these stories of shootings and looting and 
everything else going on, and I'm fearful that's spiraling out of control, and I want 
active-duty troops that are ready, willing and able to kill in that area, because we 
can't do search and rescue with that kind of stuff going on.  
According to Lokey, "within an hour" of his conversation with Brown about 
federalization, 
Governor Blanco requested to see him. "What's this about you taking over my disaster?" 
she asked Governor Blanco later explained that she objected to federalization because it 
could have subjected the state's National Guard troops to the Posse Comitatus Act 
prohibition against federal troops conducting law enforcement activities.505 "I did not 
want the Guard federalized," Governor Blanco testified. "It's very important for a governor 
to be able to retain control of the National Guard precisely for its law enforcement 
capabilities."506 Louisiana officials also believed there was no need to federalize the 
Guard. "[L]et me remind you the state is still sovereign," a member of the Governor's staff 
told Lokey and Brown. "We can handle it," Maj. Gen. Landreneau added.  "Fine, good," 
Brown said. (Chapter 26–57-59) 
 
Quand la réalité a de la difficulté à se faire entendre au milieu du fracas de la bataille 
institutionnelle 
President Bush arrived aboard Air Force One at the New Orleans Louis Armstrong 
Airport late Friday morning. Mayor Nagin, FEMA Director Brown, Lt. Gen. Blum, White 
House Chief of Staff Card, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Hagin, Louisiana Senators 
Landrieu and Vitter, and several Louisiana congressmen were present for an initial meeting 
with the President and Governor Blanco. After the initial meeting, President Bush and 
Governor Blanco met privately. 
During the initial meeting aboard Air Force One, Mayor Nagin recommended that Lt. 
Gen. Honoré be placed in charge. Mayor Nagin testified: 
I probably was a bit pushy at that meeting, because in the midst of all the rhetoric that 
was going on around the table, I stopped everyone and basically said, "Mr. President, 
Madame Governor, if the two of you don't get together on this issue, more people are 
going to die in this city, and you need to resolve this immediately." And they said yes. And 
I said, "Well, everybody else in this room, let's leave and let them work this out right now”. 
(Chapter 26-64) 
 
Grandes questions 
 
1°) La place de la Défense dans les crises civiles 
The Department's contributions to the Katrina response flow directly fiom its 
professional, sustained emphasis on education, training, retention, and rigorous adherence 
to standards, coupled with a budget and resources unparalleled across the government. 
Military culture also played a role, as many officials reported to the Committee that their 
efforts in response to Katrina were the most rewarding and satisfying missions of their 
often extensive careers. Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Ellis of the Ohio National Guard 
commanded a battalion that deployed to the Superdome during the first week, and 
reported:  
Like all commanders, my soldiers were there about seven days before they had their 
first shower. They never once complained, while they were there, and to see the 
professionalism and the dedication that those young soldiers displayed throughout 
that difficult time makes me immensely proud to have been a part of that. 
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However, as with all agencies and all levels of government, Katrina exposed 
weaknesses of, and raised questions about, the military's mechanisms for responding to 
disasters. Given DOD's unmatched power and size, and its unique Constitutional status, 
these questions merit careful consideration. 
To what extent should the nation rely upon the Department of Defense in disaster 
response? Department of Homeland Security was created, in part, to respond to domestic 
emergencies, but Katrina revealed that in critical missions, particularly in logistics, search 
and rescue, and command and control, it was unprepared to address a catastrophe of 
Katrina's magnitude. At the same time, Department of Defense, since September 11,2001, 
and since establishing U.S. 
Northern Command, has revised its mission to reflect a greater focus on homeland 
defense. Its capabilities in this arena have therefore grown more robust. But Assistant 
Secretary McHale cautioned against placing too much reliance upon the military's 
capabilities:  
I would urge you to think simultaneously about speed and the fundamental public 
policy missions, public policy questions associated with the role of the military 
within domestic American society and constitutional government.. . We have to 
balance not only what the  military is capable of doing, questions of speed and 
resources, but what the military ought to be doing consistent with the historically 
constrained role of the military within domestic American society. 
Is it wiser to further develop these capabilities in DHS? If DOD’s resources were 
already engaged in an overseas mission, military support might not be available to the 
extent that it was during Katrina. In that case, a more capable DHS would be preferable, 
especially since many of the missions DOD performed were not uniquely military. DHS 
could adopt military models of logistics, training, career development, and centralized 
incident management to improve its ability to function independently. (Chapter 26–69-70) 
 
2°) Le bon équilibre entre initiative et coordination 
At the same time, when military assistance is required, to what degree should we rely on 
a system in which specific assets are requested? After action reviews stressed, just as they 
had following Hurricane Andrew, that DOD must not wait for requests to push assets 
forward. But Katrina revealed a tension between a system of planned, coordinated 
movement, and the value of commanders' initiative in moving in advance of orders. 
Initiative, in this case, proved essential to the swift deployment of resources, but it also 
contributed to an uncoordinated response, in which strategic commanders lacked clear 
visibility over the force structure. (Chapter 26–70) 
 
3°) La tension entre niveaux institutionnels 
Katrina also revealed tension between gubernatorial and Presidential executive powers, 
underlying a delicate federalist balance: should governors retain full control of their 
National Guard forces after catastrophic events? The governors of the two most seriously 
affected states here answered "yes" unequivocally. Yet at the height of the crisis, the 
President and senior military and civilian DOD leaders grew concerned that the scale of the 
military response – both the size of the National Guard force and the addition of federal 
active-duty ground troops - required a single commander. Governor Blanco's rejection of 
their proposed solution, however, has led DOD officials to realize that unity of command, 
long a staple of military operations, can also prove inconsistent with states' Constitutional 
powers.  
The final resolution was to achieve unity of effort through the close coordination of 
federal and stated-controlled military forces. But as has been widely documented, 
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numerous factors challenged this coordination. While the Committee has not determined 
that a lack of coordination impaired the effectiveness of the military response to Katrina, 
many leaders agree that we must establish mechanisms now to ensure unity of effort 
between the Guard and active duty forces the next time they are called for such a common 
cause. Only through forethought, planning, and consensus among the agencies and levels 
of government can we ensure that we do not encounter a political or leadership crisis in a 
catastrophe that may be even more destructive, and provide less warning, than Katrina. 
(Chapter 26–70) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 149 
Chapitre 19 
 
LA PLANIFICATION NATIONALE D’URGENCE : UN PARAVENT ?  
 
 
Katrina, comme d’ailleurs les exercice TOPOF, a été un révélateur de problèmes majeurs :  
• L’idée de planification est immanquablement traduite dans les faits par la confection de 
plans-papier volumineux ;  
• Il ne peut y avoir compétence sans entraînement, mais il n’y a pas d’entraînement ; et 
pas de capacités en place pour espérer quelque entraînement à la hauteur des enjeux ;  
• Comme, à l’évidence, le système n’est pas au point, on réclame des plans encore plus 
détaillés, « de façon à ce que chacun sache bien ce qu’il a à faire » ;  
• On sent bien qu’il faudrait d’autres paradigmes, et d’autres outils sont promis, mais ils 
ne sortent jamais des chaînes de montage bureaucratiques et du labyrinthe des 
approbations en tout genre, sauf dans les quelques semaines après des fiascos majeurs 
où l’on peut entériner ce qui était déjà dans les tuyaux, jusqu’au prochain fiasco ;  
• Stupéfaction : à la première épreuve on s’aperçoit que les dirigeants n’ont en fait pas la 
moindre idée de ce qu’il y a dans les plans de leur propre entité – fût-elle en charge de 
la sécurité nationale.  
La leçon fondamentale est claire : c’est le domaine en lui-même, non la question des plans, 
qui pose problème. Aussi longtemps que ces univers de la discontinuité dans lesquels 
plongent les crises majeures sont tenus pour hors champ de connaissance, de responsabilité, 
de sérieux managérial, il est dérisoire de disserter plus longtemps sur les formes d’un plan.  
 
Le Plan, ou la fascination pour une improbable mise en tuyau  
The NRP was publicly issued with fanfare in January 2005. Tom Ridge, then DHS 
Secretary, said, “America is better prepared today, thanks to the National Response Plan.” 
He contrasted the NRP with other plans and reports routinely issued in Washington: 
“Instead of promising results in the future, it is a deliverable that we believe will bring 
definite results now.” 
The NRP, however, was not a self-executing document. It is a complex, ambitious, 400-
plus page high-level plan that was described in a document produced to the Committee by 
the Office of the Vice President, not inaccurately, as “a very detailed, acronym-heavy 
document that is not easily accessible to the first-time user.” (Chapter 27–1-2) 
 
Pas d’entraînement  
Without a systematic training and implementation effort, the NRP was unlikely to be 
widely or readily understood, and unlikely to offer effective guidance, just four months 
after its implementation, for the massive federal, state, and local response necessary for 
Katrina.  
DHS’s implementation effort appears to have been entirely inadequate. After the NRP 
was issued, DHS conducted a wave of training for headquarters staff of component 
agencies. Beyond that, it appears no one at DHS was charged with ensuring that the NRP 
would be well implemented. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
Integration Center is responsible for federal, state, and local NRP awareness training as an 
adjunct to its primary mission of fostering the widespread adoption of the NIMS, a 
nationwide approach for different jurisdictions and levels of government to work together 
in domestic incidents, but its staffing (fewer than 10 people) inherently limited its impact. 
The Integration Center relies largely on self-administered online training, in which sessions 
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could last as little as 15-20 minutes. 
Only one large-scale exercise of the NRP took place before Katrina, the DHS Top 
Officials 3 exercise (TOPOFF 3) in April 2005, at about the time the NRP was to take full 
effect and supersede other plans. TOPOFF 3, sponsored by DHS, involved responders 
from all levels of government. A report by the DHS Inspector General in November 2005 
found that “the exercise highlighted – at all levels of government – a fundamental lack of 
understanding for the principles and protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS.” It appears 
that little was done to correct this shortcoming, and that widespread unfamiliarity with the 
NRP persisted. 
In addition, the absence of any other exercises of the NRP meant that there were not 
further formal opportunities to understand and flesh out the roles allocated by the Plan, to 
clarify ambiguities, to identify potential problems, and to incorporate lessons recognized 
back into the Plan making them lessons learned. DHS’s lack of substantial and sustained 
effort to familiarize officials and responders with the NRP and to exercise the NRP under 
simulated  conditions meant, as one expert testified, that “the NRP was only a plan – it 
was not a functioning, practiced,operable, system.” (Chapter 27–2) 
 
La fausse solution miracle : pour contrer les béances, toujours plus de détails 
Detailed, more specific planning is likely to be particularly important in responding to 
catastrophes. Comptroller General Walker has stressed the crucial need for strong planning 
for catastrophic events, and recommended that the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident 
Annex – the portion of the NRP that provides for a proactive, national response to a 
catastrophe – “should be supported and supplemented by more detailed and robust 
operational implementation plans.” (Chapter 27–5) 
 
Autres crises, autres paradigmes 
As Thad Allen noted, the NRP as written “doesn’t contemplate” an event on the 
massive scale of Katrina. “[W]hen it goes off the scale, you know, you need a separate plan 
for how to deal with something that massive. In this case, there were some things that were 
unique to this event that can only be handled by an almost different approach to what 
you’re doing.” 
The NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex and its associated but still-to-be-released 
Catastrophic Incident Supplement were intended to provide this separate plan for a 
catastrophe, but, incomplete and largely untested, they went unused. The Catastrophic 
Incident Annex sets out the broad principles of a proactive response; the Catastrophic 
Incident Supplement was supposed to fill in significant, operational details. Unfortunately, 
when Katrina hit, nearly nine months after the NRP had been announced, the Supplement 
still had not been issued. (Chapter 27-5) 
 
Réticences multiples, problèmes fondamentaux non identifiés 
The NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex and its associated but still-to-be-released 
Catastrophic Incident Supplement were intended to provide this separate plan for a 
catastrophe, but, incomplete and largely untested, they went unused. The Catastrophic 
Incident Annex sets out the broad principles of a proactive response; the Catastrophic 
Incident Supplement was supposed to fill in significant, operational details.48 
Unfortunately, when Katrina hit, nearly nine months after the NRP had been announced, 
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the Supplement still had not been issued.   
According to David Garratt, Acting Director of FEMA’s Recovery Division, who had 
chaired the interagency Catastrophic Incident Planning Group that was charged with 
developing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, the Supplement had been 99 percent 
completed by late 2004, roughly the same time the NRP itself was finished. Garratt 
explained that when it came time to get the concurrence of the relevant federal agencies to 
the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, all the agencies approved with the exception of the 
Department of Defense (DOD). DOD had concerns about a Memorandum of Agreement 
related to the National Disaster Medical System and, in particular, provisions related to 
reimbursement for certain medical care in a public health emergency. The Memorandum of 
Agreement (to which DOD, FEMA, the Department of Health and Human Services, and 
the Department of Veterans Affairs were each parties) went unresolved and unsigned until 
approximately September 6, 2005 – eight days after Katrina made landfall and apparently 
only after the White House’s Homeland Security Council got involved. The Supplement, 
meanwhile, has never been issued. 
The delay in issuing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement – and developing the agency 
plans and procedures that were required to support it – deprived the federal government of 
a potential tool in its response to Hurricane Katrina. The heart of the Supplement is an 
Execution Schedule that provides an agency-by-agency (and hour-by-hour) list of the 
assets various federal agencies are to deploy automatically to the affected area once the 
Secretary of Homeland Security orders implementation. Had it been issued and high-
priority resources pre-identified and ready to deploy, the Catastrophic Incident 
Supplement might have sped delivery of supplies and personnel to mobilization centers 
close to the disaster or, in certain circumstances, directly to the incident scene without a 
need for requests from state and local authorities or from any other federal agency. 
Even if the Supplement had been implemented, however, it is not clear that it would 
have bee adequate to the task at hand. The Execution Schedule is essentially a method of 
pre-prioritizing a certain set of assets – an important and potentially very useful function, 
but not by itself likely to constitute a sufficient response to an event of catastrophic 
magnitude. Garratt, chair of the Catastrophic Incident Planning Group, characterized the 
Supplement as “basically just an acceleration model for resources that are already identified 
under the NRP.” Indeed, the fact that the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, while 
complete, has not yet been issued, apparently reflects questions about whether it needs 
further modification. To be truly effective, the Supplement would need to move beyond its 
important but narrowly focused Execution Schedule, and incorporate more robust, 
catastrophe-focused planning. (Chapter 27–5-6) 
 
La planification, un exercice purement esthétique, disjoint de la décision ? 
When the President issued an emergency declaration in the days before landfall, it should 
have been apparent that Katrina had significant potential to cause a “catastrophe” as 
defined by the NRP-CIA. After landfall, it should have been immediately apparent that the 
catastrophe had occurred. Indeed, Secretary Chertoff would eventually describe Katrina as 
an “ultra catastrophe.” But the NRP-CIA was never activated. We do not know for certain 
whether DHS leaders ever considered activating the NRP-CIA, although both Secretary 
Chertoff’s Chief of Staff Wood, and Garratt, a FEMA employee who headed the 
Catastrophic Incident Planning Group, were unaware of any discussions concerning the 
NRP-CIA in the days before Katrina made landfall. 
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In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, DHS and other federal officials have suggested 
that it was not appropriate to invoke the NRP-CIA to respond to the hurricane because the 
NRP-CIA was intended only for “no-notice” events – for which there is no time to go 
through normal procedures – whereas there was notice that Katrina was heading toward the 
Gulf Coast. The Catastrophic Incident Annex itself, however, does not contain any 
language that would limit it to no-notice events. The yet-to-be-issued Catastrophic Incident 
Supplement was somewhat more explicit, stating that it is intended to apply to “no-notice” 
or “short-notice” events. These terms are left undefined in the Supplement. While DHS 
officials contend that Hurricane Katrina was not a nonotice or a short-notice event, a 
contrary view is just as plausible. Specifically, it could be argued that a massive hurricane 
hurtling towards a major American city with two or three days’ notice meets some 
common-sense definition of a short notice event. 
Indeed, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement’s Execution Schedule makes specific 
reference to hurricanes, events for which there is typically some notice, suggesting further 
that these documents would apply to an event such as Katrina.86 Nonetheless, federal 
officials have argued that Katrina provided too much notice to qualify as a “short-notice” 
event.87 The basis for this argument is respect for the states – with prior notice the normal 
NRP process of consultation with the states about their needs should apply. There are, of 
course, countervailing considerations: some known events can still be so overwhelming and 
urgent that the NRP-CIA may be the  appropriate tool. If it were deliberate policy to 
exclude an event such as Katrina from the purview of the Catastrophic Incident Annex, 
there may be a significant flaw in the policy underlying the NRP-CIA and the Catastrophic 
Supplement. As Comptroller General David Walker testified, “the idea that we would be 
less proactive in dealing with a known natural disaster [than with a nonotice event] just 
defies common sense.” (Chapter 27–9-10 ) 
 
Incompréhention-résistance générale 
In a Quick Look Report on TOPOFF 3, issued in May 2005, DHS recognized that the 
exercise had revealed a fundamental lack of understanding of unified command. The Report 
noted that “confusion at all levels regarding identification and clarification of roles and 
levels of responsibilities.” In November 2005, the DHS’s Inspector General found that 
while “overall, objectives were addressed and met,” the TOPOFF 3 exercise demonstrated 
“at all levels of government – a fundamental lack of understanding for the principles and 
protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS.” The Inspector General highlighted “confusion 
over the different roles and responsibilities performed by the Principal Federal Official 
(PFO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO),” an issue that also plagued the Katrina 
response. (Chapter 27-12) 
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Chapitre 20 
 
FRAUDES ET GASPILLAGES 
 
 
 
La Commission dénonce un certain nombre de points qui, bien évidemment, doivent 
émouvoir si l’on veille sur la bonne utilisation de l’argent du contribuable. Mais il ne suffit pas 
de déplorer un manque de rigueur financière. Lorsque le système est aussi peu compétent sur 
tous les tableaux, on imagine mal que le point financier puisse apparaître mieux traité que les 
autres. On peut tomber ici des deux côtés opposés : soit un laxisme total, soit une rigueur 
paralysante.  
Il faut certainement prendre garde, en effet, à ne pas verser dans une réponse qui 
consisterait à simplement rigidifier les procédures : les victimes seraient livrées en biens de 
nécessité vitale avec des semaines de retard, en maisons de secours au bout de trois ans, etc. Il 
faut probablement : savoir qu’il y aura fraude et gaspillage, vu la situation chaotique ; et mettre 
en place des dispositifs ex-post de contrôle, mais sans s’interdire d’agir.  
Il faut sans doute aussi cerner ce qui appelle d’autres logiques de fonctionnement.  
Notamment, le système (fédéral en l’espèce) peut fort bien ne pas être en mesure d’entrer 
dans les espaces bouleversés et les temps écrasés de l’après-désastre. Il s’agit alors d’inventer 
de nouvelles voies d’action. En d’autres termes, en matière financière aussi, il faut faire preuve 
d’inventivité dans le pilotage, et pas seulement d’intransigeance en renforçant les règles 
habituelles. Ou d’impuissance pendant, de dénonciations flamboyantes le temps d’un rapport 
ou d’un discours médiatique, et de classement dans l’oubli convenu après quelques temps.  
 
Paiements dans la confusion 
GAO [Government Accountability Office] outlined several other examples of fraud, 
abuse, or poor management, including the following: 
• FEMA made expedited-assistance payments to tens of thousands of individuals 
whose registrations contained false or duplicative information, including Social 
Security numbers that had never been issued, or had been issued to another 
individual, or to an individual since deceased. It is important to note that not all 
duplicate information was submitted fraudulently. GAO is continuing to 
investigate both payments resulting from individuals intentionally trying to 
defraud the government and those resulting from errors in FEMA’s system or 
registration process. 
• GAO found thousands of Social Security numbers that were used on more than 
one registration associated with the same disaster. A Social Security number is a 
unique number assigned to an individual. Because individuals are eligible to receive 
disaster relief only on their primary residence, the same Social Security Number 
should not be used more than once to receive assistance for the same disaster. 
• GAO found that $10 million in duplicate payments were made when 5,000 
registrants received both a debit card and a check worth. (Chapter 28-3) 
 
Gaspillages et attitudes peu responsables 
Pour l’hébergement en urgence, les coûts d’hôtels ont dépassé les limites, et la commission 
dénonce un manque de contrôle. On ne voit pas cependant qu’il aurait fallu attendre la venue 
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d’un contrôleur fédéral pour ouvrir une chambre d’hôtel. Cela n’empêche pas un contrôle ex-
post.  
As evacuees were moved out of shelters, FEMA instructed hotels across the country to 
allow anyone with a driver’s license from the affected areas to check in and then send 
FEMA the bill. There were virtually no controls in place. The DHS IG found hotels 
charging for empty rooms, individuals holding multiple rooms, hotel rooms being used as 
storage units for personal goods, individuals staying at resorts, and hotels charging rates 
above even the “rack rate” (the maximum or full price the hotel will charge for the room) – 
at times costing taxpayers up to $400 per night. 
The DHS IG indicated that his investigators had seen more waste in contracts than 
actual fraud at that point, but attributed this partly to the fact that FEMA was in the very 
early stages of the major contracting activity. . (Chapter 28-3) 
 
L’archétype du gaspillage : l’odyssée de la glace  
In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, some of the commodities most in demand 
included water, food, and ice. The trouble FEMA had delivering commodities is discussed 
elsewhere. In the case of ice, plenty of movement occurred – but not always to places one 
would expect.  
FEMA ordered 182 million pounds of ice to respond to Hurricane Katrina. After a 
typical hurricane, evacuees soon return to their homes, but often those homes are without 
power for some period of time. Ice helps keep food and medicine cold until power is 
restored. After Katrina, however, hundreds of thousands of evacuees were sent to shelters 
across the country and did not return home for days and weeks after the storm. Thus, the 
need for ice was much lower in some areas than anticipated.16 While there was a severe 
shortage of ice in some affected areas, and many hurricane victims who remained in the area 
did not have access to ice, in the end FEMA had excess ice and used less than 50 percent of 
what it had ordered. 
Some of the ice ended up in Portland, Maine – 1,600 miles from the disaster area. The 
cost of handling and storing the 200-plus truckloads of ice that went to Portland was 
approximately $275,000. More ice went to other distant locations around the country 
because FEMA decided it made more sense to move the ice to cold-storage facilities for use 
in new disasters than to let it melt. It is not clear that this was the most cost-effective 
choice, given the lack of planning that resulted in trucks being rerouted multiple times, and 
sometimes sitting idle for days, all while costs to the government were mounting. 
On September 16, NBC News reported that it had found trucks full of ice in locations 
such as Maryland, Missouri, Georgia, and Tennessee. Some of the trucks had been driving 
and/or sitting idle with their full loads for two weeks. One truck driver reported that he had 
begun his trip in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, traveled to Louisiana, then was sent to Georgia, but 
was rerouted to South Carolina, before being sent to Cumberland, Maryland. NBC News 
later reported that the truck was then sent to Iowa, where the ice was put into cold 
storage.22 The driver reported that this cost taxpayers at least an extra $9,000. When 
multiplied by hundreds of truckloads that also took circuitous routes to cold storage, the 
wasted taxpayer dollars begin to add up. 
Some of the ice shipped to cold-storage facilities around the country has already been 
used for other disasters. But one truckload ended up at the Reid Park Zoo in Tucson, 
Arizona, to be enjoyed by the polar bears and other animals. The truck driver who donated 
 155 
the ice to the zoo did so after traveling through 22 states without delivering a single bag of 
ice to hurricane victims. (Chapter 28– 4-5) 
 
Autre cas emblématique : les caravanes pour l’hébergement 
As part of its Individual Assistance Program, FEMA typically provides travel-trailers 
to house individuals whose homes have been badly damaged or destroyed while they 
rebuild or find alternate housing. When Hurricane Katrina hit, and FEMA realized the 
scope of temporary housing needs, the agency began buying all of the travel trailers it could 
find. Unfortunately, in this buying frenzy, FEMA purchased approximately $900 million 
worth of manufactured homes and modular homes that could not be used because FEMA’s 
own regulations do not allow for these types of homes to be placed in flood plains. 
Further, some of the homes purchased did not fit FEMA’s size standards. 
The Committee held a hearing on the manufactured housing in Hope, Arkansas on April 
21, 2006, and learned more about FEMA’s poor decisionmaking and wasteful spending. 
FEMA purchased 24,967 manufactured homes and 1,295 modular homes in response to 
the need for transitional housing to assist displaced evacuees. However, FEMA seemingly 
had no plans for how the homes would be used when the purchases were made. FEMA 
issued a mission assignment to the U.S. Forest Service to set up eight emergency storage 
sites, including one in Hope, Arkansas. To house some of the manufactured and modular 
homes, FEMA leased a staging area at the Hope Municipal Airport at a cost of $25,000 
per month – equivalent to a rent of $300,000 per year. The Committee learned that prior to 
the lease with FEMA, the City of Hope had rented the same site to a hay farmer for 
$5,000 per year.34 
As of the April hearing, there were 15,603 manufactured and modular homes as well as 
7,229 travel trailers staged at the eight emergency housing sites. While FEMA was able to 
use some of the homes in other disasters, and had plans for the use of an additional number 
of the homes, they still had no plan for thousands of manufactured and modular homes. 
The Committee learned that FEMA had already hired sales staff to sell the homes as 
surplus property if they are not eventually used,35 but typically this type of sale recoups 
only pennies on the dollar. The manufactured and modular homes purchased represent 
some of the most serious waste discovered to date. (Chapter 28– 6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
